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**AFTER THE PEACE AGREEMENT: LESSONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION FROM  
MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA, AND LIBERIA**

**A thesis presented by**

**Dorina Akosua Oduraa Bekoe**

**To**

**The Kennedy School of Government  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in the subject of Public Policy**

**Harvard University  
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**AFTER THE PEACE AGREEMENT: LESSONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION FROM  
MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA, AND LIBERIA**

**ABSTRACT**

**How do former adversaries in a civil war go about implementing a peace agreement? Recommendations for extensive power sharing arrangements and international intervention miss the crucial fact that the incremental process of implementing a peace agreement is costly to the former warring parties as concrete concessions must be made. This dissertation examines the method by which former warring parties navigate the fragile postaccord environment. The central argument is that the factions implement peace agreements in ways that do not place them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis each other. Conducting case study analyses of Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia, the dissertation argues that an implementation process advances when promises of political participation and demobilization are credible to each party. The notion of credibility is operationalized through the establishment of mutual political and military vulnerability. I find that in order for the implementation of a peace agreement to proceed, the factions must at once be able to advance their interests, protect themselves from adverse actions, and retaliate for any adverse actions. In this sense, the factions make themselves politically and militarily vulnerable to each other. Due to the incremental nature of implementation, in environments without institutions, the timing of actions, events, and concessions by the factions are critical to the establishment of mutual political and military vulnerability. As institutions form, their rules and vested interests affect the degree of political vulnerability. Affecting the timing of actions, events, and concessions and the institutional rules and vested interests are the international community's financial and diplomatic policies and the organizational structure of the factions.**



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All errors of omission and commission are my own.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AFL</b>	<b>Armed Forces of Liberia</b>
<b>AFL/Coalition</b>	<b>At the signing of the Abuja Accords this comprised the AFL, LDF, LPC, NPFL-CRC.</b>
<b>ECOMOG</b>	<b>ECOWAS Monitoring Group (the ECOMOG peacekeeping force)</b>
<b>ECOWAS</b>	<b>Economic Community of West African States</b>
<b>FALA</b>	<b>Unita's armed forces / Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola</b>
<b>FAPLA</b>	<b>Government's armed forces / Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola</b>
<b>FNLA</b>	<b>National Front for the Liberation of Angola / Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola</b>
<b>Frelimo</b>	<b>Frente da Libertação de Moçambique/Revolutionary Front of Mozambique</b>
<b>GURN</b>	<b>Government of National Unity and Reconciliation</b>
<b>IGNU</b>	<b>Interim Government of National Unity</b>
<b>INPFL</b>	<b>Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia</b>
<b>LDF</b>	<b>Lofa Defense Force</b>
<b>LNC</b>	<b>Liberian National Conference</b>
<b>LNTG</b>	<b>Liberian National Transitional Government</b>
<b>LPC</b>	<b>Liberian Peace Council</b>
<b>MPLA</b>	<b>Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola / Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola</b>
<b>MPRI</b>	<b>Military Profession Resources Incorporated</b>
<b>NPFL</b>	<b>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</b>
<b>NPFL-CRC</b>	<b>National Patriotic Front of Liberia - Central Revolutionary Council</b>
<b>NPRAG</b>	<b>National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government</b>
<b>ONUMOZ</b>	<b>United Nations Observer Mission in Mozambique</b>
<b>Renamo</b>	<b>Resistência Nacional de Moçambique/Mozambique National Resistance</b>
<b>RSS</b>	<b>Reintegration Support Scheme (for Mozambique)</b>
<b>ULIMO</b>	<b>United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia</b>
<b>ULIMO – J</b>	<b>United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (Roosevelt Johnson)</b>
<b>ULIMO – K</b>	<b>United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (Alhaji Kromah)</b>
<b>UNAVEM II/III</b>	<b>United Nations Verification Mission to Angola</b>

**UNITA**                    **Union for the Total Independence of Angola / União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola**

**UNOMIL**                **United National Observer Mission in Liberia**

**Key Personalities**

**Aldo Ajello**                                    **UN Special Representative for the Secretary General to Mozambique, 1992-1994.**

**Margaret Joan Anstee**                    **United Nations Special Representative for the Secretary General in Angola (1991-1993)**

**Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye**            **UN Special representative of the Secretary General to Angola, 1993-1998.**

**Joaquim Chissano**                         **President of Mozambique**

**Afonso Dhlakama**                         **Leader of Renamo**

**José Eduardo dos Santos**                **President of Angola**

**Trevor Gordon-Somers**                    **UN Special Representative to the Secretary General for Liberia, 1993-1995.**

**Paul Hare**                                     **United States Special Envoy for Angola, 1993-1998**

**Cameron Hume**                             **Deputy Chief of Mission to the Vatican, 1991-1994**

**Roosevelt Johnson**                        **Leader of ULIMO – J**

**Alhaji Kromah**                             **Leader of ULIMO – K**

**Jonas Savimbi**                              **President of UNITA**

**Luis Serapião**                              **Renamo's US representative until 1989**

**Charles Taylor**                            **President of Liberia, 1997 – present; Leader of NPLF**

**Ismael Valigy**                              **Former member of the government's delegation in the 1994 National Elections Commission**

**Matteo Zuppi**                                **Member of the Comunità di Sant'Egidio and a mediator for the Mozambique conflict**

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

### SECTION 1.1 INTRODUCTION

As many cases confirm, the signing of a peace agreement does not automatically bring peace. Indeed, it is not unusual for conflict to resume during the implementation of the peace agreement, as evidenced by the history of negotiated settlements: only fifty percent of all negotiated settlements survive past five years.<sup>1</sup> Reinforcing these findings, Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) show that the average peace lasted three and a half years (42 months) before conflict resumed.<sup>2</sup> In fact, in some studies, military victories have been shown to be more stable than negotiated settlements.<sup>3</sup> The puzzle surrounding these results has led to a large amount of research to uncover the reasons why combatants sign agreements in the first place, the institutions which best sustain peace, and the special role of the international community.<sup>4</sup> A smaller part of the literature deals specifically with a theory on the implementation of the peace accord.<sup>5</sup> Yet,

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<sup>1</sup> Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993." American Political Science Review . 89. 3, (September 1995): 685.

<sup>2</sup> Caroline Hartzell, Mathew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables" International Organization 55.11 (Winter 2001):195.

<sup>3</sup> Roy Licklider. "Early Returns: Results of the First Wave of Statistical Studies of Civil War Termination". Civil Wars, 1.3 (Autumn 1998): 125.

<sup>4</sup> On impetus for resolution, see for example: I. William Zartman, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts" in Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 20-34.; Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization, 51. 3 (Summer 1997): 335-364; On institutions for peace, see for example: Caroline A.Hartzell, "Explaining the stability of negotiated settlements to intrastate wars," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43. 1 (February 1999): 3-22; David Wippman, "Practical and Legal Constraints on Internal Power Sharing" in International Law and Ethnic Conflict, ed. David Wippman (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998): 211-241; On the international community, see for example: Fen Olser Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); Boutros Boutros-Ghali , An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping. "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January, 1992", (A/47/277-S/24111). 17 June 1992, [online database] <[www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html)> (cited September 2, 2000).

<sup>5</sup> See for example: Stephen John Stedman. Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers, (New York: International Peace Academy, May 2001), p. 16. [online database] <[www.ipacademy.org](http://www.ipacademy.org)> (cited on November 30, 2001), 16; Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar. Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2001). Note: I acknowledge that many works exist detailing individual cases. Here, I am

given the short time of peace experienced by many countries or the multiple peace accords necessary by some, it makes sense to focus more closely on understanding the process of implementing an accord.

The post-accord period is characteristically fragile – often held together with tenuous cease fire agreements. Even though parties have signed an accord, before implementation they have not concretely given up political or military positions. All political and military concessions remain to be fulfilled. Only once they start the implementation process, will the balance between the parties begin to shift. These changes, and the tensions that they cause, hold the potential to give rise to hostilities as faction leaders attempt not to place themselves at a disadvantage. In order to successfully complete the implementation of an accord and continue to create the institutions in the post-conflict world, the factions must somehow learn to manage conflict that arises between them. Unmanaged, such conflict can escalate, leading to a break down or stalling of the peace process. This dissertation examines the implementation of the peace agreements in Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia to determine which strategies advanced or stalled the process.

This dissertation develops a framework to evaluate the conditions that will prevent a peace agreement from unraveling. Through a focus on the key tasks required of the implementation period, the research attempts to bring an understanding to the reasons a faction leader or the faction members may choose to stall the implementation process, resume the conflict, or to continue to implement the peace accord. The thesis for the research is that factions and their leaders, who continually evaluate their military or political position with respect to the other factions, will only advance the implementation process if the level of military or political vulnerability is balanced.<sup>6</sup> In other words, given that the concessions offered in a peace

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referring to the absence of theories or frameworks to deal with implementation in an analytical rather than a narrative sense.

<sup>6</sup> The notion of balanced power can also be found in the literature on security dilemmas and causes of ethnic conflict. See the following: Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, "Civil War and the Security Dilemma", in Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder. (New York: Columbia

agreement entail some change in military or political vulnerability among the factions, only when the faction leaders do not feel unequally vulnerable, will the implementation process advance. More specifically, signatories to the peace accords deem others' promises for political and military concessions more credible if fulfilling them creates a degree of vulnerability to adverse actions by the other party. In contrast, concessions will not be deemed credible, if concurrently, a party retains or increases political or military influence.<sup>7</sup>

In sum, the central theme of this dissertation is that the creation of mutual political and military vulnerability among the parties makes promises for political reform and demobilization more credible. As such, parties are able to believe that commitments will be followed through and renegeing will incur penalties, making it more likely that all parties will follow through on commitments. Consequently, the implementation process proceeds, as promises are honored. The cases in this dissertation will be used to assess evidence of political and mutual vulnerability.

The main contribution of this research will be to bring more attention of the implementation period of a peace agreement. Implementing a peace agreement is often a difficult, tense time that normally receives attention only when things go badly wrong – such as a return to war. The recommendation for the post-agreement period draws on the conflict management literature by emphasizing broad participation in institutions for governance and adopting policies that promote moderation.<sup>8</sup> Yet, even these goals involve time and inter-party negotiations as

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University Press, 1999), 15-35; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict", International Security 21.2 (Fall 1996): 48-53.

<sup>7</sup> The literature on credibility, which will be reviewed in the theory section, draws the work of such scholars as Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Winston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic theory (New York : Oxford University Press, 1995); David M. Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole Game theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); Oliver E. Williamson. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (New York: The Free Press, 1985).

<sup>8</sup> Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism" International Security 22.2 (Fall 1997): 54-89; Barbara F. Walter. "Designing Transitions from Civil Wars: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace" International Security 24.1 (Summer 1999): 127-155; Hartzell (1999).

implementing them may give unforeseen advantages to one group over another. In fact, the tension may be such that the parties may not be able to form those institutions or may do so after much delay.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, even studies that do show that institutionalization of economic, territorial, or military provisions result in more stable settlements give no indications for how the parties arrived at that state.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the peace agreement cannot anticipate every contingency that may arise to stall the implementation of the agreed to provisions. Alternatively, many peace agreements may be vague.<sup>11</sup> In these cases, the implementation methods of the peace agreement become critical. For these reasons – the general absence of the topic in the literature, the possibility that some provisions may not materialize, the impossibility of anticipating all contingencies in the peace agreement, and the vagueness of some agreements – make it important to understand how the postaccord period can continue to bring the country closer to peace. In other words, how did the factions navigate through the implementation period? How were tensions mitigated or mismanaged?

In the next part of this section, I provide an overview of the literature on the implementation of peace agreements and negotiated settlements and information on the case selection, methodology, and data. In the last section, I outline the theory of mutual political and military vulnerability as determinants of successful implementation processes.

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<sup>9</sup> In El Salvador, the provisions of the peace accord were not fully implemented even five years after its signing; see the following as examples: On the fulfillment of land reform: Jack Spence, David R. Dye, Mike Lanchin, Geoff Thale, with George Vickers. Chapultepec: Five Years Later – El Salvador's Political Reality and Uncertain Future (Cambridge, MA: Hemisphere Initiatives, January 16, 1997), 35; On small business opportunities: Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (San Francisco: Westview Press) 1995.

<sup>10</sup> Hartzell (1999)

<sup>11</sup> A case in point is the settlement of the Nicaraguan civil war. Good summaries of the Nicaraguan civil war and settlement are found in: Cynthia Arnson, . Fitful Peace: Human Rights and Reconciliation in Nicaragua Under the Chamorro Government (Americas Watch Report), July 1991; Rose Spalding, "From Low-intensity War to Low-Intensity Peace: The Nicaraguan Peace Process" in Cynthia Arnson, ed. Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press) 1999.



## LITERATURE REVIEW

What options exist to sustain peace following a negotiated settlement? Generally, the existing literature places the onus on the international community to facilitate the implementation of a peace accord. Other work also cites the type of factions characterizing the conflict and the conflict management strategies employed. The complexity of a civil war settlement often requires several of these factors to be considered at once. However, I separate them for ease of discussion.

Given the history of conflict resolution, it is not unusual for much of the focus to lie on the role of the international community. The United Nations has led peacekeeping forces to maintain the peace since 1948. To date, the United Nations has deployed 54 peacekeeping operations.<sup>12</sup> Since the end of the cold war, the United Nations' resources have been in even higher demand. Between 1945 and 1987, the United Nations undertook 13 peacekeeping operations. However, it only took five years, 1987-1992, to undertake 13 peacekeeping operations, as the cold war began to come to an end.<sup>13</sup> Since 1992, the United Nations has organized 31 peacekeeping operations.<sup>14</sup>

The significance of the international community in the settlement of civil war has been well documented and promoted. The post-peace accord period began to receive increased importance with the 1992 publication of An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking,

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<sup>12</sup> United Nations. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations", Prepared by the United Nations Department of Public Information, Peace and Security Section, January 15, 2002. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf](http://www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf)> (cited on March 24, 2002); Diehl (1993) argues that earlier UN involvement in the form of the observers that were sent to Greece following the instability after World War II did not have the characteristics of traditional peacekeeping (26-28). For this reason, he cites the first peacekeeping operation as the 1956 mission to mitigate the crisis caused by the nationalization of the Suez Canal. [Paul F. Diehl. International Peacekeeping. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 26-31]

<sup>13</sup> Boutros-Ghali, para 47.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, "Current Peacekeeping Operations", Department of Public Information. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu\\_mission/body.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm)> (cited on March 24, 2002); United

and Peace-Keeping, by then-UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Like many of the works that followed it, Boutros-Ghali prescribed macro-level strategies for peace building. In particular, the focus lay on using the international community's organizations to invest in economic development, democracy, and demobilization and demilitarization.<sup>15</sup> Generally, the literature concludes that the greater or more involved the international community, the higher the probability for a successful negotiated settlement. Hampson (1996) asserts that third party involvement is crucial for a successful peace process by providing support through extensive participation in implementing the agreement.<sup>16</sup> Specifically, Hampson (1996) cited the involvement of the UN in activities such as demobilization, civil administration, political reform, and electoral monitoring.<sup>17</sup> In a related argument, de Soto and del Castillo (1994) advocate economic investment and coordination between different development agencies to solve military, economic, social, and environmental problems as the keys to successful implementation of peace accords.<sup>18</sup> Advancing a more pointed role for third parties, Walter (1997) states that the willingness and ability of a third party to forcefully enforce the peace will lead parties to sign agreements and subsequently, ensure stable settlements.

While it is true that frequently, the international community provides the impetus for negotiations and assists in the mediation to resolve the conflict, there are other events or under currents during the implementation process that push factions to concede positions in fulfillment of the peace accords. For example, the types of factions characterizing the civil conflict may hamper the work of the United Nations or other international organizations working to resolve the

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Nations, "Completed Peacekeeping Operations", Department of Public Information. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/co\\_miss.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/co_miss.htm)> (cited on March 24, 2002).

<sup>15</sup> Boutros-Ghali, paras 56-59.

<sup>16</sup> Hampson, 207; 221-223.

<sup>17</sup> Hampson 208.

<sup>18</sup> Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo. "Obstacles to Peacebuilding". *Foreign Policy*, 94, (Spring 1994): 7.

conflict. As Doyle and Sambanis (2000) find among their results for successful peace building strategies, the higher the degree of acceptance of the peace process among the factions the more positive the effect of international intervention.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, their results indicate that the number of groups may also impair the peacebuilding process.<sup>20</sup> In earlier work, Nordlinger (1972) emphasized that conflict regulation strategies call attention to the group leaders and the manner in which they interact with their groups.<sup>21</sup> Citing Dahrendorf, Nordlinger states that cohesive groups are the best vehicles to communicate efforts of conciliation and also to ensure the successful implementation of the agreements for conflict regulation reached by elites.<sup>22</sup> Thus, it is reasonable to inquire if the type of organization or the control of the faction leaders over their groups hindered or hampered the implementation of the peace accord.

Other studies attempt to predict the sustainability of peace by turning to the conflict management literature's prescriptions of creating power-sharing arrangements, such as governments of national unity, proportional representation, and territorial autonomy.<sup>23</sup> The intuition behind these inclusive strategies is clear: if all parties are able to participate in government the fighting should stop. In one of the few large-scale studies of these strategies, Harzell (1999) finds that the institutionalization of power sharing economic, political, and territorial, policies increases the possibility that the peace will last. In a more extensive study,

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<sup>19</sup> Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacbuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis", American Political Science Review, 94.4 (December 2000), 795.

<sup>20</sup> Doyle and Sambanis, 789

<sup>21</sup> Nordlinger, Eric A. Conflict regulation in divided societies (Cambridge, Mass. Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972), 41.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 74

<sup>23</sup> Some important works in the conflict management literature include: Donald L. Horowitz. Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (University of California Press: Berkeley, CA. 1985); Timothy D. Sisk Power sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); Arend Lijphart. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977; Arend Lijphart. "The Power-Sharing Approach" in Joseph Montville editor,

Hartzell et al (2001) reinforce the positive impact of the institutionalization of political reforms. In brief, such power-sharing strategies, like governments of national unity, proportional representation, and territorial autonomy offer the promise of political participation, some degree of self-determination, and sovereignty. For this reason, they are promoted as strategies for conflict resolution.

The work of the conflict management scholars has not gone unheeded. Several of these provisions are included in peace agreements, with a view to managing the post-agreement period. Yet, why do former warring factions cease to proceed with demobilization or a transitional government even when the peace agreement makes promises of political inclusion, proportional representation, and territorial autonomy as recommended by the conflict management literature? While Hartzell's (1999) conclusions are useful, they still do not answer the questions of why and how factions were able to stay the course during the implementation period or during other important features of the post-agreement period. For example, is the prospect of powersharing sufficient to ensure a successful implementation period? If so, why do some agreements containing such provisions fail? In a sample of 25 cases civil war settlements in 10 countries<sup>24</sup> the record of sustaining peace five years after the peace agreement was signed is mixed (see appendix 1-A). Notably, there is no clear relationship between the presence of inclusive strategies in the peace agreement and the presence of peace. Therefore, given the widely accepted notion of power sharing, this common way in which negotiators conceive of the post-conflict environment is not working.

The resumption of conflict despite the presence of power sharing strategies raises the question of whether the future promise of power sharing arrangements sufficed to push former warring parties to implement the provisions of the peace agreement. Or, were they driven by

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Conflict and peacemaking in multiethnic societies (Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, 1990): 491-510; Wippman (1998: 211-241).

other, more immediate factors? What factors hindered or advanced the peace process? Some work is beginning to develop on implementation processes. Notably, Stedman (1997) presents a typology of “spoilers” to the peace process and outlines the means by which the international community may minimize their damage.<sup>25</sup> Thus, a peace process can be successfully managed by international organizations correctly identifying and attending to the spoilers of the peace.<sup>26</sup> In other recent work more directly focused on implementation, Stedman (2001), presents the additional argument that the international community must focus closely on demobilization and reintegration to ensure successful implementation of a peace plan.<sup>27</sup> Attempting to account for existing conditions, Cousens and Kumar (2001) argue that in order for self-enforcing peace to occur, the international community must use the peacebuilding period to establish the “mechanisms by which a polity can resolve its rival claims”.<sup>28</sup> Cousens and Kumar (2001) claim the international community should work within the framework of the political environment of the post-conflict state to develop processes by which needs are addressed and institutions developed. Importantly, the international community must engage the local political community and thoroughly understand the political landscape.<sup>29</sup>

This recent work begins to draw out the details of an implementation process. Yet, the impetus for proceeding or the obstacles that stall the implementation remain unclear. In this dissertation, I contribute to the literature on implementation of peace agreements by articulating some of the reasons that may allow an implementation process to continue and those that hinder it. I examine the post accord period in Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia, by a step-by-step

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<sup>24</sup> The countries represent the post-cold war, centralist civil wars – wars for a change in the political space as opposed to session (Zartman.[1995],6-7). More on the case selection is discussed ahead.

<sup>25</sup> Stephen John Stedman. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Process”, International Security 22.2 (Fall 1997): 5-7.

<sup>26</sup> Stedman (1997), 52-53.

<sup>27</sup> Stedman (2001), 16).

<sup>28</sup> Cousens and Kumar, 12

analysis of the implementation of peace agreements and other milestones of a peace process, such as election planning. Through such analysis, I uncover the factors that advance, stall, or stop a peace process. By focusing on the implementation period, I draw attention to the reasoning conducted by the faction leaders in continuing or abandoning the peace process.

Such power sharing tactics as governments of national unity, proportional representation, and territorial autonomy do not always lead to peace because the implementation period breaks down due to the parties' inability to concede the promised political reforms or believe that promises for political reforms are credible. The case studies show that there is a gap between the macro-level political reform provisions of the peace agreements and the micro-level steps to obtain these provisions. Both levels are important. But during the implementation period, the macro-level provisions cannot be obtained if the process breaks down at the micro-level. For example, a macro-level task of the peace agreement may be demobilization, however, the micro-level decisions to implement it might include when and where to deploy observers or which party moves first. The fragile nature of an implementation of a peace process makes each step prone to conflict. For this reason, in many respects, the promises of power sharing may lie too far into the future for the resolution of conflict at early moments in the implementation process.<sup>30</sup>

The factions use the steps employed by each other during the implementation period and their subsequent level of vulnerability to determine the credibility of each other's promises of political reform and demobilization. In an environment without established institutions, the emphasis on the step-by-step process brings to the fore the timing of events, actions, and concessions offered by the parties. In other words, timing establishes vulnerability. As institutions begin to form, rules and vested interest affect vulnerability. The complexity of the implementation period contains the interactions of other factors. In particular, I consider the

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 183-188.

impact of the international community's financial and diplomatic policies and organizational structures of the factions.

## **CASE SELECTION, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA**

### ***Case Selection***

Generally, civil wars may be classified as centralist or regional. In a centralist civil war, the insurgents' goal is to increase political participation or access the means by which to influence policy. In a regional civil war, the goal is a struggle for secession or self-governance.<sup>31</sup> Because my study will focus on political reform, I choose cases in which the insurgents' goal is to change or expand the political space – centralist civil wars. Moreover, to minimize the effect of the cold war on civil wars, I have chosen cases from 1989 onward. Additionally, I use the increasingly standard five-year period to assess the sustainability of peace after an accord has been signed.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the cases I examine concluded peace accords no later than 1996.<sup>33</sup> A list of regional and centralist civil wars from 1989 is in Appendix 1-B. From the 10 centralist civil wars, I have chosen to trace the impact of the presence or absence of mutual vulnerability as an indicator of credible political reform and demobilization in the implementation periods of Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia.

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<sup>30</sup> This is not an unusual occurrence. In the context of legislative cooperation, Weingast and Marshall (1988: 139-143) discuss the difficulties encountered by representatives in contracting for votes, under the promise of future cooperation.

<sup>31</sup> I. William Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1995).

<sup>32</sup> The five year period is also used by Licklider (1995); Walter (1997); and Hartzell (1999) as the basis to categorize if a country has returned to war or maintained peace.

<sup>33</sup> I have chosen 1996 because the case selection was conducted in 2001.

### ***Choosing from centralist civil war cases***

From Table 1.1, the 10 countries that experienced centralist civil wars may be placed in three categories: protracted cases, unexpected cases, and expected cases. The protracted cases describe countries that undertook several peace accords. These are useful to analyze because they offer an opportunity to compare different degrees of vulnerabilities and political reforms. Unexpected cases, as the name implies, had low or no power sharing arrangements, yet did not return to conflict (or vice versa) – contrary to recommended practices. Expected cases represent countries that had power sharing arrangements and did not experience a return to conflict (or vice versa). The dissertation will use the cases of Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia to determine the extent that credible political reform, a function of political and military vulnerability, succeeds in minimizing or settling political instability during the implementation of the peace accord. As a group, the three cases show variation of time and space.

**Table 1.1 Categorizing Outcomes in Centralist Civil Wars<sup>34</sup>**

<b>Protracted Cases</b>	<b>Unexpected Cases</b>	<b>Expected Cases</b>
Liberia	Cambodia	Chad
Sierra Leone	Mozambique	South Africa
Nicaragua	El Salvador	Angola I
	Angola II	
	Guatemala	

#### ***Mozambique***

The implementation of 1992 General Agreement for Peace, which ended the 16-year Mozambican civil war, culminated in the 1994 General Elections. Managed by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, the Mozambican settlement has been widely hailed as a success. Since the 1992 peace accord, civil war has not resumed in Mozambique. Following the first elections in 1994, Mozambique has held two other elections, with varying levels of political instability. Nonetheless, today, Renamo, the former insurgents, participate in parliament with the

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<sup>34</sup> Sources on these cases are listed in Appendix one.



government's Frelimo party. The process of the implementation of the General Agreement for Peace and the management of the elections hold lessons for navigating the post-agreement period.<sup>35</sup>

Mozambique's successful peace settlement provides a surprising result, as the peace accord in Mozambique does not contain provisions for the power sharing strategies of a government of national unity or territorial autonomy.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, it provides an opportunity to examine what other factors were at work in the settlement of the Mozambican civil war. I examine the implementation period of the peace accord (1992-1994) and the planning of the three elections (1994, 1998, and 1999).

### *Angola*

Angola is the opposite of Mozambique. Angola's two peace agreements that I examine, the 1990 Bicesse Accord and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, which attempted to end the civil war that began in 1975, were unable to settle the civil war. Like in Mozambique, the United Nations conducted the mediation and management of the implementation of the accord. After the 1990 Bicesse Accord, war resumed shortly after it was announced that the insurgents, UNITA, would not win the presidential elections and a run-off was necessary. While the Bicesse Accord contains some generally agreed upon flaws, the Lusaka Protocol was widely viewed as not only an improvement, but as a more robust accord. In 1994 the Lusaka Protocol also offered hope that the civil war would end. Unlike the 1990 Bicesse Accord, the 1994 Lusaka Protocol contained the power sharing prescriptions of a government of national unity or territorial autonomy. Yet, in

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<sup>35</sup> Good summaries of Mozambique's implementation process may be found in: Cameron Hume. Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices, (Washington, DC: USIP, 1994); Richard Syngé. Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action: 1992-1994. (Washington, DC: USIP, 1997); Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, and Alex Vines. "The Mozambique Peace Process in Perspective", Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, 3 (London: UK, Conciliation Resources, 1998).

<sup>36</sup> Power sharing and territorial autonomy can serve to manage conflict. See: Lijphart (1977, 1990); Horowitz (1985). Sisk (1996).

1998, war resumed in Angola.<sup>37</sup> Again, because of the unexpected result, the case offers opportunities to explore the other factors impeding peace in Angola. I examine the implementation of the two peace accords until the resumption of war (1990-1992 and 1994-1998).

### *Liberia*

Liberia differs from Mozambique and Angola in some important respects. Firstly, rather than one significant peace accord, the settlement of Liberia's civil war, which began in 1989, required 14 peace accords. Unlike the other cases, Liberia was also characterized by the proliferation of factions throughout the war; eight warring factions signed the last accord. Finally, unlike the other cases, the United Nations did not play a prominent role in the mediation and management of the implementation of the accords. Rather, this task fell to the Economic Community of West African States.<sup>38</sup> While Liberia does not have civil war today, it is not an unqualified success; since the signing of the last peace accord in 1996, which culminated in the 1997 presidential election, Liberia's peace has been fragile.

Liberia's peace accords provide unique insight to the incremental process of the implementation of a peace accord. Additionally, conflict resumed several times during the implementation periods – providing more information on the determinants and the hindrances to political stability. I examine the periods of peace and war in the seven-year civil war in Liberia (1989-1996) and the implementation of its last accord (1997).

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<sup>37</sup> Good summaries of the Angola's implementation process may be found in: Margaret Joan Anstee. Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Paul J. Hare. Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998); Tony Hodges. Angola From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001).

<sup>38</sup> Good summaries of the Liberian implementation period may be found in: Jeremy Armon and Andy Carl, editors. "The Liberian Peace Process: 1990-1996", Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives 3 (London: UK, Conciliation Resources, 1996); Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War (London: Hurst and Company, 1999);

## ***Methodology***

An in-depth case study of a few countries proves to be the best way to observe the mechanisms through which mutual vulnerability determines compliance with the peace agreements. The large-n studies lose the level of detail regarding actions by the government and insurgents that I wish to expose. For the analysis, I use the case study methodologies of controlled comparison and process tracing. Respectively, these methodologies permit me to compare events between countries and within countries.<sup>39</sup> Controlled comparison could highlight, for example, how different environmental or political factors succeeded in producing similar events under different circumstances; I am able to compare across cases. On the other hand, with process tracing I may examine how different leaders or actions exhibited varying degrees of vulnerability or how different responses were elicited from former insurgents by different strategies. Process tracing is most useful when changes within the country occur or when a process undergoes several iterations. Through process tracing and controlled comparison, I am able to determine the impact of certain events or actions on the level of vulnerability felt by the factions and their leaders. Equally important, process tracing will help to increase the number of observations – a critical factor in any small-n study.

## ***Data***

Data on implementation periods is obtained from primary and secondary sources. Details of the proposed political and military promises are obtained from the peace agreements and other subsequent accords made during the implementation period. To analyze the implementation period, I use published accounts from entities such as the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States, other international organizations, American and foreign

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Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay, and 'Funmi Olonisakin, Peacekeepers, politicians, and warlords: The Liberian Peace Process (New York: United Nations University Press, 1999).

governments, and news databases such as Lexis-Nexis and the Foreign Bureau Information Service. Additionally, I include interviews with some key participants involved in the meditation, implementation, or other aspects of the civil war and peace process.

## **SECTION 1.2 CONSTRUCTING A THEORY OF A SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS**

### **The Central Argument**

In the context of an implementation process, a promise for reform and demobilization becomes credible if concurrent actions are taken that make it politically or militarily costly to renege – hence rendering one party vulnerable to the other. In this way, the party keeping its promises gives the other party tools to use against it should it renege. Thus, a peace agreement that usually contains concessions by one party in exchange for another's concessions, may be deemed as advancing credible political reform and demobilization depending on the vulnerability to adverse actions caused by the concessions. Specifically, renegeing on the concessions must result in penalties; as such they restrict actions.<sup>40</sup> These are the macro-level provisions contained in the peace accord. The fulfillment of these provisions occurs differently in environments with non-existent institutions versus those with institutions.

In an environment without institutions, implementation occurs in a step-by-step process that is also advanced by concessions by each party. As the parties advance through the implementation stage, they evaluate the credibility of the others' promise for reform through the mutual political and military vulnerabilities that are created with each step. Due to the step-by-step nature of implementing a peace agreement, the timing of events, concessions, and other actions by the factions are the critical factors in the creation of mutual political and military

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<sup>39</sup> For more on these two techniques see Stephen Van Evera Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997): 56-67.

<sup>40</sup> For more on how action are restricted and punishments occur after defections see: Robert M. Axelrod, The evolution of cooperation (New York: Penguin Books, 1990); Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott,

vulnerability. The case studies bear out that implementation processes advanced where the timing of events created mutually vulnerable situations. Whereas, without mutual vulnerability, the implementation processes stalled or there was a resumption of conflict.

Granted that institutionalization of government structures are more prominent after the accord has been implemented and the country moves on to more “normal” politics, the formation of such institutions can occur during the implementation period. This is particularly true when a country creates structures to plan for elections or for a transitional government, such as occurred in Liberia and Mozambique. As some parts of the implementation process require institutions, I consider the role of institutional decision-making rules and the vested interests that support those rules on the generation of mutual political vulnerability. Rules and vested interests sustain institutions and provide the decision-makers with expectations of certain responses<sup>41</sup>; as such, they can affect the political and military vulnerabilities felt by the warring parties. Some institutions are more viable than others and subsequently affect the implementation process differently. The focus here is not on how effective the same institutions have been across countries, but how the rules and vested interests that define an institutions can keep it going or stall its progress. Here too, I find that rules that created mutual political vulnerability between the parties were able to more successfully stave of political instability than those that did not do so.

The implementation of the peace accords provisions does not occur in a vacuum. In particular, the international community and the organizational structure of the factions interact with the timing of events, concessions, and actions of the factions that affect mutual political and military vulnerabilities between the parties. Firstly, I consider the international community, given its substantial influence of in mediating conflicts and financing peace-building efforts. Secondly, I account for the structure the factions – the number and degree of cohesion within the groups.

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<sup>41</sup>“Rules, rather than discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”. *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 85, No. 3. (Jun., 1977), pp. 473-492; Williamson (1985); Fudenberg and Tirole (1991);

Hence, two levels exist in the implementation of a peace accord. The first level refers to the actual provisions of an accord. For example, it contains how or if power will be shared, when demobilization will occur, or how the country will be administered. In order for the implementation of these provisions to begin, they must place the parties in mutually vulnerable political or military positions – these make the provisions credible promises of political reform and demobilization. The second level describes the actual implementation of the peace agreement. Like the first level, this is also dependent on the creation of mutual political and military vulnerability. Due to the incremental nature of implementing a provision, political and military vulnerability depends on the timing of events, concessions, and the actions of the factions. In other words, the context is important. Accordingly, the timing is affected by the external environment – the international community’s financial contributions, diplomatic pressure, and degree of consensus regarding the peace process and its requirements – and the internal environment – the degree of cohesiveness of the factions and the number of factions.<sup>42</sup> In the formation of institutions, rules and vested interests replace timing. The box below summarizes the argument.

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
<sup>41</sup> Douglass C North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3-6

<sup>42</sup> Stedman (2001: 10) writes that the presence of several factions make implementation difficult because balance of power shifts more frequently, the factions’ strategies are more erratic, and coalitions change often.



**Box 1.1 Mutual vulnerabilities and the implementation of a peace accord**

**Conditions for a Successful Implementation**



*Level 1: The Peace Accord*



*Level 2: The Implementation Period – [No institution building]*



*Institutional Development*



In sum, I will first identify the general provisions in each peace accord to determine if the concessions offered create mutually vulnerable political and military situations. Next, I will examine how the implementation process affected each party's sense of mutual vulnerability through the impact of the timing of events, the international actors, the organizational cohesion of the factions, the interaction of the factions with each other, and the rules and vested interests of the institutions created.

### **Developing Vulnerability**

Understanding that peace agreements generally call for political reform, which comprises political inclusion and demobilization, my analysis begins with the basic assumption that at the outset, warring factions do not trust each other to follow through on promised concessions even after an accord has been signed. In the time following a settlement, I surmise that the parties essentially contemplate: what is the likelihood that the adversary will follow through on promises of political reform? Thus, if there is sufficient reason for a faction to believe that the other party will renege on agreements, it will re-ignite the conflict.<sup>43</sup> The task then becomes how to convey to the former insurgents that they will obtain sufficient political power to positively affect their groups and that the government will demobilize. Analogously, the government must feel assured that increasing political access maintains some of its political power,<sup>44</sup> and that the former insurgents will demobilize. In this dissertation, I examine the methods by which warring factions convey their commitments to the political reforms of demobilization and political inclusiveness. In other words, I evaluate the credibility of promised political reform and demobilization.

Drawing on the work of Williamson (1985) and Schelling (1980), I suggest that in order for signatories to a peace agreement to follow through on provisions they must somehow not only

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<sup>43</sup> This assumption is similar to that found in the literature discussing the security fears of factions: Synder and Jervis (1999); Hartzell (1999).



feel constrained to do so because of possible negative repercussions for renegeing, but also because the other parties will suffer negative repercussions as well for renegeing on promises. Namely, both sides find themselves mutually vulnerable. When this balance is upset or asymmetrical –for instance, one party may take actions to diminish its vulnerability – there is a break down in the peace process. Alternatively, the maintenance of this balance allows the peace process to advance. The presence of mutual vulnerabilities therefore determines the credibility of political reform – which is, defined here as political participation and demobilization. Specifically, it relies on the notion that, in addition to providing access to the political space and incentives for demobilization, the tasks required of each party must be costly (by means of creating vulnerability to adverse actions) in order to convey credibility of promises.

The concept of credibility is informed by the contracts and game theory literature.<sup>45</sup> The economic literature on contracts discusses costly behavior as a way of creating behavior-constraining mechanisms. In other words, the signatories to the contract hold themselves “hostage”<sup>46</sup> to a particular commitment by accepting certain conditions. By creating such constraints, parties to an agreement form expectations of responses and, hence, decrease the chance of a party acting adversely toward another. Specifically, Williamson (1985), echoing Schelling (1980), discusses that the components of bilateral agreements require the creation of a “mutual reliance relation”.<sup>47</sup>

Williamson (1985) discusses the rationality of *rival* firms entering into a bilateral contract. Rival firms will choose to enter into a bilateral contract when it decreases the market risk to which each are exposed. Because of the low probability of such a partnership, rival firms will choose to enter into a bilateral relationship – one in which inputs are reciprocally exchanged,

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<sup>44</sup> Zartman (1993: 20-34) also recognizes this asymmetry of goals.

<sup>45</sup> Examples include: Axelrod (1990); Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).

<sup>46</sup> The term “hostage” is used by Williamson (1985),169.

for example – when they can be sure that the other will not renege on the agreement. Should one firm renege, the other firm can only dispose of the supplies at below market prices, since they were specifically targeted for the rival firm.<sup>48</sup> Thus, bilateral contracts are secured when each firm commits to producing an input for a large amount of a specific product. In so doing, each firm is bound to remain in the contract with the other. Additional security guarantees may also be put in place to guard against the cancellation of the contract: one firm may require an advance payment of the supplies. However, such a requirement would risk that the product will never be fully supplied because the money has been already received. Williamson argues that this second danger will not occur if both firms require specific goods from each other. Only then, when each firm is mutually vulnerable to costs for renegeing, are contracts honored.<sup>49</sup> The existence of such a “mutual reliance relation” ensures that agreements survive because of reciprocity of actions.<sup>50</sup>

Schelling (1980) provides another example in which agents seek to limit their chances of renegeing on promises by creating mutual dependency. In Schelling’s example, a strategy to avoid war may be for both sides to give up defensive weapons so that their entire populations are at risk or “held hostage”.<sup>51</sup> In this act of mutual deterrence, it is not in either party’s interest to begin a war; agreements to prevent conflict may then stand.

Agreements between governments and insurgent groups are analogous to contracts between rival firms, discussed by Williamson, or foreign enemies discussed by Schelling. For example, Bates (1991) in describing the political arrangement during the post-independence period in Zimbabwe points out that such a system of dependency developed. Rather than the preferred centralized state, black Zimbabweans provided political and economic rights to white Zimbabweans to ensure that white Zimbabweans, who controlled the economic power, would not

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<sup>47</sup> This term appears in Williamson (1985: 190)

<sup>48</sup> Williamson, 193-195.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 194-195.

<sup>50</sup> Williamson, 190; see also Axelrod (1990).

retaliate by damaging the country economically.<sup>52</sup> Hence, in cases that strive to ensure that a party does not renege on an agreement, incentives, through punishments and rewards, must be in place. Cooperation then is ensured through negative or positive reinforcement.

### ***Cooperation is Better than Unilateral Action***

Underlying the quest to produce reciprocal actions is the notion that cooperation produces a better result than unilateral action. The fragile nature of the post-conflict environment suggests that the former warring parties, reluctant to concede to each other, will punish defections from cooperation by failing to cooperate as well. As a result, in a game where defections are only punished by defections, knowing that future actions matter makes cooperation more valuable than a string of punishments. This outcome is illustrated by a version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game.<sup>53</sup> In a classic prisoner's dilemma, a player may gain in the short run from defecting. However, in the long run this is probably not a good strategy, as the player will reap a string of punishments,<sup>54</sup> as illustrated by Figure 1.1.

In Figure 1.1, the payoffs are shown first for the government and then for the insurgents (Government, Insurgents). In the context of the implementation of a peace agreement, if the government complies with the agreement, the insurgents gain by renegeing. If the government reneges on the agreement, the insurgents once more gain by renegeing. No matter what strategy the government uses, the insurgents are better off renegeing. When the insurgents renege, the government is better off renegeing, as well.

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<sup>51</sup> Schelling, 136

<sup>52</sup> Robert H. Bates, "The Economics of Transition to Democracy", PS: Political Science and Politics 24.1 (March 1991), 25 [24-27].

<sup>53</sup> See Axelrod (1990) for a clear review of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

**Figure 1.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma**

		<b>Insurgents</b>	
		<b>Comply</b>	<b>Reneg</b>
<b>Government</b>	<b>Comply</b>	5,5	-2,7
	<b>Reneg</b>	7, -2	<b>-1, -1</b>

The outcome of (renege, renege) with a payoff of (-1, -1) is a worse outcome for both players because they could be better off by complying with agreements – i.e. choosing (comply, comply) for a payoff of (5,5). Figure 1.1 shows that due to each player's desire to maximize his outcomes from agreements, they choose strategies that make the other player worse off. Thus, although the dominant strategy for the government and the insurgents is to renege -- both can be better off if they were to comply. With respect to peace agreements, compliance with agreed to provisions occur in environments either with or without institutions. Below, I discuss the means by which compliance can occur in these two settings.

***Compliance without institutions***

The reason the prisoner's dilemma produces a value of (renege, renege) is because it is only played once. But what if it is played several times? The players either have the choice of obtaining payoffs of (-1, -1) for an infinite number of times or they can cooperate for an infinite number of times. As a result of many interactions, the future become valuable, making cooperation more likely.<sup>55</sup> Axelrod (1990) emphasizes that players make their moves based on the expectation of how and when the other player will react. Importantly, it is the promised interaction between the players that makes previous and anticipated future moves important for

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<sup>54</sup> Kreps, Chapter 14.

<sup>55</sup> Axelrod (1990); Mas-Colell, Winston, and Green (1995); Fudenberg and Tirole (1991); and Kreps (1990) on repeated games.

the present.<sup>56</sup> Another way to understand this concept is that players continually evaluate their position in light of the previous move made by the other player. Within the context of an implementation, it suggests that the timing of the move is important.

### Timing of Moves

As suggested by the literature, in a state of weak or non-existent institutions, actors do not have rules by which to predict outcomes, rather, they look to overt actions. Weingast and Marshall (1988) distinguish between actions and reactions for government policy makers being managed by repeated play and reputations versus those being constrained by rules, norms and procedures that are obtained through institutions. In a discussion of legislative institutions, Weingast and Marshall claim that institutionalization is the difference between having to renegotiate a political move each time it is made (a costly and time consuming endeavor) to understanding which response options are available to the actors.<sup>57</sup> Due to the need for renegotiation each time a political move is made, the timing of actions becomes very important. In one example of timing, de Klerk writes that in order to ensure that the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) did not carry out its threat to boycott the elections, just days before the voting, the National Party (NP) traded its assigned spot on the ballot sheet (the bottom box) to the IFP, for another position. Notably, throughout the electoral campaign, the National Party had built its election advertisements around its previous position on the ballot sheet.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Axelrod, "Chapter 1: The Problem of Cooperation", but see especially, page 21; Additionally see, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Chapter 5: "Repeated Games", 145-206; Kreps (1990), Chapter 14: "Repeated Play: Cooperation and Reputation", 503-550. Also useful is: Mas-Colell, Winston, and Green (1995), Chapter 9: "Dynamic Games", 267-305.

<sup>57</sup> Weingast and Marshall. (1988):157.

<sup>58</sup> F.W. de Klerk The Last Trek – A New Beginning: The Autobiography (London: Pan Books – Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 2000), 327

I hypothesize that parties continually re-assess their vulnerability in light of their present positions and by the actions recently taken by other factions. The consideration of timing gives rise to the first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** The implementation of the peace accord may stall if concessions that create mutual political and military vulnerability do not occur concurrently.

### ***Compliance with institutions***

The standards for peace without institutions are quite high and require that cooperation be returned with cooperation. However, in the flux of political life, this is not always the case. At times, cooperation is not returned by cooperation. Yet, this does not always result in war.<sup>59</sup> Charges of fraud at the ballot box or instances of governance where not all the political parties are equally represented do not always dissolve into civil conflict. For an explanation of these developments, it is necessary to look to how, in the long run, political reform can stem renewed conflict. For sustained peace, political parties must be able to weather the inevitable slights and losses that come with political interaction. The uncertainty that drives the factions during the period of conflict must be replaced by an expectation of stability and certainty in the ability to participate politically.

Institutionalization has been shown to facilitate long-term political planning or economic investment. As Bates (1996) points out, while market places are everywhere, industrialization, which requires a larger amount of investment, time, and trust between partners, is not.<sup>60</sup> Rather, it is the presence of institutions that brings the necessary predictability and stability to economic transactions that engender industrialization by reassuring investors that their large, lumpy, one-

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<sup>59</sup> Hartzell and Rothchild (1997) define a stable political pact in this way: “[P]act [are] stable when their institutions provide for successful conflict management and when the defection of exclusion from the pact of a major groups leader does not result in a renewed outbreak of hostilities” (154).

<sup>60</sup> Robert H Bates, “Institutions as Investments” Development Discussion Paper, no. 527. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1996), 10-11.

time investments will be used as promised. As a result, the investor does not feel that the agent will take the money and renege on their agreement. The presence of institutions provides incentives for the agent to follow through on promises and provides incentives to both the investor and the agent to see the project succeed.<sup>61</sup> In this way, institutionalization “[transforms] the structure of ownership.”<sup>62</sup>

### *Rules and Vested Interests*

The presence of rules and vested interests sustain institutions and lie behind their persistence.<sup>63</sup> Indeed, North (1990) writes that rules and vested interests in an institution can establish a type of path dependence that makes change ever more difficult.<sup>64</sup> The presence of rules helps to make certain (but not all) political and economic exchanges easier.<sup>65</sup> Assuming that these exchanges are beneficial, the cost of subverting the rules is the prevention of the exchanges. Thus the rules are adhered to and the institution persists in order to preserve the benefits.<sup>66</sup>

Additionally, beneficial exchanges create a loyal customer base. As Hirschman (1970) argues, loyal customers choose to remain with an organization or comply with a set of institutional rules, versus choosing to exit. Loyal consumers develop vested interests in the

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<sup>61</sup> Bates (1996) esp. pages 15, 18, 22

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, (1996), 15

<sup>63</sup> see Robert H Bates, “The International Coffee Organization: An International Institution” in Analytic Narratives ed. Bates, et al. (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1998), 194-230; Philip A. Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A sociological interpretation 1957; Albert O. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970); Max Weber, “The Protestant Sect and the Spirit of Capitalism” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology editors and translators H.H. Gerth and C., Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946); North (1990); Selznick (1957)

<sup>64</sup> North, 99

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 46-7

entity and will take actions to ensure its endurance.<sup>67</sup> Max Weber (1946), normally cited for his contribution to understanding bureaucracy, also contributes to the understanding of cooperative behavior. Specifically, Weber shows that people within institutions follow rules because of the positive benefits that accrue to them for doing so. In “The Protestant sect and the Spirit of Capitalism”, the members of the sects, by association, are preferred business associates. Not only does their membership imply that they are upstanding citizens, but it also says that should a business member default, the sect would be able to ensure the payments to the creditors.<sup>68</sup> More importantly, writes Weber, a sect member is perceived as less likely to default because only the most “morally *qualified* beyond doubt” were admitted to the group.<sup>69</sup> Sect membership requires periodic demonstrations of high moral standards. In turn, by retaining their good standing, they gain the benefits of being trustworthy.<sup>70</sup> In sum, institutions with rules that promote beneficial exchanges in turn create loyal customers who develop vested interests in their persistence.<sup>71</sup>

In order for peace to endure, then, institutions that create vested interests in the peace accords provisions should develop. The literature identifies three broad types of institutions: elections, administrative, and public policy / redistributive tactics.<sup>72</sup> Within the context of conflict

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 47

<sup>67</sup> See: Barbara Geddes, “Initiation of New Democratic Institutions in Eastern Europe and Latin America” in Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America, ed. Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Timothy Frye, “A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies” Comparative Political Studies, 30. 5 (October 1997):. 523-552; for a discussion on the role of political preferences in institutional choice. Also, March and Olsen (1984: 734-747) discuss the rise of the “new institutionalism” and the role played by political interests in designing institutions. See Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997: 515-529) on how international pressure can affect states’ internal decisions.

<sup>68</sup> Weber, 305

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, 305

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, 320-321.

<sup>71</sup> See for example: North (1990), Selznick (1957), Bates (1996; 1998)

<sup>72</sup> see Power, Timothy J. and Mark J. Gasiorowski. “Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World” Comparative Political Studies 30. 3 (April 1997): 123-155; I. William. Zartman,



management and settlement stability, these institutions allow the minorities or the losing faction to have access to government. In the case studies, I focus on elections and administrative organizations in the post-conflict environment, when such institutions exist.<sup>73</sup>

### Electoral Rules

Electoral institutions determine who will govern and provide information on the opportunities for different groups to govern. Electoral *rules*, and the vested interests that support those rules, cover a range of issues – from how the electoral process will be organized to how winners will be selected. Each step holds the possibility for political participation and political concessions. Majoritarian systems are criticized for their possibility of continually marginalizing minorities and, therefore, may not provide the incentives or accommodation to minorities to forgo violent responses to grievances. Alternatively, many see proportional representation as a means of accommodating groups following a settlement because it allows the various parties to have an opportunity to govern.<sup>74</sup> Opportunities for political influence may appear in smaller steps as well – such as in deciding the election date or membership in the elections commission. As a result, the rules that govern the formation of these institutions can render parties vulnerable to each other for adverse political outcomes. The existence of mutual vulnerability will most likely result in political stability, while asymmetric vulnerability may not. For example, even before the results of Cambodia's majoritarian elections were announced, the losing parties began to form power-

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**"Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again" in The International Spiral of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ 1998); Frank S. Cohen, "Proportional versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies" Comparative Political Studies, 30.5, (October 1997): 607-630; Hartzell (1999); Hartzell et al (2001) , Sisk (1996), Horowitz (1985), Geddes (1996);**

<sup>73</sup> see Horowitz (1985, 1990); Cohen (1997); Geddes (1996) and Power and Gasiorowki (1997) for a discussion of different electoral and administrative systems).

<sup>74</sup> See Horowitz (1985), 628-33; Nordlinger (1972), Sisk (1996); Cohen (1997). for more on electoral rules.

sharing coalitions, to ensure the possibility of some political participation.<sup>75</sup> The consideration of electoral rules as a mean for political participation offers another hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2: Electoral rules and their vested interests affect the establishment of mutual political vulnerability through the available avenues for political influence.**

### **Administrative Policies**

Administrative solutions re-arrange the relationship of governing entities to its constituents and can also be institutionalized to manage conflict. In general, this involves the degree of control the center holds over the rest of the country. These political arrangements range from a very centralized to a decentralized system of governing. The more decentralized the system, the more power that provinces or states within a country have. The results provided by Hartzell (1999) and Hartzell et al, (2001) do show that institutionalizing territorial arrangements result in a stable settlement. The arguments in favor of decentralization are that it provides decision-making power to ethnic groups that might be concentrated in certain parts of the country, but do not necessarily hold national governing power.<sup>76</sup> Territorial arrangements may range from the semi-autonomous states of the South Africa's KwaZulu Natal<sup>77</sup> and other states sharing a common language and culture<sup>78</sup>, or the 'development poles' created by the Nicaraguan government for both the contra and sandinistas guerrillas where they could access health care, employment, and housing.<sup>79</sup> Each arrangement provides varied opportunities for political participation, and different benefits and costs for the government and the insurgents.

Administrative rules also reflect the political power that may be centrally shared. As a result, a

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<sup>75</sup> Michael W. Doyle. UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate . Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, 72; William Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Contemporary Issues, paper #1, 1994, 25

<sup>76</sup> See Horowitz (1985); Sisk (1996); Zartman (1998); Cohen (1997) for more on administrative rules.

<sup>77</sup> De Klerk, 327

<sup>78</sup> Nelson Mandela. Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 536.

group's vulnerability to adverse political policies is also varied. I hypothesize that such differences have an effect on political stability.

**Hypothesis 3: Administrative rules and vested interests can affect the establishment of mutual political and military vulnerabilities through the relative changes in political control of certain groups**

Institutions are important in the post-conflict political environment because they provide an expectation for how people respond to each other in instances of threat or grievance; they “define and limit the set of choices available to individuals”.<sup>80</sup> Since the rules and vested interests governing the institutionalization of political reforms can affect the payoffs for complying with agreements, they thereby affect the degree of vulnerability the parties feel toward each other.

#### *Other Inducements for Cooperation*

The above examples imply that rules are followed and the timing of moves are conducted in isolation – governed by the principle that defections will be punished. While Axelrod's work concludes that a strict strategy of punishing every defection (TIT for TAT) produces the best chance for cooperation, it is not the only strategy. For example, players can also use a strategy that only punishes after two defections. While this is a more forgiving strategy, it is harder to establish cooperation because of the chance it gives players to defect.<sup>81</sup> Adopting this to the present study, then, depending on the penalty, governments and insurgents may not see it in their best interest to cooperate all the time. Given the structure of the game in Figure 1.1, just the timing of the actions may not be enough to encourage cooperation at the beginning. Plausibly, factions may test each other by trying to defect from time to time. Thus actions and concessions by parties may not occur in isolation. Here, I consider two factors that help to change the payoffs

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<sup>79</sup> Spalding (1999)

<sup>80</sup> North, 4

of the dilemma faced by the signatories to the peace agreements in order to create a “mutual reliance relation” to induce compliance. Figures 1.2a and 1.3 show two additional ways in which compliance may be encouraged. The payoffs are listed first for the government and second for the insurgents (Government, Insurgents).

		Insurgents	
		Comply	Reneg
Government	Comply	<u>5</u> , <u>5</u>	<u>-12</u> , 4
	Reneg	4, <u>-12</u>	<u>-10</u> , <u>-10</u>

		Insurgents	
		Comply	Reneg
Government	Comply	<u>10</u> , <u>10</u>	<u>1</u> , 7
	Reneg	7, <u>1</u>	-1, -1

In figure 1.2, the penalty for renegeing is increased to a large amount, but the gains for cooperation are not changed. In figure 1.2, when the government complies, the insurgents are better off complying. But when the government reneges, the insurgents are better off renegeing as well (the result is the same when the insurgents choose first to comply or renege). Unlike in figure 1.1, there is no dominant strategy; rather, the outcome is a mixed strategy.<sup>82</sup> The strategy employed by the insurgents depends on that observed by the government. The goal becomes to increase the probability that the government or the insurgents will comply. In figure 1.3, the gains for cooperation are increased while the penalty for renegeing stays the same. In this case, the dominant strategy is to comply.

In the case of figures 1.2 and 1.3, intervening variables may induce cooperation when it is not a clear choice as in figure 1.2 or increase the gains of cooperation, as in figure 1.3. The literature points to two variables that may help induce cooperation or increase the gains of cooperation: the international community and the degree of cohesion in the factions.

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<sup>81</sup> Axelrod, 150-154.

### International community

Many scholars have examined the role of the international community as often, external intervention on behalf of the warring parties may affect the course of the war or peace process.<sup>83</sup> As stated earlier, Walter (1997), Hampson (1996), Stedman (1997) and Cousens and Kumar (2001) see positive, effective roles for the international community. Issuing a cautionary note, Stedman (2001) points out that compliance with the provisions of the accord may weaken in the presence of a divided or unfavorably biased international community.<sup>84</sup> In this project, I examine the impact that the international community has, via financial contributions and diplomatic policy, on the presence of mutual vulnerability, through its impact on the timing of events, concessions and actions of the factions. Specifically, I consider the monetary or diplomatic benefits the international community may bring for complying with or reneging on agreed provisions, and therefore, on the implementation of the peace accord's provisions.

An example of the role played by the international community's financial contribution to the implementation may be the funding of humanitarian appeals that the UN sends out to request funds for demobilization and integration programs. Indeed, Stedman (2001) argues that the international community could speed up or assure demobilization by guaranteeing that one party will not take advantage of another during this process<sup>85</sup>, but this does not say much about why a faction leader will decide to demobilize or what alternatives exist for soldiers besides demobilization. I look to the international community as a potential agent to facilitate such a choice.

Alternatively, the diplomatic or foreign policy adopted by outside states may have an effect on the timing of actions taken by the factions. One well-known example is the pressure

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<sup>82</sup> See Mas Colell Winston, and Green (1995), especially chapter 7.

<sup>83</sup> See for example, Stedman (2001), 11.

<sup>84</sup> See Stedman (2001), 2.

that was placed on (and the rewards promised to) South Africa's de Klerk to take steps to accelerate the political settlement with the African National Congress.<sup>86</sup>

Yet, the effect is not always positive. Indeed, the international community may also encourage the parties to renege on agreements. A timely example of such an effect is the problem faced by the Kimberly Process<sup>87</sup> in controlling conflict diamonds: as long as some nations are willing to act as sanctions busters, measures taken to prevent diamonds from fueling wars will not be able to work effectively.

Thus, the international community may affect the parties' decisions to comply or renege on agreements in the peace accord by affecting the gains the parties would receive from cooperation or defection. In turn, this affects the actions they undertake and subsequently, the presence of mutual vulnerability. This leads to two additional hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 4:** The international community's financial responses to a conflict can increase mutual military and political vulnerabilities among the parties if increase the benefits of cooperating or the penalties of renegeing with stated promises.

**Hypothesis 5:** The international community's diplomatic responses to a conflict can increase mutual military and political vulnerabilities among the parties if increase the benefits of cooperating or the penalties of renegeing with stated promises.

### Organization of the Factions

Organization of the factions refers to both the internal cohesion among factions and the number of factions in the conflict. In particular, the work by Nordlinger (1972) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) on the effects of factions' organizational structures on the realization of a group's goal suggest that the organization of the factions can dilute or enhance the actions taken by the insurgents. As a result, a disorganized faction may have trouble communicating decisions

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<sup>85</sup> Stedman (2001), 16.

<sup>86</sup> Indeed, De Klerk writes that the biggest foreign policy objective was the acceptance of the United States (188). On the playing of *Die Stem*, the South African national anthem, during his visit in the United States, De Klerk writes, "...I found it difficult to hold back my tears. After so many years in the wilderness, I felt as though [South Africa] had once again rejoined the mainstream of humanity" (189).

taken at the bargaining table and thus defeat the purpose of taking costly actions. Alternatively, non-costly actions could also be enhanced or diluted by strong or weak organizational structures, respectively. Equally important, the recent work by Stedman (2001) points to the increased difficulty of settling conflicts with a large number of factions. In particular, Stedman cites the experience of Cambodia, where the number of factions made outcomes unpredictable as competing interests had to be considered.<sup>88</sup> As a result, events, actions, and concessions affect groups with disparate interests differently, making the creation of mutual vulnerabilities among groups more difficult to achieve.

In sum, the organization and proliferation of factions can affect the incentives to comply with agreements through the control that their leader has over them and the challenge of addressing possibly disparate interests. More precisely, through the control a faction leader has over the rank and file, the organizational structure can affect the impact of the timing of events, actions, and concessions and therefore, the degree of mutual vulnerability experienced by each faction. Likewise, in the case of disparate groups with diverse interests, events may impact each differently, thereby affecting the incentives to advance the implementation process. Five hypotheses may be tested from these claims.

**Hypothesis 6:** Among leaders that fulfill political promises for participation and demobilization, more cohesive factions may positively contribute to the creation of mutual political and military vulnerability.

**Hypothesis 7:** Among leaders that fulfill political promises for participation and demobilization, less cohesive factions may negatively contribute to the creation of mutual political and military vulnerability.

**Hypothesis 8:** Among leaders that do not fulfill political promises for participation and demobilization, more cohesive factions may negatively contribute to the creation of mutual political and military vulnerability.

**Hypothesis 9:** Among leaders that do not fulfill political promises for participation and demobilization, less cohesive factions may have little effect on the creation of mutual political and military vulnerability.

<sup>87</sup> On the Kimberley Process see: [www.kimberleyprocess.com](http://www.kimberleyprocess.com) (cited January 8, 2002).

<sup>88</sup> Stedman (2001), 10

**Hypothesis 10:** As the number of groups increase, the possibility of actions creating simultaneous mutual vulnerability decreases.

### Summary

While concessions that render the parties mutually vulnerable may be written into the peace accord, the implementation period requires several smaller steps to bring them to fruition – to persuade the parties not to abandon the implementation process. For this reason, I identified several variables that may affect the sense of vulnerability each party felt toward the others. These variables could advance or hinder the implementation of the peace accord. In the table below, I summarize the variables and the method by which they may affect the vulnerability felt by the parties.

**Table 1.2. Summary of effects of variables**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Effect on Vulnerability</b>
Timing of Events, Concessions, Actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The absence of institutions places importance on overt actions. Concurrent actions affect the level of vulnerability felt by parties.</li> </ul>
Electoral rules and vested interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rules and vested interests affect factions' access the political space.</li> </ul>
Administrative rules and vested interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rules and vested interests impact the ability of factions to direct policies in their favor.<sup>89</sup></li> </ul>
International Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International community can affect the timing of events, actions, and concessions and the institutional rules through the benefits of complying with provisions by diplomatic biases/relationships.</li> <li>• Financial contribution to reintegration can affect the timing of events, actions, and concessions by increasing the incentive for demobilization.<sup>90</sup></li> </ul>
Organization of Factions	<p>Group structure can affect the timing of events, actions, and concessions through the manner in which the rank and file obtain and use information.<sup>91</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The more united the group the fewer incentives are needed to induce cooperation.</li> <li>• The more decentralized the group, the greater the incentives needed to induce cooperation.</li> <li>• The more factions exist, the more difficult it is to create mutually vulnerable situations.</li> </ul>

<sup>89</sup> For electoral and administrative systems see: Horowitz (1985); Sisk (1996); Ben Reilly and Andrew Reynolds. *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies*. (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999).

<sup>90</sup> On the role of the international community, see: Walter (1997); Hampson (1996); Stedman (2001).



The dissertation examines the factors that advance or hinder the implementation of a peace accord. Specifically, it examines the variables that induce the signatories to the peace accord to comply with the provisions in the peace accord or to stall the implementation process. Drawing on work in game and contract theory, the presence of incentives to cooperate is assumed to induce compliance with stated promises. As emphasized by such scholars as Schelling (1980) and Williamson (1985), cooperation is theorized to occur when concessions offered by the parties also increase their vulnerability. When cooperation is likely, the promise is credible. I hypothesize that mutual vulnerabilities among the warring factions induce them to take steps to fulfill the provisions in the peace accord. Asymmetric vulnerabilities lead to a stalling of the implementation or renewed conflict.

#### **PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION**

The dissertation contains four additional chapters. The second, third, and fourth chapters present the case studies of Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia, respectively. The fifth chapter provides some conclusions and offers some policy recommendations in order ensure more successful implementation processes.

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<sup>91</sup> Nordlinger (1972).

## **CHAPTER 2. COSTLY PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE**

### **SECTION 2.1 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION TO MOZAMBIQUE**

The civil war ended in Mozambique on October 4<sup>th</sup> 1992 with the signing of the General Peace Agreement between the Government of Mozambique (of the Revolutionary Front of Mozambique [Frelimo]) – led by Joaquim Chissano, now president of Mozambique – and the insurgent force, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) – led by Afonso Dhlakama. After a two year peace process (1990 – 1992), handled primarily by the Italian Catholic lay group, the Comunità di Sant’ Egidio, the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, including the holding of elections, was managed by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) from 1992 – 1994.

Nine years after signing the General Peace Agreement in 1992, Mozambique continues to remain at peace.<sup>92</sup> The regularity of the political process also points to signs of stability. Presidential and parliamentary elections took place in 1994 and 1999 and municipal elections occurred in 1998. In the 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections, the system of proportional representation, introduced by the General Peace Agreement, brought the former insurgents, Renamo, into power along with a third party, the Democratic Union: of the 250 parliamentary seats available, Renamo obtained 112, the Democratic Union obtained 9, and Frelimo obtained 129.<sup>93</sup> Today, Renamo holds 117 seats, while Frelimo holds 133 seats (there are no other parties represented in parliament).<sup>94</sup> What explains the relative stability in Mozambique?

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<sup>92</sup> There have been incidents of political instability stemming from the 1999 presidential elections, however a civil war has not resumed.

<sup>93</sup> United Nations, “Final report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ” S/1994/1449, 23 December 1994, para 8, listed as *Document 90* in *The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995*, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995).

## **The outcome in Mozambique**

Mozambique is a good case because it was not evident, by standard measures, at the end of the 1992 peace process and at the end of implementation of the accord, that the peace would hold. In particular, the General Peace Agreement did not call for power sharing and permanent territorial autonomy in this very divided country.<sup>95</sup> Equally important, at the time of elections, disarmament was incomplete, the new, unified army had not been fully formed, Renamo still continued to resist integrating its territory into that of the government's, there were several challenges to the government's sovereignty, and both the government and Renamo hid weapons and retained soldiers.<sup>96</sup>

There are two characters to the implementation period in Mozambique. The first, which follows the signing of the peace agreement most immediately, is characterized by a relative absence of institutions. In this environment, roughly from 1992 – 1994, I suggest that conflict did not resume in Mozambique because the actions and concessions made by Renamo and Frelimo created mutual political and military vulnerabilities between them. Specifically, during the period immediately following the accord, because institutions did not exist, credibility was based on a constant renegotiation process.<sup>97</sup> Toward the end of the implementation period, as the parties began the formation of electoral institutions, rules and vested interests continued the creation of mutual political vulnerabilities, which governed the relationship and behavior of Renamo and

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<sup>94</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Chissano and Frelimo Win but Renamo Demands a Recount" in Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 24, Published by AWEPA, 28<sup>th</sup> December 1999. [Online Database] <[www.mozambique.mz/awepa/awep24/corpo.htm](http://www.mozambique.mz/awepa/awep24/corpo.htm)> (cited on February 24, 2001).

<sup>95</sup> Power sharing and territorial autonomy are cited by the conflict management literature as keys to containing conflict. See for example Lijphart (1977; 1990), Horowitz (1985), and Sisk (1996) for examples.

<sup>96</sup> Several works detail these: on the record of demobilization, disarmament, and the new army see Berman (1996), Walter (1999), and Sygne (1997); on Renamo's territorial administration and challenges to sovereignty see: Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 12 (September 1994); Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 15 (April 1995) for examples.

<sup>97</sup> See Marshall and Weingast (1998); Bates (1996); Terry M. Moe. "The New Economics of Organization" American Journal of Political Science 28. 4 (November 1984): 739-777;

**Frelimo. To show the effect of rules on political vulnerability and stability, I continue to look at Mozambique's subsequent elections.**

**In this chapter, I outline the political reform promised by the General Peace Agreement and the mutual political and military vulnerability that was created by the parties in Mozambique. Additionally, I account for the effects of the international context and the parties' organizational structure on the development of mutual political and military vulnerability. Section two reviews the competing explanations for conflict resolution in Mozambique. Section three documents the mutual political and military vulnerability during the initial period without institutions, while section four examines mutual political vulnerability with institutions. Section five offers some conclusions.**

## **SECTION 2.2 Competing Explanations for Mozambique**

**Explanations for Mozambique's success generally fall into three recurring categories. Specifically, scholars and practitioners point to the international context, the United Nations' in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and conflict management strategies. The explanations do not usually stand alone, but I have separated them to discuss them individually.**

**Many scholars and practitioners suggest that weak internal and external resources and support for Mozambique's civil war at the time helped to bring the war to an end.<sup>98</sup> In essence, this line of reasoning focuses on the lack of regional and international support for the continuation of the civil war in Mozambique, and in particular Renamo. In fact, this was the case. South Africa, the main supporter of Renamo, stopped its support following the dismantling**

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<sup>98</sup> Elements of this can be found in the work by Jett (2000); Minter (1994); Ohlson (1998) for example. This has been mentioned by Cameron Hume, at the time the Deputy Chief of Mission to the Vatican (personal interview with the author, August 7, 2001), Margaret Vogt, UN Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary General, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations (personal interview with the author, August 14, 2001).

of apartheid.<sup>99</sup> Assistance from the US, while never sanctioned by the Reagan or Bush administrations, occurred through private groups and was a divisive subject among Congress.<sup>100</sup> However, this support came to a halt following the publication of the *Gersony Report*, which detailed the atrocities committed by Renamo.<sup>101</sup>

There was also a neutralizing of external supporters toward the end of the civil war. Most significant was the role played by Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's President. Mugabe supported the Frelimo government due to the destabilizing actions of Renamo to the Beira corridor, which served as a transportation point between the two countries.<sup>102</sup> But as the account by Cameron Hume details, Mugabe became instrumental in ensuring Renamo's continuing participation in the peace talks.<sup>103</sup> (Cameron Hume served as the Deputy Chief of Mission to the Vatican and one of the mediators in the Mozambican peace process). Consequently, as Margaret Vogt phrased it, Renamo had little choice.<sup>104</sup>

Still, while international pressure may entice a party to begin negotiations or sign a peace agreement, it does not necessarily mean that the party can overcome the insecurity associated with disarmament and surrender to sign a peace agreement or to abide by it.<sup>105</sup> Specifically, it ignores the very real changes that may have taken place domestically that changed the incentives for continuing with the civil war.

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<sup>99</sup> Herman J. Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 193.

<sup>100</sup> See Austin (1994); Minter (1994); Crocker (1992).

<sup>101</sup> See Crocker (1992), 249-250 and Austin (1994), 20-21.

<sup>102</sup> see Vines (1991) and Cohen (2000).

<sup>103</sup> Hume (1994).

<sup>104</sup> Vogt, personal interview with the author. August 14, 2001.

<sup>105</sup> Walter and Synder (2000) have applied the security dilemma paradigm to intrastate conflict as well.

The second explanation credits the United Nations as having played a central role because it was willing to contribute a large number of peace keeping troops and financial resources to manage demobilization and elections in Mozambique.<sup>106</sup> The UN operation in Mozambique cost \$700 million<sup>107</sup> and contributed 6,239 troops.<sup>108</sup> Walter (1999), in particular, writes that the presence of a large UN force represented a credible commitment that the provisions of the peace accord will be guaranteed.<sup>109</sup> ONUMOZ, Walter (1999) argues, helped to mitigate the security dilemma by its troop commitment. Yet, focusing solely on the United Nations ignores some of the other agreements between the parties that took place along the way to implementation and held the peace together. Moreover, the UN's program itself was fraught with delays and other difficulties<sup>110</sup> that make it unlikely to be the complete explanation for Mozambique's success. Additionally, as Walter (1999) herself points out, just because an outside force can implement the agreed upon peace, it is no indication of peace after the international force leaves.<sup>111</sup>

In support of her conclusion, Walter (1999) suggests that three factors besides an external security force determined peace after the United Nations left Mozambique: internal political, military, and territorial guarantees written into the accord. Specifically, Walter states that the political guarantees gave Renamo confidence that it could challenge the government, the military guarantees made Renamo feel safe and the territorial guarantees of a dual administration

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<sup>106</sup> For the involvement of the UN see the work by Sygne (1997); Berman (1996); Hampson (1996), Jett (2000), Walter (1997).

<sup>107</sup> Sygne(1997), 150. Sygne notes that this figure has been difficult to verify.

<sup>108</sup> United Nations. "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ" (S/1994/89) 28 January 1994 and S/1994/89/Add.2, 1 February 1994, para 15, listed as *Document 55* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995).

<sup>109</sup> Walter (1999), 150

<sup>110</sup> See in particular the work by Sygne (1997) and Berman (1996)

<sup>111</sup> Walter (1999), 155

prevented Renamo's obsolescence.<sup>112</sup> Dennis Jett, former US Ambassador to Mozambique during the implementation period, reflects that a more complete operation would entail that the UN remain behind to build political institutions.<sup>113</sup> But these reasons, while describing factual events, I believe miss the essence of the implementation period in Mozambique by not drawing out the mechanisms by which the parties continued to negotiate with each other in the absence and/or weakness of institutions. It is one thing for the accord to state that Mozambique will use a system of proportional representation or permit Renamo to hold onto some of its territory, but it does not mean Renamo will be able to both influence policy and prevent adverse policies. As Dhlakama declares out loud during the debate over creating a government of national unity: 'There is a need to know how winner will treat the loser'.<sup>114</sup> Nor does it describe the ways in which Renamo used those provisions or other tactics to ensure their political participation. In particular, it leaves out the costly concessions extracted from Renamo by the government during the process of implementation. In other words, it takes the provisions of the General Peace Agreement for granted and does not assess the degree of mutual political and military vulnerability that characterized the implementation period.

In this review of the Mozambican experience, I look inward at the parties' interaction as an explanation for the continued stability in Mozambique in the implementation period. The General Peace Agreement held the details for the structure of the new Mozambique. How likely would this structure lead to the sustainability of peace in Mozambique, given the provisions of the General Peace Agreement and environmental factors such as the type of organizational structure of Renamo and Frelimo and the international context during the peace process? During the implementation period, Mozambique successfully resolved destabilizing crises through the

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid, 149.

<sup>113</sup> Dennis Jett, telephone interview with the author. September 26, 2001.

construction of mutually vulnerable political and military situation – in turn these made the promises for political reform credible.

## **SECTION 2.3 MANAGING PEACE WITHOUT INSTITUTIONS**

### **The Promise of Political Reform in Mozambique**

After independence from Portugal, Frelimo established itself as the only legal party permissible in Mozambique. This policy began to change during the late 1980s. In the “Twelve Principles for Peace of the Mozambican Government” issued by President Chissano on July 17<sup>th</sup> 1989, references are made to include all groups to participate politically. The “Twelve Principles...” continues by stating that groups involved in an armed conflict, would be guaranteed participation. Renamo, for its part responded through a document entitled “Sixteen Point Declaration of the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo)”, that it was already a political force and should be recognized as such.<sup>115</sup>

Even as the government adopted a multiparty system by amending the constitution in 1990, Renamo’s chief delegate, Raul Domingos stated that changes outside the Rome peace process would not be recognized because Renamo was not part of the decision-making process and it was not done in a democratic manner.<sup>116</sup> According to Matteo Zuppi, member of the Comunità di Sant’ Egidio Matteo and instrumental in directing the negotiations<sup>117</sup>, Renamo insisted that the decisions taken between the parties in Rome would not be subject to approval by

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<sup>114</sup> “Renamo leader comments on his visit to USA, voter registration problems, other issues” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts June 15, 1994. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. July 9, 2001.

<sup>115</sup> The text of the “Twelve Principles for Peace of the Government of Mozambique” and the “Sixteen Point Declaration of the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo)” can be found in: Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, and Alex Vines. “The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective” in Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives. 3 (London, UK: Conciliation Resources, 1998), 38-39.

<sup>116</sup> Hume (1994), 48

<sup>117</sup> For a good review of the beginnings of the contacts between Renamo and the Government, see Della Rocca (1996). See also Hume (1994) for an account of the interventions of the Comunità di Sant’ Egidio in the peace process.



the (all-Frelimo) parliament.<sup>118</sup> Zuppi remarked that in his opinion the government's intent in permitting a multiparty system, in addition to reflecting an evolution in party ideology, also served to prevent Renamo from having a legitimate grievance about the absence of a multiparty system in Mozambique.<sup>119</sup> The government's preemptive offer created asymmetric vulnerability on the part of Renamo. The notion of mutual vulnerability entails that the parties not only benefit by the concessions obtained from the others, but are also able to stave off or retaliate against adverse actions. In this case, Renamo could not obtain assurances of how it could check the government's actions.

Given the rejection of the 1990 Constitutional reforms by Renamo, the significance of the General Peace Agreement lies in the political reform that recognizes Renamo as a legitimate political party and the adoption of electoral and administrative rules that allow it to exist as an effective political party. In exchange, the government requested a cessation of armed conflict and recognition of its sovereignty.

### **Elements of political reform in Mozambique**

In this section, I lay out the strategies employed by the government and Renamo to fulfill the promises made for greater political inclusion, the cessation of hostilities, and the retention of sovereignty during the transition. I discuss the manners in which both the Government and Renamo created or responded to vulnerability and political costs they faced. The peace agreement's provisions made to Renamo and the Government in the General Peace Agreement hold the *potential* for making political reform credible because they can conceivably create mutual vulnerabilities for and exact costs on the government and Renamo for agreeing to the terms of the peace accord. Their success in creating mutual political and military vulnerability is

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<sup>118</sup> Matteo Zuppi, personal interview with the author, September 7, 2001.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

determined by the timing of the events, actions, and concessions taken to implement the provisions and the effect of the international community and organizational structure on those actions.

As a result of the General Peace Agreement, the Government and Renamo were to complete a schedule of tasks by which they could advance political reform and protect themselves from adverse actions by the other. Renamo's place on the political scene was seemingly assured through the availability of financial assistance for its transformation as a political party, continued administration of its own territory, and the demobilization of government forces. Similarly, the government hoped to obtain a cessation of hostilities by Renamo's demobilization and disarmament, and acceptance of eventual territorial sovereignty. Following a discussion of the potential for each of these scheduled tasks to exact costs and vulnerabilities on the parties, I will trace out the ways in which the parties used them in the transition period. Table 2.1 below lists the political vulnerability from the promises to ensure political reform.

**Table 2.1 Elements of Political Reform**

<i>Scheduled tasks</i>	<i>Beneficiary</i>	<i>Criteria for Credibility: Mutual Vulnerability</i>
Financing Renamo's Transformation	Renamo	<i>Vulnerability of Renamo:</i> Financial assistance draws the group out into the political process.  <i>Vulnerability of Government:</i> Assurance of entry to the political space by Renamo; diminished autonomy in policy making
<b>Territorial Issues</b>		
Temporary administration over territory	Renamo	<i>Vulnerability of Government:</i> Continued (but temporary) denial of sovereignty; diminished autonomy in policy making
Agreement on Frelimo governors	Government	<i>Vulnerability of Renamo:</i> Ceding of sovereignty; Risk of dominance by government
Demobilization	Government/Renamo	<i>Vulnerability of Renamo/ Government:</i> Surrender of greatest weapon against the government/Renamo; risk of dominance by government/Renamo.

## ***Financing Renamo's transformation***

### ***Promises in the General Peace Accord***

Much has been written about the role of financial assistance to Renamo in settling the Mozambican civil war.<sup>120</sup> At the time of the peace accord, Renamo was not established in Maputo. Aldo Ajello, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Mozambique, described Renamo's presence in Maputo as "little more than a mailbox".<sup>121</sup> In the bush, where Renamo had its headquarters, Ajello describes meeting Dhlakama in "a hut in Maringuè" and being received at the airstrip by Raul Domingos, Renamo's chief delegate in Rome, on his motorbike.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, prior to the settlement of the civil war, Dhlakama had never been to Maputo. Clearly, from this description, Renamo did not have all the trimmings of a full-fledged political party. Furthermore, as the General Peace Agreement had not offered power sharing arrangements or other types of joint governing plans during the transition,<sup>123</sup> the only way for Renamo to be part of the government was to win a substantial amount in the elections and obtain parliamentary seats through the system of proportional representation. This was only a possibility if Renamo could successfully convert itself into a political party.

According to the General Peace Agreement, the National Elections Commission, of which one third was to include Renamo-appointed members, would be responsible for distributing to *all parties*, in proportion to the number of their candidates, "the available subsidies

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<sup>120</sup> See in particular, Vines (1996), Austin (1994).

<sup>121</sup> Aldo Ajello. "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement" in Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), 625.

<sup>122</sup> Ajello, 625-6.

<sup>123</sup> Chissano had been asked by some, the US included, to consider a government of national unity. He rejected that possibility. See the following: Joseph Hanlon, "Pressure for Unity Government" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 10 (July 1994); "Chissano on campaigning conditions, possibility of Dhlakama being vice-president", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts April 26, 1994. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. July 9, 2001; "South African president meets Mozambican former rebel leader", Deutsche Presse-Agentur July 22, 1994. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. July 9, 2001.

and logistic support for the election campaign".<sup>124</sup> Although all parties were to get financial assistance, Renamo clearly received the most attention. The General Peace Agreement bound the government to "assist in obtaining installations and means so that Renamo may secure the accommodation and transport and communications facilities it needs to carry out its political activities in all the provincial capitals and in other locations to the extent that the available resources so permit".<sup>125</sup> As further assurance, the General Peace Agreement stipulated that the international community (Italy in particular) would be approached to fund the political campaign trust fund.<sup>126</sup> More specifically, the protocol stated that "an appropriate share" of the funds obtained at a Donor's Conference hosted by the Italian government should be set aside to finance the political campaigns of the parties.<sup>127</sup>

The General Peace Agreement committed the two parties to press the Italian government to organize a donor conference to obtain funds for the electoral process, reintegration programs and demobilization. As Zuppi, noted, the joint appeal by Renamo and the Government is significant because it legitimized Renamo as a political entity.<sup>128</sup> To reinforce this pledge, the Italian government had promised in August 1992, two months prior to the signing of the protocol, to host such a conference of donors.<sup>129</sup> Thus, even if the government of Mozambique itself did not have the money, there was some guarantee that the international community would provide the funds.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> General Peace Accord of Mozambique. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: African-European Institute, 1993, Protocol III, Part V, section 7a

<sup>125</sup> General Peace Accord, Protocol III, Part V, section 7b

<sup>126</sup> General Peace Accord, Protocol III, Part V, section 7c

<sup>127</sup> General Peace Accord, Protocol VII, section 2.

<sup>128</sup> Zuppi, personal interview, September 7, 2001.

<sup>129</sup> Hume (1994), 119

Financial assistance to Renamo could have provided credibility to political reform if it assured Renamo of success in transforming itself into a viable political party, mounting a successful political campaign, and obtaining a significant share of parliament's seats. Such developments would cost the government leverage in policy design, making it vulnerable to influences by Renamo. The government's pledge to agree to provide / allow financial assistance to Renamo was much more than a transfer of money that would facilitate its entrance into the political space. Through the General Peace Agreement, the government pledged to help the group that it had described as bandits and fought for 16 years to become strong enough to compete with it on equally footing. Financing Renamo's transformation into a political party could also make Renamo vulnerable. By accepting the financial assistance and developing a presence in Maputo, Renamo could become more accessible to the outside community and therefore easier to monitor.<sup>131</sup> Getting more Renamo members into Maputo, and out of the bush, benefited the government by solidifying its claim to sovereignty as it strove to unite the country.<sup>132</sup>

#### *Creating mutual vulnerability through financial assistance*

In all, the UN trust fund for the transformation of Renamo from military to a political organization amounted to \$ 17.5 million.<sup>133</sup> Indeed, the general fear that the peace would unravel generated concern and quick responses among the international community. This pattern of fairly quick response by the international community held throughout the implementation process. I

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<sup>130</sup> It was well known that the government could not have financed Renamo to the amount that was agreed and what little money it did have, it did not want to spend it on Renamo (Zuppi, personal interview).

<sup>131</sup> This idea was sparked by Matteo Zuppi's observation that Renamo's participation on the Verification Committee which entailed it to travel to different parts of Mozambique served as a training ground for future interactions with the international community.

<sup>132</sup> Matteo Zuppi, personal interview.

<sup>133</sup> See Ajello, 633.

have listed them in table 2.2 below to show the relationship more clearly. Needless to say, the quick responses and the willingness to get around bureaucratic procedures to speed up the transfer of funds not only shows commitment on the behalf of the international community, but also makes the political development more possible.

**Table 2.2 Pattern of Response to Renamo's Requests for financial assistance**

Date	Request / Response / Result
December 15-16, 1992	<b>Request:</b> Conference of Donors takes place in Rome to consider proposals by Renamo & Mozambican Government. Commits to \$76 million to electoral assistance. <sup>134</sup>
December 15-16, 1992	<b>Request:</b> Renamo and Frelimo request that separate funding for political parties be addressed. <sup>135</sup>
January 30, 1993	<b>Response:</b> Italy's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Colombo writes to Boutros Boutros Ghali pledging Italy's help in funding political parties in Mozambique. <sup>136</sup>
March 9, 1993	<b>Result:</b> No concrete moves made to fulfill request to fund political parties. Renamo delegation leaves Maputo citing that the government had not made the "necessary logistical arrangements" to bring renamo to Maputo. <sup>137</sup> Specifically, Renamo states that the government had not provided them with adequate housing and logistics to continue serving on the commissions. <sup>138</sup>

<sup>134</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 30 December 1992 from Italy transmitting the conclusions of the Donor's conference for Mozambique, held in Rome on 15 and 16 December 1992". (S/25044), 4 January 1993, Annex IV, listed as *Document 28* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995),163.

<sup>135</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 30 December 1992 ..." (S/25044), 163.

<sup>136</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 30 January 1993 from Italy's Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General on the creation of a trust fund to sustain political parties in Mozambique", listed as *Document 31* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995), 172.

<sup>137</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 23 October 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council taken by his Special Representative in Mozambique toward implementation of the General Peace Agreement" , listed as *Document 19*, in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995),142

<sup>138</sup> United Nations "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ" . (S/26034), 30 June 1993, para 12, listed as *Document 37*, in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995).

(Table 2.2 continued)

April 27, 1993	<b>Request:</b> Renamo does not attend a consultative meeting on the new electoral law scheduled with the government and the 12 un-armed political parties, stating that it did not have enough time to review the draft electoral law. Then, the 12 un-armed parties walk out of the consultative meeting stating that the government had failed to provide it with the materials to establish their headquarters in Maputo. <sup>139</sup>
May 10, 1993	<b>Response:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• ONUMOZ establishes a trust fund "to provide RENAMO with office space, accommodation and equipment."<sup>140</sup></li><li>• Italy donates \$6 million to the trust fund.<sup>141</sup></li><li>• 'Tiny' Rowland, CEO of Lonrho arranges for Renamo delegation to stay at Lonrho's Cardoso Hotel in Maputo;<sup>142</sup> the hotel remained closed to the public for one year while Renamo lived there.<sup>143</sup></li><li>• The Government provides 18 houses to Renamo.<sup>144</sup></li></ul>
End of May 1993	<b>Result:</b> Renamo delegation returns to Maputo and resumes meeting with members of the commissions. <sup>145</sup>
June 8 - 9, 1993	<b>Request:</b> At a follow-up to Rome's Conference of Donors, Renamo states that it needs office equipment, food, transportation, and more money for training centers for the demobilized soldiers as a condition for going to the Assembly Areas for demobilization. <sup>146</sup>
June 16, 1993	<b>Response:</b> The government agrees to provide funds to assist the unarmed opposition with housing and funding for their political campaign. <sup>147</sup>
June 16, 1993	<b>Result:</b> The government, Renamo and the un-armed opposition agree to reschedule the consultative meeting for July 1993. <sup>148</sup>
July 6, 1993	<b>Result:</b> Renamo commission members arrive at the Cardoso Hotel in Maputo. <sup>149</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid, 187

<sup>140</sup> Ibid, para 12.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, para 12,

<sup>142</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Money and housing" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 4, June 1993, p. 2.

<sup>143</sup> Vines (1998), p. 73

<sup>144</sup> Ibid, para 12.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, para 13.

<sup>146</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Renamo Demands" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 5, August 1993, p. 1

<sup>147</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ" (S/26034), para 17.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, para 17.

<sup>149</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Calendar" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 5 (August 1993): 10.

(Table 2.2 Continued)

October 18-20, 1993	<b>Request:</b> During a visit to Maputo by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then the secretary general of the United Nations, Dhlakama informs him that elections could not occur without money and demobilization would not be successful if sufficient financial remuneration was not provided. <sup>150</sup>
November 1, 1993	<b>Response:</b> The secretary general's report stresses Renamo's need for resources to develop as a political party. Commenting that the UN trust fund stood at \$5.6 million as of October 26, the secretary general requested at least \$ 5 million more from member states. The secretary general adds that because not all activities could be funded by the UN, due to "the rules and procedures that govern their use", he recommended setting up an alternative funding mechanism. <sup>151</sup>
January 14, 1994	<b>Response:</b> The secretary general supports the proposal that Dhlakama receive \$300,000 as a way "to meet the expectations of his supporters" and not "lose authority and prestige". To establish this new fund, the secretary general requests the Italy contribute \$500,000 as a way to entice other member states to contribute. <sup>152</sup>
January 28 <sup>th</sup> 1994	<b>Response:</b> Stating the peace process may unravel due to the lack of funds, Boutros-Ghali's report to the security council reiterates the need for a more flexible instrument. <sup>153</sup>
March 4, 1994	<b>Response:</b> Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, confirms Italy's contribution of \$500,000 for the new flexible fund for Dhlakama. Ciampi wrote: "We continue to be fully convinced that international support must not fall short in the current moment, when the normalization process has entered a delicate phase..." <sup>154</sup>
-- October 1994	<b>Result:</b> Dhlakama receives \$3.9 million in cash during the last 13 months of the implementation process through the secondary trust fund. <sup>155</sup>

<sup>150</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Will Boutros-Ghali Prevail?", Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 7 (December 1993): 2

<sup>151</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", S/26666, 1 November 1993 and S/26666/Add.1, 2 November 1993, para 49, listed as *Document 48* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995).

<sup>152</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 14 January 1994 from the Secretary-General to Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, President of the Council of Ministers of Italy requesting a contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for assistance to RENAMO" listed as *Document 54* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995), 215-6.; United Nations "Letter dated 4 March 1994 from the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy to the Secretary-General on Italy's further contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund", listed as *Document 58* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995), 230.

<sup>153</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", S/1994/89 and S/1994/89/Add.1, 28<sup>th</sup> January 1994, and s/1994/Add.2, 1 February 1994, para 34, listed as *Document 55* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995).

<sup>154</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 4 March 1994 ...."

<sup>155</sup> Ajello (1999), 637



Most obviously the \$17.5 million in the trust fund helped Renamo launch an electoral campaign and provide a certainty that Renamo could wage a viable campaign, but there were other less obvious, yet equally important effects, that added to the credibility of political reform. These effects not only sustained the political costs to the government of broadening the political space but also made Renamo vulnerable to accepting government compromises by drawing it out of isolation.

Through the contributions by Lonrho and the government, Renamo was able to set up offices in Maputo, which in turn facilitated its participation on commissions. As a section further on discusses, Renamo's participation in the all-important National Elections Commission helped it establish election management policies in its favor and begin to build its legitimacy. Additionally, the secondary trust fund allowed Renamo to establish itself in the main cities<sup>156</sup> – previously, Renamo's base was in the bush.<sup>157</sup> Getting Renamo out of the rural areas was a priority for the government as well, Zuppi has noted.<sup>158</sup> This is not surprising: in addition to concretizing the end of the war<sup>159</sup>, getting Renamo out to Maputo somewhat dulls the notion of a dual administration in Mozambique and increases the government's sovereignty in Mozambique. (This last point is also discussed in further detail in the next part of the section).

The decision by Aldo Ajello, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General to Mozambique, to establish a secondary trust fund took advantage of the tight control Dhlakama had over Renamo. Ajello admits the \$3.9 million in cash sent to Dhlakama served as a means to prevent Renamo from splintering and maintain Dhlakama as a strong leader who could deliver

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<sup>156</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ" (S/1994/511), 28 April 1994, para 31, listed as *Document 63* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995), 237.

<sup>157</sup> See the work by Finnegan (1992) on Renamo's base.

<sup>158</sup> Matteo Zuppi, personal interview

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

assistance to his supporters.<sup>160</sup> Keeping Renamo together would ensure that Dhlakama obtained some political power. Ajello justifies the cash payments by pointing out the great control and resources available to the government while Renamo did not even have housing, food, and clothes.<sup>161</sup> Essentially, it was a leveling of the playing field. In contrast, the government continued to be vulnerable to the increased possibility of Renamo's political influence.

### **Establishing Administrative Autonomy**

#### *Promises in the Peace Accord*

For both the government and Renamo, territorial sovereignty was a critical component of the peace process. News accounts show that the question of territorial sovereignty blocked humanitarian aid and stalled the peace process. It remained a problem even after the national elections. The territorial division of the civil war in Mozambique was stark: Renamo was based in the disadvantaged, northern and central areas, while Frelimo had its roots in the economically advantaged, southern areas.<sup>162</sup> The General Peace Agreement allowed Renamo to control its own areas from the time of the cease-fire until a new government took office.<sup>163</sup> Specifically, the General Peace Agreement stated "RENAMO shall employ only citizens resident in those areas, who may be members of RENAMO".<sup>164</sup> The list of Renamo-controlled areas were somewhat disputed. It was estimated that Renamo-controlled about 25 percent of Mozambican land and six

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<sup>160</sup> Ajello, 637. See also: "UN's Ajello comments on Renamo trust fund, Rapid Intervention Police, elections". BBC Summary of World Broadcasts September 15, 1994. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. August 2, 2001. See also Joseph Hanlon, "Renamo wants more Cash", Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 12 (September 1994): 5.

<sup>161</sup> Ajello, 637.

<sup>162</sup> Documentation on the geographic division of Renamo and Frelimo can be found in Finnegan (1992); Minter (1989). This is also supported by an interview with Luis Serapião conducted on July 2, 2001. Serapião was Renamo's US representative until 1989.

<sup>163</sup> General Peace Agreement, Protocol V, Part III, section 9d.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

percent of the population. Pockets of Renamo-controlled territory appear all over Mozambique, but the largest concentration is in Manica, Sofala and Zambézia provinces in the Central part of the country.<sup>165</sup> By this agreement, if the government did not follow through on certain political promises, Renamo had not lost because it still was in charge of its own areas.<sup>166</sup> The cost of such a concession is high for the government because it weakens its sovereignty.

The concession on administration acquires even more importance because the issue of sovereignty became so significant during the negotiations. Renamo repeatedly challenged the government's claim to sovereignty while the government was adamant that Renamo recognize it as the sovereign power in Mozambique.<sup>167</sup> Indeed, that was the basis for Renamo's refusal to acknowledge the constitutional changes that occurred in 1990.<sup>168</sup> Even after the first protocol was signed, binding Renamo to recognize the government's sovereignty<sup>169</sup>, it was questioned throughout the peace process, as Hume's (1994) account details. Acknowledging the government's sovereignty could increase Renamo's vulnerability to treatment as a less than equal partner.

The administrative autonomy negotiated by the government for Renamo could add to the credibility of political reform if it served as a tool for Renamo to ensure political participation or at least protection and thus make the government vulnerable to questions concerning its legitimacy. Similarly, concessions made by Renamo to provide the government with assurances of its sovereignty are signals that the cessation of hostilities will occur.

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<sup>165</sup> see map in Joseph Hanlon, "Renamo Holds 25% of Land", Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 10, July 1994, p. 8

<sup>166</sup> This is also noted by Matteo Zuppi (personal interview).

<sup>167</sup> See Hume (1994);

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

<sup>169</sup> Hume (1994) remarks that both sides looked at the first protocol as a step to mutual recognition of Frelimo as the government and Renamo as the opposition (71).

### ***Mutual vulnerability through Territorial Control***

Territorial autonomy (as separate from secession) has been treated as a way to manage conflict because it allows groups to take control of their own affairs. Furthermore, the literature on conflict management depicts territorial control as a way to assure that government does not create adverse policies in the insurgents' territories.<sup>170</sup> In fact, in a large-n study, territorial autonomy has been shown by Hartzell et al (2001) to contribute to civil war settlement.<sup>171</sup> Usually, this refers to a particular region in a country and implies that the territorial autonomy is a permanent change. Arguably, the territorial transfer also implies a zero-sum transfer: the aggrieved party gains, while the government loses.

Territorial administration took on a different meaning in Mozambique. In the first place, territorial administration by Renamo was temporary; eventually, the General Peace Agreement stated, sovereignty would be returned to the government.<sup>172</sup> Equally significant, territorial control was scattered and not fixed in one region. While Renamo mostly controlled central Mozambique, there were pockets in the South and North.<sup>173</sup> It was also fluid and contested, according to news accounts on the impediments to humanitarian aid delivery. What is the meaning or use for this temporary asset?

Effectively there were two administrations in Mozambique throughout the transition period: the regions controlled by Renamo and the regions controlled by Frelimo.<sup>174</sup> During the transition period, Renamo controlled access to its areas by government representatives and humanitarian organizations. Special permission had to be obtained from Renamo to enter. Renamo's block of its region resulted in delays for the delivery of humanitarian aid, verification

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<sup>170</sup> see in particular Horowitz (1985).

<sup>171</sup> Hartzell et al, 99-200.

<sup>172</sup> General Peace Agreement of Mozambique, Protocol V, Part III, section 9d.

<sup>173</sup> see map in Hanlon, "Renamo holds 25% of land", 8.

of cease-fire violations, and generally questioned the sovereignty of Frelimo as the government of Mozambique. Indeed, Renamo's insistence on being recognized as the political power in the central and northern provinces stalled the peace process.<sup>175</sup>

The consolidation of territorial administration and control remained largely unresolved throughout the transition period following the General Peace Agreement – as evidenced by the ineffectiveness of the Commission on State Administration. Territorial control by Renamo was helped by the vagueness in the General Peace Agreement regarding territorial transfer to the government. Following the General Peace Agreement, it was clear that the government intended for the Commission on State Administration to facilitate this transfer, whereas Renamo intended to hold on to them until the election. In August of 1993, while Dhlakama accepted, at that time, that at some point, the Renamo-controlled areas would be folded into one administration, he expressed concern that this would mean the end of administrative influence.<sup>176</sup> Notably, in August, the UN troops had been fully deployed<sup>177</sup> – earlier Renamo had stipulated that demobilization would start once 65 percent of the UN contingent had arrived.<sup>178</sup> Thus, Renamo likely stood at the point of conceding its most important bargaining chip.

The blocking of government and international entities, which eventually contributed to a stalling of the peace process, led to summit between Chissano and Dhlakama on August 23-September 3 1993. In the compromise that followed, the government conceded that Renamo

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<sup>174</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "On the Angola Road" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 12 (September 1994): 1.

<sup>175</sup> Blocking of agencies by Renamo was on going. Details on the access of outsiders to Renamo-controlled areas can be found in the Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin of various issues (see for instance Hanlon, Joseph. "Access Remains Restricted" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 11 (August 1994); Joseph Hanlon, "Still no Access" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 9 (April 1994), 2).

<sup>176</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Fears grow over slow progress" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 5 (August 1993): 2,3.

<sup>177</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ" (S/26034), para 3.

<sup>178</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 7 January 1993 from RENAMO President Afonso Dhlakama to the Secretary-General requesting urgent deployment of United Nations troops to Mozambique" listed as

could appoint three advisors per province to the Frelimo-governors in Renamo zones. Significant rights and privileges were secured for the Renamo advisors. Importantly, the advisors' opinions would take priority during decisions concerning the Renamo-controlled zones and the government's provincial directors would be required to assist the advisors in any way possible. In addition, Renamo reserved the right to staff the civil service posts in its zones. Other benefits to the staff included a wage commensurate with their counterparts in government, a house, and transportation.<sup>179</sup> Thus, while the government took the helm of the provinces, Renamo retained considerable influence over outcomes. Under the compromise, the government was able to retain the right to sovereignty by not appointing Renamo members, but at the same time Renamo was not denied access to political power.

The negotiations over the state's administration were costly to the government and built-in vulnerability to Renamo's political influence through the rights given to the advisors. At the same time, denying Renamo the governors of its zones cost Renamo a measure of sovereignty. Given these conditions, the tension created with the territorial division of Mozambique made political reform more credible – Renamo witnessed the government's political will through its costly decisions and the government obtained Renamo's implicit agreement that it was the legitimate ruler over Mozambique.

Allowing Renamo to continue to manage its own zones provided it with the means to assert itself politically, while demobilization was scheduled to start. Indeed, the fact that, the nomination of advisors to the governors – 30 in all – did not take place until March of 1994, almost six months after the summit and<sup>180</sup> Renamo still did not open up its areas<sup>181</sup> suggests that

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*Document 29* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995 . (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995), 170-171.

<sup>179</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 8 September 1993 from Mozambique transmitting the final document from the 23 August – 3 September meeting between President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama" (S/26432), 13 September 1993, paras 1-13, listed as *Document 41* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995 . (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995).

<sup>180</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ" (S/1994/511), para 3.

Renamo may have been looking for a way to simply assert itself as a legitimate political force at the time of demobilization.

### ***Demobilization and Disarmament***

Demobilization and Disarmament can be straightforward indicators of credibility. To say that a country showed credible signs of political reform because it demobilized and disarmed can be perceived as tautological. But there are lessons in looking at when and how demobilization takes place.

Both disarmament and demobilization entail the surrendering of the insurgents' single most important bargaining chip – the armed conflict. For Renamo, demobilization removed the most important weapon it had against the government. Through the armed conflict, Renamo had succeeded in creating sufficient havoc in the country to start a peace negotiation. What guarantee did Renamo have that the government would abide by its decision to implement the provisions of the peace accord? The answer to this question came through several answers to other questions regarding political participation and territorial control. It is not an accident that demobilization came last.

### ***Credible Political Reform through Demobilization***

The process of demobilization and disarmament recall the classic prisoner's dilemma: how does one player know that the other is also demobilizing and not hiding weapons with which to threaten him later? The presence of this security fear leads Walter (1997) to conclude that only international forces, ready to use force to retaliate against cheating, can bring about successful demobilization and, subsequently, peace. Regarding Mozambique, Walter (1999) claims that

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<sup>181</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Gloom descends on Maputo" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 6 (October 1993):1.

only after the UN troops deployed in Mozambique did the parties begin demobilization.<sup>182</sup> Walter also claims that the fact that demobilization was not complete helped to win over any insecurity fears.<sup>183</sup> A reading of the various reports issued by the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ give the impression that delays in the approval of assembly areas – the places where troops were to gather before being assigned to demobilization or enlist in the new army – also delayed demobilization.

I argue that the start of demobilization is more complex than depicted by Walter or the approval of the Assembly Areas. First, in January 1993, Renamo insisted that demobilization could only take place after 65 percent of all UN troops had arrived in Mozambique.<sup>184</sup> By June 1993, this requirement had been met<sup>185</sup> (and by August 1993, all 6,004 UN troops had been deployed<sup>186</sup>). Then, in June 1993, both parties stated that demobilization would not begin until all 49 assembly areas opened (at that time, only 13 assembly areas had been approved).<sup>187</sup> The assembly areas designated by the parties were difficult to approve from a logistical standpoint because their selection was based on strategic interests of the parties.<sup>188</sup> All 49 assembly areas were opened by February 21, 1994. Demobilization began on March 10 of 1994.<sup>189</sup>

As the single, most important, card, I argue that demobilization depended on a number of confidence-building measures and it is important to place it in context. In fact, between January

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<sup>182</sup> Walter, (1999), 149.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 7 January 1993 from RENAMO ...", 170-171.

<sup>185</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ" (S/26034), para 6..

<sup>186</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", (S/26385), 30 August 1993, and S/26385/Add.1, 10 September 1993, listed as *Document 40* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995), para 4.

<sup>187</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", (S/26034), para 7.

<sup>188</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", (S/25518), 2 April 1993, listed as *Document 33* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995), paras 11-12.

<sup>189</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", (S/1994/511), para 8.



1993, when Dhlakama made public his requirement for the presence of 65 percent of all the UN troops before demobilization, and March 10, 1994, the start of demobilization, a number of other events had taken place. They are outlined in the Table below. Specifically, as is summarized in Table 2.3, all the UN troops has been deployed, Dhlakama began to receive \$300,000 a month through a private fund, the issue of the composition of the National Elections Commission had been settled, as had the issue of territorial autonomy. Crucially, the government made the first step toward demobilization. Hence, by the time demobilization started, both Renamo and the government had created a situation in which both were politically vulnerable.

**Table 2. 3 Events leading up to Demobilization**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>
January 7, 1993	Renamo requirement that 65 percent of UN troops needed for demobilization to begin. <sup>190</sup>
May 10, 1993	UN trust fund set up for political transformation of Renamo. <sup>191</sup>
June 1993	UN troop deployment at 65 percent level (at 6,100 it exceeds 65 percent). <sup>192</sup>
June 1993	Renamo and the Government require all assembly areas to open before demobilization can begin. <sup>193</sup>
August 1993	All UN troops deployed. <sup>194</sup>
August 23- September 3, 1993	Dhlakama and Chissano meet to discuss the issue of territorial autonomy. <sup>195</sup>
September 1993	Dhlakama begins receiving \$300,000 through a second trust fund set up by Ajello. (No date is given. Ajello simply states that Dhlakama received \$3.9 million during the last 13 months of the peace process, which ended with elections). <sup>196</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 7 January 1993...", 70-171.

<sup>191</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", (2/26034), para 12.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid, para 3;6.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid, para 6.

<sup>194</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ" (S/26385), para 3.

<sup>195</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 8 September 1993..." (S/26432, Annex), 196-198.

<sup>196</sup> Ajello, 637

(Table 2.3 continued)

October 20, 1993	Dhlakama and Chissano settle on the issue of the composition of the National Elections Commission [more on this in the next section]. <sup>197</sup>
November 1993	Thirty-six assembly areas approved; <i>the government indicated that it would approve some assembly areas in Renamo-controlled areas.</i> <sup>198</sup>
November 30 1993	Cantonment of troops in assembly areas begins <i>with the Government's troops outnumbering those of Renamo.</i> <sup>199</sup>
March 4, 1994	Italy commits \$500,000 in increased funding for Renamo's transformation. <sup>200</sup>
Early January 1994	The government presents its list of soldiers for demobilization or recruitment into the unified army. <sup>201</sup>
February 21, 1994	All 49 assembly areas opened.
March 1, 1994	Renamo-nominated advisors begin working with the provincial governors <sup>202</sup>
March 10, 1994	Demobilization of <i>Government</i> soldiers begins. <sup>203</sup>
March 18, 1994	Demobilization of Renamo soldiers begins. <sup>204</sup>

Given the above events and the fact that Renamo did not present lists of soldiers for demobilization or recruitment into the new army until March 18<sup>th</sup> 1994<sup>205</sup>, it is unlikely that full UN deployment was the only catalyst for demobilization. This does not deny the significance of the UN presence in addressing security fears between Renamo and Frelimo. Nor is it meant to minimize the UN's active mediation in establishing assembly points. However, given that demobilization was the last possible card, it is no surprise that several other confidence building steps had to be established before demobilization took place. Each step served to reinforce the notion of mutual vulnerability between Renamo and Frelimo. Events between January 1993 and

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<sup>197</sup> United Nations, "Press briefing by the Secretary-General in Maputo" UN Press Release (SG/SM/5133), 20 October 1993, listed as *Document 46* in The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995), 203-4.

<sup>198</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", ... (S/26666), para 8.

<sup>199</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", ... (S/1994/89), para 6.

<sup>200</sup> United Nations, "Letter dated 4 March....", 230.

<sup>201</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Demob starts, then stalls" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 9, (April 1994), 1.

<sup>202</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", (S/1994/511), para 3.

<sup>203</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ"... (S/1994/511), para 8; Hanlon, "Demob...", 1

<sup>204</sup> Hanlon, "Demob ...", 1

March 1994 point to instances where the government was made to demonstrate a costly action. Importantly, as Table 2.3 shows, the government moved aggressively with troop assembly (November 1993) and moved first with a list for demobilization (January 1994), and demobilization itself (March 1994), before Renamo followed suit.

Once begun, demobilization continued at a slow pace until the international community stepped in to change the incentives for the individual soldiers. The Commission for Reintegration had been created to manage the transition from military to civilian life; the government was offering a package of six-month severance pay to assist with the transition. Then, in early 1994, the United Nations created an \$18 million trust fund – the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) – to supplement the government’s program.<sup>206</sup>

The new reintegration package included the following: “(1) six months’ salary (half on demobilization day); (2) transportation with the soldier’s family to any part of Mozambique, where food for three months and a kit of tools and vegetables seeds would be provided and the other half of the six months’ salary would be paid; (3) an additional eighteen months’ salary, based on the ex-soldier’s former rank and payable in two-monthly installments; (4) an information and referral system; (5) occupational training; and (6) a provincial fund to support ex-soldiers’ activities in their communities”.<sup>207</sup> With this package, it was difficult for Frelimo band Renamo to convince the soldiers to stay on.<sup>208</sup> With the new program, Synge writes, the RSS “could hardly fail to persuade a soldier to choose demobilization rather than continued service”.<sup>209</sup> The RSS brought the soldiers out into the open and decreased the number of hidden

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> The RSS is first mentioned as a new program in the “Report of the Secretary-General...”(S/1994/511). No specific date is given. (para 37).

<sup>207</sup> Synge, 66.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Synge, 66. See also Berman (1996), 71.

troops.<sup>210</sup> In fact, the desire for reintegration was so strong that at some assembly areas, the soldiers actually staged a mutiny and it became difficult to find soldiers for the new unified army.<sup>211</sup>

Arguably, with the RSS, the international community helped to break the organizational unity of the government and Renamo. Suddenly, life as a soldier did not seem attractive any longer. The consequences of a weakly organized party in part worked against Dhlakama during his call for a boycott of the 1994 elections (this is covered in the next section).

As long as demobilization was under the control of the party leaders, proof had to be given that surrendering weapons would not invite the other side to attack. The slow creation of trust depended on a series of negotiations that attempted to paint a picture of the other party's intentions as well as create a degree of control over outcomes. However, once the incentives for the soldiers were changed by the international community's RSS, demobilization took on a momentum of its own, apart from elite control.

### **Summary**

Mutual vulnerability, which led to credible political reform and demobilization, in the absence of institutions in Mozambique, was demonstrated through the provision of financial assistance to Renamo, the administration of territory, and demobilization. These three features functioned because both Renamo and the Government were able to use these provisions strategically to advance their political agendas and protect themselves as well. The three factors created mutual vulnerabilities on both the Renamo and government.

Renamo was able to obtain access to the political space while at the same time retaining options to prevent adverse policy actions against it through financial assistance and placing

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<sup>210</sup> Ajello, 631.

<sup>211</sup> Syngé, 100-103.

advisors in areas it controlled. Similarly, adverse actions against the government by Renamo were checked by the government retention of sovereignty and eventually demobilization. These moves created mutual vulnerability. In particular, the timing of the events and the concessions by the factions was critical. Firstly, to ensure the availability of financial resources, the international community moved quickly and cohesively, and sought ways to avoid bureaucratic barriers. Secondly, the compromise on the administrative structure occurred at the time when both parties had agreed on demobilization to take place. Finally, the steps leading up to demobilization depict the creation of a sense of mutual vulnerability. In the case of demobilization as well, the response of the international community was instrumental in bringing it to a successful close. The organizational cohesion of Renamo played two distinct roles. While it was kept intact by the international community in order to navigate the implementation period, Renamo's splintering at the end also brought the implementation to a close. With the weakening organization of Renamo and Government troops at the end of the process, neither Chissano nor Dhlakama could continue to threaten each other with their armies because demobilization was preferred.

#### **SECTION 2.4 SETTING THE RULES FOR PEACE: THE ROLE OF ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS**

In the long run, the relationship between opposing parties must depend on predictable and durable rules. More precisely, rules outline the process by which things will work and therefore bring predictability. In turn, rules are supported by vested interests – participants or groups that gain from the presence of those rules.<sup>212</sup> In Mozambique, rules regarding the management of elections have been central to the interaction of the political parties. Since Mozambique's first election, political instability and resolution have found their roots in the electoral institutions' rules that prevented dominance by one party and made the process more transparent.

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<sup>212</sup> Some examples of work on institutions include; Lijphart (1977; 1996); Geddes (1996); Hirschman (1970); North (1990) Weingast and Marshall (1988); Moe (1994); Bates (1996; 1998); Weber (1946)

This section shows that electoral rules that require costly concessions create mutual vulnerability, and subsequently mitigate political instability. The presence of mutual vulnerability lends credibility that the rules will further political participation. First, I demonstrate the ability of electoral rules that engender costly concessions and mutual vulnerabilities to manage political tensions during the implementation period as the parties planned the 1994 election. Additionally, Mozambique's experience allows an analysis beyond the immediate implementation period to demonstrate how subsequent electoral laws in 1998 and 1999 affected the mutual vulnerability of the parties and political stability. Equally important, this section highlights the role of the domestic and international environments in sustaining such rules.

### **The 1994 Elections**

Four features of the 1994 elections demonstrate the effect of rules and vested interests that create costly concessions and mutually vulnerable situations to mitigate political instability and tension: the rules of the National Elections Commission that guided the composition of the commission, the selection of the chair of the commission, the decision making process of the commission, and finally, the neutralization of the potential bias in the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration. I also demonstrate the presence of vested interests in the electoral rules. With these four issues, it is possible to see how rules engendering mutual political vulnerabilities moderate political instability; such rules make political reform credible.

#### ***Rules of the National Elections Commission***

##### ***Composition of the National Elections Commission***

Recent work by Carrie Manning (2001) on the National Elections Commission emphasizes the historic moment (the end of the war), the strong leadership of its director, Brazão Mazula, and a willingness among the members to engage in endless debate as key factors in

enabling the often contradictory processes of political accommodation and competition.<sup>213</sup> The discussion on the National Elections Commission, which follows, differs from this work by bringing out the mechanism by which the Commission was able to create the mutual political vulnerability necessary for credible political reform. I do this by bringing out some examples of how decisions were made and add some insight into the vested interests that sustained those decision-making rules.

The new electoral law served as the mechanism by which Renamo and the other political parties would enter into the political space in the first multiparty elections. However, the new electoral law in Mozambique could not be passed without the formation of the National Elections Commission to carry out the presidential and parliamentary elections. Although, the peace accord called for the formation of the National Elections Commission by December 1992,<sup>214</sup> due to disagreements over the composition of the National Elections Commission, it did not form until October 1993. Subsequently, it delayed the creation of a new electoral law;<sup>215</sup> the electoral law was finally passed on 28<sup>th</sup> December 1993. (Originally, the General Peace Agreement called for an electoral law in time for elections to take place in October 1993).<sup>216</sup> The debate over the composition of the National Elections Commission, displays the necessity to provide costly concessions that render the parties mutually vulnerable, in order to ensure the successful planning and holding of elections. The final composition of the National Elections Commission and the consequences of its decision-making rules affected the ability of the parties to take actions that would undermine the structure of mutual vulnerability.

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<sup>213</sup> Carrie Manning, "Competition and Accommodation in Post-Conflict Democracy: The Case of Mozambique", *Democratization*, 8.2 (Summer 2001): 152-153.

<sup>214</sup> General Peace Agreement, Protocol III, Part V, section 3a.

<sup>215</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ", (S/26385), para 29.

<sup>216</sup> General Peace Agreement, Protocol III, Part V, section 1c.

Charged with the “organization, direction, coordination, carrying out, conduct and implementation of the electoral registration and all activities relating to the electoral process”<sup>217</sup> the National Elections Commission held an enormous amount of power during the most critical part of political reform. For example, the National Elections Commission determined the funding and reimbursements to political parties<sup>218</sup> and where and when voting would start.<sup>219</sup> As summarized by Ismael Valigy, a member of the government’s delegation in the National Elections Commission, the National Elections Commission held all the decision-making power with respect to the elections.<sup>220</sup>

Although the General Peace Agreement called for one-third of all members to be from Renamo and the remainder composed of the government<sup>221</sup>, after the signing of the General Peace Agreement, Renamo, the government, and the un-armed opposition members presented three other proposals (see Table 2.4).

**Table 2.4 Proposals for the National Elections Commission<sup>222</sup>**

<b>Proposal #1: by a minor party</b>	<b>Proposal #2 : by Renamo and un-armed opposition</b>	<b>Proposal # 3: by the government</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government to name ten members</li> <li>• Renamo to name seven members</li> <li>• Un-armed opposition to name three members</li> <li>• Chair should be a neutral party.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seven members would be nominated from each of the Government, Renamo, and un-armed parties.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government to name eleven members</li> <li>• Renamo to name seven members</li> <li>• Un-armed opposition to name three members</li> </ul>

<sup>217</sup> Republic of Mozambique, Electoral Law No. 4/93 of 28 December 1993, (Article 13), as reproduced in : I Encontro Eleitoral, Encontro dos Ministros Responsáveis pela Administração Eleitoral dos Países Africanos de Expressão Portuguesa e de Portugal. Volume IV – Mozambique: Constituição, Lei Eleitoral E Legislação Complementar. (Published by MAI/Stape, July 1994), 64

<sup>218</sup> Law No. 4/93 of 28 December 1993, (Article 105, No.2), 88

<sup>219</sup> Law No. 4/93 of 28 December 1993, (Articles 111-114), 90

<sup>220</sup> Ismael Valigy, personal interview, August 8, 2001.

<sup>221</sup> General Peace Agreement , Protocol III, Part V. section 3a.

<sup>222</sup> United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ”, (S/26385), para 24.



In the end, the first proposal won.<sup>223</sup> In addition, all parties and ONUMOZ could assign one member (as a non-voting member) of their party to attend the Commission's sessions.<sup>224</sup> In a meeting with Boutros-Ghali on October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1993, Dhlakama and Chissano agreed that the 20 commission members would choose the chair. If the committee members were unable to reach a decision, then the President of the Republic would select the chair from a list of five names that the National Elections Commission would provide to him.<sup>225</sup> In the end, the commission was able to choose a chair without having to use the government as a tiebreaker.<sup>226</sup>

### **Selecting the Chair of the National Elections Commission**

The selection of the chair offers a unique insight into the formation of and need for mutual vulnerability. The methodology of choosing the chair, worked out in the meeting with Boutros-Ghali, Dhlakama, and Chissano, was that each party – Renamo, the government and the unarmed opposition – would present one candidate for the head of the National Elections Commission.<sup>227</sup> Valigy recalls that Brazão Mazula, the commission's choice for chairman, was selected from the list of the three nominees for his relative neutrality and lack of involvement with the conflict.<sup>228</sup> Specifically, Mazula did not have any political affiliation in Mozambique.<sup>229</sup> In fact, ten years prior to the nomination, Mazula had been living in Brazil. Perhaps most importantly, the interview with Valigy revealed that Mazula was the nominee of the three

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<sup>223</sup> United Nations, The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995, (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1995), 36.

<sup>224</sup> Law No. 4/93 of 28 December 1993, (Article 15, no. 5), 64-65.

<sup>225</sup> United Nations, "Press Briefing by the Secretary-General in Maputo" 20 October 1993, 203.

<sup>226</sup> Brazão Mazula. Moçambique: Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento (Maputo: Inter-Africa Group, 1995), 40.

<sup>227</sup> United Nations, "Press Briefing by the Secretary-General in Maputo" 20 October 1993, 203.

<sup>228</sup> Ismael Valigy, personal interview.

members of the un-armed opposition. According to Valigy, the government knew that Renamo would not agree to a government-nominee. Therefore, the choice of Mazula was obvious.<sup>230</sup> In selecting Mazula, both Renamo and the Government, the most significant entities on the Commission, ceded their leverage on the Commission – both incurred political vulnerability because Mazula did not represent either of their particular groups. Yet, the choice of Mazula helped to move the electoral process forward and avoid a political impasse.

### **Decision-making at the National Elections Commission**

The decision-making process within the National Elections Commission also made the parties politically vulnerable to each other. According to Valigy, despite the higher number of government representatives, the members of the National Elections Commission did not feel its decisions would favor the government. Valigy stated that early in the electoral law process, the decision had been made that the National Elections Commission would make decisions by consensus;<sup>231</sup> one party could not over-power another by sheer numbers. Valigy stressed that the government's goal was to seek ways in which to build confidence that Renamo would realize that the political system was open for their participation.<sup>232</sup> Importantly, the system and functions of the National Elections Commission were duplicated at the provincial and district levels. Each had government, Renamo, non-armed opposition members, a member of ONUMOZ, and was chaired by an independent person.<sup>233</sup> The use of unanimity by the National Elections Commission in making decisions essentially equalized all participants – including giving each the

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<sup>229</sup> United Nations, The United Nations and Mozambique: 1992-1995 ( 1995), 56

<sup>230</sup> Ismael Valigy, personal interview.

<sup>231</sup> Law No. 4/93, 28 December, 1993, (Article 22, no. 2), 67-68.

<sup>232</sup> Ismael Valigy, personal interview. (It should be restated that Valigy represented the government on the Commission).

<sup>233</sup> Law No. 4/93, 28 December, (Articles 23, 24, 25), 68.

power of the veto.<sup>234</sup> It forced compromise on almost all decisions. The participants were at once empowered and boxed in from making adverse policy decisions. Admittedly, deadlocks and vetoes were frequent<sup>235</sup>, but at the same time it provided security that biased results would be held at bay.<sup>236</sup>

Two examples, in addition to the selection of Mazula, demonstrate how this rule of unanimity in decision making helped to preserve political stability and move the electoral process forward: the debates on the computerization of the electoral results and irregularities and on allowing expatriates to vote.<sup>237</sup> It must first be recognized that although the political parties decided to make their decisions by consensus they had by no means dropped their partisan affiliation. Given the chance, with no requirement of consensus, the parties would vote in their own interests. Such partisanship is particularly evident in the two debates mentioned above.

#### ***Computerization of the electoral results and irregularities***

The National Elections Commission proposed that the electoral results and irregularities be stored in a computerized database. The split among the Commission members prevented quick action on this matter. In particular, the un-armed groups feared that on the orders of Frelimo, technicians from Brazil and England had “infiltrated” the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration, the body designated to carry out the functions and directives of the National Elections Commission, and were in the process of programming computers to generate

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<sup>234</sup> This point is also brought out by a later article: Joseph Hanlon, “Power and Cooperation” Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 17, Part I, November 1996. Published by AWEPA. [Online Database] [www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace\\_96\\_1.html](http://www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace_96_1.html) (cited February 2001).

<sup>235</sup> Ismael Valigy, personal interview.

<sup>236</sup> When asked about the presence of bias in results, Mr. Valigy responded that the requirement to make every decision by unanimity prevented bias (personal interview).

<sup>237</sup> Mazula, 49.

fraudulent votes for Frelimo. (Allegedly, such manipulation occurred in Angola and benefited the government).<sup>238</sup>

To bring the opposition around, Brazão Mazula, the president of the National Elections Commission, traveled to Dhlakama's house on April 2, 1994 to explain the benefits of the computers in the vote counting. In his account, Mazula explained the mechanisms of a computer and how it would actually reduce the numbers of errors that a manual count and calculator may produce. At the end, Dhlakama commented that nobody had ever explained computers and the reasons behind the National Elections Commission's desire to use computers as had Mazula.<sup>239</sup> On May 26, 1994, speaking for the opposition, Dhlakama issued a statement saying that computerization of results would be supported under the provision of tight control by the members of ONUMOZ.<sup>240</sup> The actions by Mazula cast legitimacy on the opposition's fears and the agreement on the presence of outside monitors accommodated their concerns as well as potentially prevented fraud by both sides. Without the rules, each side would have voted according to its party's position, giving the government its way because it held a majority of seats on the National Elections Commission.

### ***Debating the Expatriate vote***

The debate over allowing Mozambican citizens overseas to vote was also divisive. The government desired to allow voting by expatriates, while Renamo opposed it. According to Valigy, Renamo feared that the government would somehow manipulate votes in neighboring countries in their favor.<sup>241</sup> In fact, many expatriates had left Mozambique due to Renamo's

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<sup>238</sup> Ibid, 50

<sup>239</sup> Ibid, 53-4.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid, 50

<sup>241</sup> Ishmael Valigy, personal email correspondence, October 18, 2001.

activities.<sup>242</sup> As no compromise could be reached on this issue, it was eventually dropped.<sup>243</sup> In essence, the government conceded, because no accommodation with Renamo could be developed. Unimpeded by a requirement of consensus, the government would have gotten its way, by simply its majority on the National Elections Commission.

The consensus rule allowed opportunities for both sides to create situations in which the other was politically vulnerable. In particular, of importance to Renamo, without such a rule, the government would have voted to advance its own position. Furthermore, Mazula himself admits that in the desire to get unanimity, the other members of the National Elections Commission were forced to form strong relationships within and outside the organization.<sup>244</sup> These actions bestow legitimacy and respect to the parties and allow their inclusion into the political process. Doing otherwise would marginalize opposition parties. Equally important, taking such steps to prevent a group's marginalization risks compromising one's own view, thus making one's view vulnerable to political influence of another group.

#### **Neutralizing the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration**

Equally important as the National Elections Commission was the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration, which carried out the functions and directives of the National Elections Commission.<sup>245</sup> During elections, the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration was to report directly to the National Elections Commission, but during non-election years, would revert back to a department under the Ministry of State Administration.<sup>246</sup> The structure of the National Elections Commission and the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration and

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<sup>242</sup> Hanlon, "Logistic Problems", 2

<sup>243</sup> Mazula, 51-52.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid, 54

<sup>245</sup> Law No. 4/93, (Article 19, no. 4), 66-67

their relationship to each other was the same at the provincial and district levels as at the national level.<sup>247</sup>

By itself, the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration did not display any costly concessions. There were 50 members of the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration: 25 nominated by the government, 9 by Renamo, 4 from the non-armed opposition, and 12 from the United Nations.<sup>248</sup> While the government appointed the director of the Technical Secretariat, deputy directors came from Renamo and the other parties.<sup>249</sup> Neutrality seemed compromised. Yet, because the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration was subordinate to the National Elections Commission<sup>250</sup>, whose design created mutually politically vulnerable situations, this negative configuration was diluted.

### **The Creation of Vested Interests**

Some may refute that Mozambique's electoral rules prevented political instability by citing Dhlakama's call for an electoral boycott on the eve of the elections. However, the political developments and the organization of the elections, whose progress had been facilitated by the rules of the National Elections Commission, already had vested interests by the time of the elections. At least, Renamo's soldiers were not vested in following Dhlakama. As pointed out earlier in the discussion of demobilization, the offer to the soldiers of 18 months of salary for demobilization greatly sped up the process.<sup>251</sup> Carolyn Nordstrom, quotes one representative of Renamo at the polling station as saying: 'Dhlakama can go back out in the bush and fight by

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<sup>246</sup> Ismael Valigy, personal interview.

<sup>247</sup> Law No. 4/93 of 28 December 1993, (Article 19, no. 6), 67

<sup>248</sup> Mazula, 41.

<sup>249</sup> Law No. 4/93, (Article 19, no. 3,4), 66

<sup>250</sup> Ibid, (Article 19), 66-67.

<sup>251</sup> Synge. 100-103.

himself if he wants war so bad.’<sup>252</sup> Given the 88 percent voter turnout<sup>253</sup>, it is not surprising that the accounts from Mozambique show that the call to boycott was unsuccessful among Renamo members.<sup>254</sup>

At the national level, Renamo members of the National Elections Commission were now part of the system they created. Matteo Zuppi commented that Renamo members of the National Elections Commission in Maputo did not accept Dhlakama’s order. At that point, they too, like the other commission members, wanted to hold the elections.<sup>255</sup> Ajello writes that the refusal by the National Elections Commission’s president to investigate claims of fraud no doubt fueled Dhlakama’s call for a boycott.<sup>256</sup> Dhlakama changed his mind after Ajello and other members of the international community promised to investigate allegations of fraud.<sup>257</sup> Yet, it also illustrates the effect that weakly vested interests can have on limiting the options available for thwarting a process. Perhaps, the intervention of the international community hastened Dhlakama’s change of heart, but organizationally, his support was already weak.

In sum, the requirement of consensus, the balanced composition of the National Elections Commission, and the necessity of compromise, bolstered the credibility that Renamo’s entrance into the political space would provide it with influence in structuring the electoral process. It could protect itself from adverse government decisions through its veto power and by the neutrality of Mazula. Importantly, the government had the same tools at its disposal. The situation placed both Renamo and the Government in mutually vulnerable positions. The rules

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<sup>252</sup> Carolyn Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 228.

<sup>253</sup> United Nations, United Nations in Mozambique....., 30.

<sup>254</sup> See for example, Nordstrom’s account of election day (226-228)

<sup>255</sup> Matteo Zuppi, personal interview.

<sup>256</sup> Ajello, 635

governing the National Elections Commission allowed compromise, as seen in the debate over the composition of the Commission itself and the decisions on computerization and the expatriate vote. These types of outcomes, which essentially limited bias and guaranteed some representation, conceivably created in Renamo, the un-armed opposition, and the government a vested interest in maintaining these rules. Such a conclusion may be deduced from the developments in the subsequent elections when a change in the rules resulted in Renamo's and other parties' boycott of elections, as the next part will show.

### **The 1998 Local Elections**

The 1998 local elections were the first elections held after the transition to a multi-party system. By holding the election of municipal assemblies, presidents of municipal assemblies, and mayors, the 1998 local elections also marked the beginning of the decentralization of political power in Mozambique. For Renamo in particular, it meant that even if they did not obtain the majority in parliament, they might be able to govern locally. The 1994 local elections had shown that Renamo had relatively significant support; based on the legislative results of the 1994 national elections, Renamo had support in more than one third of Mozambique.<sup>258</sup> Thus, the stakes were high for both the government and Renamo.

Two main issues paralyzed local elections in Mozambique: (1) the rules governing which provinces would participate and (2) the rules governing the management of the elections (the local elections necessitated the creation of new electoral laws as the first election had been for the national representatives). The process by which these impasses were either resolved or not resolved revealed the tepid credibility of political reform in the 1998 elections, as a result of asymmetric vulnerability. Equally significant, the 1998 elections revealed the importance of the

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<sup>257</sup> Ibid, 636. This point was also repeated during a phone interview with Dennis C. Jett, Former U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique from 1993-1996, on September 26, 2001.



electoral rules and the persistence of those rules through the weaknesses in the domestic political environment and the international community.

The local elections were still managed by the National Elections Commission and the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration. As in 1994, the National Elections Commission held the decision-making power. However the rules governing these institutions had changed. As a result, unlike the 1994 elections, the 1998 elections did not produce compromise or provide Renamo or the other opposition members with the possibility of blocking actions they viewed as unfair. The low degree of mutual political vulnerability was manifested by the eventual boycott by Renamo of the parliamentary vote to determine which localities would participate in the elections and the boycott of the election itself by Renamo and other members of the opposition. After discussing the international and domestic environment, I will turn to the process that decided which localities would participate, Renamo's parliamentary boycott, and the electoral rule changes that prompted the boycott of the election. The outcome of the elections shows the importance of the international community in the persistence of Mozambique's electoral laws.

### ***The international and domestic environment***

#### ***Division in the International Community***

In a country dependent on the international community to fund elections<sup>259</sup>, the preferences of the international community can influence choices. At the time of the 1998 local elections, the international community was divided over the amount of consensus needed to pass the electoral law and the degree of accommodation the government should give to Renamo. On

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<sup>258</sup> Chissano won the first election with 53.3 percent of the vote, against Dhlakama's 33.73 percent of the vote. (United Nations, Elections in the Peace Process in Mozambique,...p. 30.)

<sup>259</sup> "Deputies end debate on local government draft laws" Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1030 GMT, 31 March 1997 (excerpt). Translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

one hand, the United States appeared to advocate a greater role for Renamo in decision making<sup>260</sup> and supported European donors who stated that consensus on the electoral law had to be reached even with parties not represented in parliament.<sup>261</sup> In fact, the United States appeared relatively more supportive than other states of ensuring that Renamo was a viable part of the political process – expressing concern and, subsequently providing legitimacy for Renamo’s complaints of questionable voter registration procedures.<sup>262</sup>

On the other hand, there was also a sense in the international community that Mozambique was at a stage where it could conduct ‘normal politics’ and Renamo’s tactics or expectations of consensus were viewed as only applicable for the 1994 post-conflict, elections.<sup>263</sup> Indeed, the government and many members of the international community saw the 1998 local elections as needing less political cooperation. There seemed to be a determination on the part of the government and the international community to go by the rules established. For example, responding to questions on whether the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration would include political representatives, Chissano replied that only the Assembly of the Republic could make such a decision – and their agenda had already been drafted.<sup>264</sup> Additionally, although there were conflicting reports about the European Union’s continued financial support for the elections in light of the rule changes, in the end, they did not remove their funding.<sup>265</sup>

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*FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa* April 1, 1997 [Online Database] October 10, 2001; FBIS-AFR-97-090).

<sup>260</sup> “US holds up funds for Mozambique’s first local elections” Agence France Presse May 13, 1998. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. Januar 5, 2002.

<sup>261</sup> “Mozambique: Local Elections Debate” Indian Ocean Newsletter, November 18, 1995. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. July 11, 2001.

<sup>262</sup> “Mozambique says elections to go ahead despite US criticism” Agence France Presse May 13, 1998. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. January 5, 2002.

<sup>263</sup> Manning (2001), 165.

<sup>264</sup> “Chissano gives new conference on election postponement issue” British Broadcasting Corporation, March 16, 1998. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. October 30, 2000.

### *The Domestic Political Environment*

Domestically, Renamo was not viewed as a political threat to the government. As Manning (1998) describes, Renamo had not proved an organizationally strong or ideologically united political party. Of the 112 members of parliament, only 18 had been 'in the bush' during the war.<sup>266</sup> Perhaps for this reason, within itself, Renamo members were suspicious of each other's motives for joining the party. Moreover, Renamo parliamentary tactics of frequent reversals on decisions further evidenced its organizational weakness.<sup>267</sup> Thus, I argue, there was some evidence that to some extent, Renamo was fractured and therefore posed less of a threat to the government and could not present a vigorous, united challenge.

The actions of Frelimo and Renamo mirror the support each perceived from the international community and the political opportunities at the domestic level. The division of the international community and the perceived weakness of Renamo manifested themselves in the decisions by Renamo to boycott the parliamentary vote on the localities that would participate in the local elections, the government's decision to change the electoral rules and maintain the changes in the face of opposition, and Renamo's subsequent boycott of the elections. Unfortunately, the change in the electoral rules also affected the mutual vulnerability of both parties.

#### ***Decisions on Participating Localities***

According to the Municipalities Law passed in March 1994, which Renamo unanimously supported,<sup>268</sup> only municipalities meeting certain conditions would be permitted to hold elections

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<sup>265</sup> "Says his main concern is Mozambique's development" *Financial Times Information* May 21, 1998. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. January 5, 2002.

<sup>266</sup> Manning. (1998), 185.

<sup>267</sup> Manning (2001), 162-3

<sup>268</sup> "Renamo Threatens to Boycott Local Elections" (Internet) Dakar PANA in English, 17 Jan 1997, *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa* Jan 22 1997. [Online Database: FBIS-AFR-97-013] (cited October 10, 2001).

(parliament would decide these municipalities). The stipulations, which required a locality to have a town hall, typewriter and copy machine, car, small truck or tractor, five “trained” staff, and the ability to raise revenue, left out 128 rural districts and 23 urban districts.<sup>269</sup> Moreover, holding local elections in a few “ready” localities defined the concept of gradualism preferred by Frelimo. In this first proposal, 11 constituencies would participate in the local elections.<sup>270</sup>

Renamo felt that these constituencies favored the government and began a renewed insistence on having local elections nationwide.<sup>271</sup> As a compromise, a second proposal, which would include 22 other localities, was presented for a vote to parliament in April 1997.<sup>272</sup> Whereas, the original proposal by the government (designated as Proposal one in appendix 2) included only three districts in which Renamo won 50 percent or more of the legislative vote, the additional 22 localities cities (designated as Proposal two in appendix 2) added eight more districts where Renamo had an advantage.<sup>273</sup> If the 1994 legislative voting patterns were to repeat themselves in 1998, Frelimo would have won 60 percent of the vote under Proposal one, versus 52 percent under Proposal two. On the other hand, Renamo would receive 27 percent with Proposal one versus 34 percent under Proposal two.<sup>274</sup>

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<sup>269</sup> Joseph Hanlon, “Local government...” Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 15 (April 1995): 3-4.

<sup>270</sup> Joseph Hanlon, “City Council Elections in 1997?” Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 17. Part I (17 November 1996) [Online Database]. [www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace96\\_1.html](http://www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace96_1.html) (cited February 24, 2001).

<sup>271</sup> “Renamo threatens to Boycott Local Elections”

<sup>272</sup> Manning (2001), 148.

<sup>273</sup> As cautioned in the Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin (Issue 18, Part 2, June 1997), the voters in 1998 will not necessarily vote like those in 1994 or that the rural vote will resemble the urban vote. Nonetheless, the districts still provide indications of political leanings for the area [Joseph Hanlon, “How They Voted” Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 18. Part II (June 1997). [Online Database] [www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace97\\_2\\_2.html](http://www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace97_2_2.html) (cited February 24, 2001)]. Whereas the Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin discusses the number of localities won by either Renamo or Frelimo, I also indicate the nation-wide support for both parties. I believe this gives a clearer idea of the amount of support each party had in the country.

<sup>274</sup> Calculated from the electoral results published by STAE (Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration) 1994.

Still, Renamo contested the final list of eligible localities. In January 1997, as the time neared to a parliamentary vote on which cities would participate, Raul Domingos, head of Renamo's bench in parliament reintroduced an amendment that had been ruled out of order the previous December – elections should be held nationwide. Domingos claimed that the 33 localities selected would ensure Frelimo a victory.<sup>275</sup> Earlier, João Gonclaves, a deputy leader of Renamo, commented that holding local elections a little bit at a time or as localities became ready, would essentially mean that local elections would be held every year in a staggered manner. Gonclaves took that to mean that since local elections could not be held at one time, change would be incremental and the status quo, favoring Frelimo, could be preserved.<sup>276</sup> To improve their chances, Renamo argued for the inclusion of another 27 localities<sup>277</sup> (designated as Proposal three in appendix 2).

Using the 1994 voting patterns again, an analysis shows that if all of Renamo's nominated cities and towns were to be included, Frelimo would still lead with 47 percent of the vote, whereas Renamo would gain 37 percent of the vote<sup>278</sup> – just three more points than with Proposal two. When it came time for a vote, Renamo boycotted the parliamentary vote on the 33 localities<sup>279</sup> and parliament settled on them in April 1997.<sup>280</sup>

Reflecting the international community's requirement of consensus for passing the electoral law, many in Mozambique attributed Renamo's boycott to the expected international

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<sup>275</sup> "Renamo Threatens to Boycott Local Elections"

<sup>276</sup> "Renamo Deputies Criticize Recommendation to Amend Constitution". BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 13, 1996. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. July 11, 2001.

<sup>277</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Other Renamo Points" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 18, Part 1, (June 1997). [Online Database] [www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace97\\_2\\_2.html](http://www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace97_2_2.html) (cited February 24, 2001)].

<sup>278</sup> Calculated from the election results published by STAE.

<sup>279</sup> Manning (2001), 148.

<sup>280</sup> "List of constituencies for local elections" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts April 19, 1997 Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. July 11, 2001.

support it may receive.<sup>281</sup> As stated previously, at one point, European donors, with the support of the US, stated that consensus had to be reached even with parties not represented in parliament.<sup>282</sup> Yet, the belief domestically and among some international entities that the cooperative spirit of the 1994 elections did not apply to the 1998 elections<sup>283</sup>, may have led the government to forge ahead with the parliamentary vote, despite the boycott by Renamo. Thus, the split at the international level, in a country dependent on international funding for elections<sup>284</sup>, created a space for both an insistence on compromise and a reluctance to do so. In this case, the notion of vulnerability was asymmetrical because Renamo continued to feel that it would be placed in an inferior position.

### ***Electoral Rule Changes and the Boycott of the 1998 Elections***

#### ***Electoral Rule Changes***

While Renamo accepted the 33 localities selected for local elections, rule changes in the management proposed for the elections undermined credibility in the National Elections Commission through the creation of additional asymmetry in vulnerability. Specifically, Renamo and the other opposition parties cited their concern for the methods used to administer the election.

Four important changes occurred in the National Elections Commission since 1994. First, the National Elections Commission abandoned the requirement to reach unanimity on all decisions. For the 1998 elections (and 1999 for that matter), decisions were made by majority

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<sup>281</sup> "Dhlakama warns donors Renamo to boycott local elections" British Broadcasting Corporation, February 19, 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 6, 2002.

<sup>282</sup> "Mozambique: Local Elections Debate" Indian Ocean Newsletter, November 18, 1995.

<sup>283</sup> Manning (2001),165.

<sup>284</sup> "Deputies end debate on local government draft laws"...*FBIS Daily Report-Southern Africa*. April 17, 1997

vote.<sup>285</sup> The abandonment of unanimity exacerbated a second problem – that the composition of National Elections Commission staff, now numbering 9 instead of 21, favored the government. It was composed of four members nominated by Frelimo, three members nominated by Renamo, a president, Leonardo Simbine nominated by Chissano, and a technical expert, Fernando Macarno, nominated by the council of ministers (who came from the majority party, Frelimo). Leonardo Simbine also served as the Frelimo-nominated vice president of the National Elections Commission in 1994 and Fernando Macarno was at the time the deputy national director of local government in the Ministry of State Administration.<sup>286</sup> Thus, of the nine members of the National Elections Commission, six potentially favored the government and three favored Renamo. Third, the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration would no longer have political parties' members on staff or at the polling stations.<sup>287</sup> This change was especially contentious, as Renamo had questions about the transparency of the voter registration process.<sup>288</sup> Fourth, the National Elections Commission voted on 20<sup>th</sup> January to limit all observers to the 1998 local elections to Mozambican citizens.<sup>289</sup>

The new arrangement created asymmetric political vulnerability in three ways. Firstly, the abandonment of the consensus requirement meant that the Government did not have to compromise for Renamo. Consensus and compromise proved instrumental in securing Renamo's

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<sup>285</sup> Ismael Valigy, personal interview.

<sup>286</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Elections Commission Starts" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 19 (September 1997). [Online Database] < [www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace97\\_3\\_1.html](http://www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace97_3_1.html) > (cited on February 24, 2001).

<sup>287</sup> "Chissano give news conference on election postponement issue"; "Renamo denied participation in electoral administration agency" *Xinhua News Agency* March 19, 1998. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. October 30, 2000.

<sup>288</sup> "President Chissano Intervenes to End Election Crisis" *Johannesburg SAPA. FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa* February 20, 1998. [Online Database] on January 5, 2002.

<sup>289</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "No Foreign Observers for Local Elections" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Local Election Extra, (10 February 1998). [Online Database] < [www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace98\\_extra.html](http://www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace98_extra.html) > (cited on February 24, 2001).

agreement during the 1994 elections. Although the government was represented in higher numbers in 1994, the requirement of consensus in the National Elections Commission mitigated against biased or suspicious decisions as demonstrated in the rulings on the vote for expatriates, computerization of vote counts, and even in the selection of Mazula as chair of the National Elections Commission. Secondly, the absence of Renamo representatives in the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration meant that, effectively, the government had complete control over the election process. Even if the National Elections Commission still oversaw the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration, the National Elections Commission, as I pointed out above, contained elements of bias. In the first two cases – abandoning unanimity and eliminating political parties from the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration – the government incurred no cost by refusing to engage in conciliatory strategies toward Renamo. Thirdly, preventing the monitoring by the international community also may have hidden irregularities and fraud in the system. In this still fragile democracy, such outside validation is conceivably invaluable and renders both parties vulnerable to outside monitoring. In the 1994 elections, the invitation of the international community to monitor the vote count in particular helped to assuage Renamo's fears of fraud.

#### *Renamo's Boycott*

Renamo and some opposition parties responded to these changes by boycotting the 1998 local elections.<sup>290</sup> According to Dhlakama, the main factor behind the boycott was the management and verification process of the local elections. In particular, Dhlakama wanted the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration to have political party representation.<sup>291</sup> In

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<sup>290</sup> "Renamo announced Final Decision not to Take Part in Local Elections" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts April 30, 1998. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. January 5, 2002.



protest, Renamo members left the National Elections Commission on January 29, 1998 (nine days after the National Elections Commission voted to keep international observers out).<sup>292</sup> Moreover, as mentioned before, the National Elections Commission could have moved forward even with a unanimous Renamo objection. Thus, one could not say that Renamo could gain from or punish the National Elections Commission by impeding its meetings. Rather, it reflected both a commitment on behalf of Renamo that it fundamentally opposed the set up of the election and that it might be able to gain more from boycotting than cooperation.

The boycott called by Renamo and the other opposition parties of the 1998 local elections was followed by voter turnout of approximately 15 percent<sup>293</sup>-- a significant decrease from the nearly 88 percent of the 1994 elections.<sup>294</sup> The poor showing in the elections was especially significant since President Chissano had stated that if there were a strong showing in the elections it would balance out the boycott.<sup>295</sup> Thus, the 15 percent showing was in many ways a victory for Renamo and the other opposition groups. Still, abandoning the local elections was a significant loss for Renamo, the major opposition party. Frelimo ran unopposed in 81 percent and 58 percent in the municipal and mayoral races, respectively.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>291</sup> Joseph Hanlon. "Renamo's Refusal to Participate" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 20. Part II (March 1998). [Online Database] < [www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace98\\_1\\_2.html](http://www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace98_1_2.html) > (cited on February 24, 2001).

<sup>292</sup> Joseph Hanlon. "Renamo leaves CNE" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 20. Part II (March 1998). [Online Database] < [www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace98\\_1\\_2.html](http://www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace98_1_2.html) > (cited on February 24, 2001).

<sup>293</sup> "Dhlakama Demands Annulment of Municipal Polls" Africa News Service July 20, 1998. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. January 5, 2002.

<sup>294</sup> United Nations, United Nations in Mozambique.... , p.30

<sup>295</sup> "Chissano Softens Stance On Local Mozambican Polls Debate" Africa News Service March 13, 1998, Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. August 20, 2001.

<sup>296</sup> Carter Center, Observing the 1999 Elections in Mozambique: Final Report Democracy Program, The Carter Center, August 2000. [Online Database]. < [www.cartercenter.org](http://www.cartercenter.org) > (cited September 18, 2001), 9

### ***Explaining the Electoral Rule Changes and Renamo's Boycott***

If the consensus rule and political representation at the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration helped to stave off political instability during the first elections, why did the National Elections Commission change and maintain the rules in 1998? Similarly, why did Renamo forego a chance at local political influence? I suggest that answers to these questions reflect the conflicting messages at the international level.

As pointed out in the previous part, the selection of the chair of the National Elections Commission, the computerization of the election results, and prohibition of voting by expatriates demonstrate that either party would have preferred to vote in its own interest, given the chance. Indeed, during the 1994 presidential campaign Chissano was open in his reluctance to share power with Renamo – although he did say that no agreement would be made before elections.<sup>297</sup> In contrast, Renamo voiced a willingness to form a joint government.<sup>298</sup> Furthermore, besides the benefits obtained through the compromising on issues, the consensus rule requirement of the National Elections Commission made for slow decision-making.<sup>299</sup>

Thus, there were both political and logistical reasons to change the rules of the National Elections Commission – the international preferences helped to sustain those desired changes. In particular, many in the international community who provided funds for and monitored the

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<sup>297</sup> “Chissano Discusses Peace Accord, Upcoming Elections” Maputo SAVANA in Portuguese 21 Jan 1994 p. 2,3 (text). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Services. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa* 15 February 1994. (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-031; p. 22 19-24); “Chissano Rules Out Pre-election Accord With Renamo” Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1400 GMT 27 Aug. 1994 (text). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Services. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa* 27 August 1994 [Online Database].

<sup>298</sup> “Renamo President on Elections, Future Government” Lisbon RTP Internacional Television in Portuguese 1800 GMT 21 Apr 1994 (text). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Services. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa* 22 April 1994. (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-078; p. 24-25); “Renamo's Dhlakama Holds News Conference on Situation – Demands National Unity Government” Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1730 GMT 26 Aug 1994 (text). Translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Services. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa* August 26, 1994. [Online Database].

<sup>299</sup> This effect was brought up in an interview Ismael Valigy (August 2001, Washington, DC). See also: Hanlon, “Logistic Problems”...(August 1994), 2.

elections did not view the 1998 elections as containing the special conditions of the 1994 elections. Reverting to 'normal politics' would not require the government to reach consensus with Renamo on all points. Moreover, the complaints by Renamo on irregularities in the voter registration process were met with lukewarm concerns. When Renamo complained about irregularities in the voter registration process, the observers stated that, even if Renamo was correct, organizing new voter registration drives, which had cost \$11 million, was a waste of money.<sup>300</sup> Despite uncertainty about the European Union's continued financial support for the elections in light of the rule changes, they did not remove their funding.<sup>301</sup>

Notwithstanding some members' of the international community insistence on the normalcy of the 1998 election, the implicit support of the United States may have contributed to Renamo's confidence in calling for a boycott. Early legitimacy for Renamo's grievances regarding the voter registration procedures were given by a group of international donors who recognized that in Renamo areas there had been voter registration irregularities.<sup>302</sup> Later, however as Renamo continued to threaten a boycott, the US Embassy in Mozambique issued a communiqué stating that the US would not continue to support the elections given the *legitimate* [italics are mine] concerns over impartiality and transparency.<sup>303</sup> Additionally, the United States hinted, as the elections drew near, that these problems should not occur in the 1999 elections.<sup>304</sup> Thus, Renamo may have thought that it could garner international support if the electoral changes did not go its way.

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<sup>300</sup> "President Chissano Intervenes ....";

<sup>301</sup> "Says his main concern is Mozambique's development".

<sup>302</sup> "Local ballot problems" Indian Ocean Newsletter, February 29, 1998. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. January 5, 2002.

<sup>303</sup> "Mozambique says elections to go ahead despite US criticism".

<sup>304</sup> "Mozambique says elections to go ahead despite US criticism..."

If Renamo thought that it could bring the government to change its mind, then Renamo miscalculated the international support for consensus during the management of the elections. The international community did not intervene. Similarly, Frelimo underestimated the unity of Renamo and the opposition parties in general and the interest of the international community in Mozambique's politics. The changes in electoral rules in 1999 appear to ameliorate the problems Renamo had with the 1998 elections. Seemingly, the Frelimo government appears to compensate for the negative effects of the boycott - Chissano had publicly declared that the effect of a boycott would be annulled by a high voter turnout<sup>305</sup> – and the fact that international community did admit to irregularities in the registration processes. In the 1999 presidential elections, the two main changes made – the representation of political parties at the polling stations and the invitation of international observers, which I discuss next – reflect these concerns.

### **The 1999 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections**

The boycott of the 1998 elections by Renamo and the unarmed opposition stemmed from the asymmetric vulnerability created by the rules, given the structure of the National Elections Commission. Due to the low turnout that resulted from the boycott and perhaps the less than robust international support as a result of the boycott, the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections sought to correct the problems of the 1998 election. Because the 1994 election was special and tied to the General Peace Agreement, the next set of national elections required a new electoral law.<sup>306</sup> Under the new national electoral law, the number of National Elections Commission members increased and the provinces and districts would also have smaller versions of the National Elections Commission – just like in 1994. The new National Elections

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<sup>305</sup> “Chissano Softens Stance On Local Mozambican Polls Debate”.

<sup>306</sup> United Nations, Elections in Mozambique, 5

Commission had 17 members: eight appointed by Frelimo, six appointed by Renamo, one appointed by the Democratic Union, and two by the government.<sup>307</sup> However, the National Elections Commission did not return to the consensus requirement.<sup>308</sup> Thus, on the face of it, the government had a potential 3-person lead.

Of great importance in the 1999 elections, however, was an emphasis on transparency.<sup>309</sup> The 1999 Electoral Law allowed the political parties to have representatives at the polling stations to inspect the voting process, ballot boxes, and voting cabins.<sup>310</sup> In addition, the law permitted the participation of electoral observers.<sup>311</sup> These were critical rules, as the seeming violation of these new rules by the government led Renamo to cry foul, later.

The election proceeded successfully with 69.5 percent and 68.1 percent of voters turning out for presidential and legislative elections, respectively. Chissano retained the presidency, obtaining 52.3 percent of the vote against Dhlakama's 47.7 percent. In parliament, Frelimo won 48.5 percent of the parliamentary seats and Renamo won 38.8 percent of parliamentary seats.<sup>312</sup>

Problems in the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections occurred at the end of the process, from disputes between Renamo and Frelimo surrounding the ballot counting rules. Unlike in the previous two elections, the international community did not take public positions over the disagreements. Indeed, while the international community is present during the 1999

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<sup>307</sup> The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries. Mozambique Elections Observer Mission Report: 3-5 December 1999 (Auckland Park, South Africa: the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa): 8.

<sup>308</sup> Manning (2001), 155

<sup>309</sup> Carter Center (2000),10; The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries, 8.

<sup>310</sup> Republic of Mozambique, Assembly of the Republic, Law No. 3/99, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 1999, (Articles 47, 49), as reproduced Republic of Mozambique Electoral Laws and Regulations Handbook (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, n.d.), 33.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid, (Article 8), 9

<sup>312</sup> The Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries, p. 23-4.

elections, it is relatively neutral. As a result, it does not constrain the government from acting in its own interests.

### ***The international community***

In contrast with the previous two elections, the international community seemed decidedly neutral and perhaps even supportive of the government. Unlike in 1998, the reports on the electoral process from the major international monitors were favorable. Jimmy Carter called the Mozambican election “the best in the 29 international elections [the Carter Center] has participated in.”<sup>313</sup> Although, later, the Carter Center, which sent 50 observers to Mozambique and visited voting stations in 10 of the 11 provinces, admitted that they did not have adequate access to ballot counting procedures to fully ascertain their fairness; they did not say the process was unfair.<sup>314</sup> Similarly, Pertti Paasio, the head of the European Union’s observation team called Mozambique an example to Europe for its high voter turnout rate.<sup>315</sup> Hence, I argue, the neutral monitoring of the international community provided no constraint to the government to compromise during the ballot-counting phase.

### ***Ballot Counting Rules***

The election results were not published immediately due to a number of difficulties with the software used for ballot counting and the rules under which it was conducted. As disagreements over ballot counting increased, Renamo walked out of the National Elections Commission before the election results were announced, citing fraud.<sup>316</sup> Instead, Renamo

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<sup>313</sup> “Observers Praise Mozambique Elections” Africa News Service December 7, 1999. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. January 5, 2002.

<sup>314</sup> Carter Center (2000), 26

<sup>315</sup> “Observers Praise Mozambique Elections”

<sup>316</sup> Carter Center (2000), 6

insisted that it had won the election.<sup>317</sup> Subsequently, Renamo filed a complaint with the Supreme Court. In its review, the Supreme Court rejected all of Renamo's 23 complaints and confirmed the fairness of the election.<sup>318</sup> Until Chissano broke off discussions in the early part of 2001, Dhlakama was insisting that Renamo governors be appointed in provinces where Renamo had a majority of the vote.<sup>319</sup> Even in January 2002, when the country was making preparations for the 2003 Municipal elections, Dhlakama refused to recognize Chissano as the legitimate president.<sup>320</sup>

Renamo's walk out was prompted because of disagreements over two important ballot-counting rules. First, per Renamo's request, the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration was to be represented by both Renamo and Frelimo party members.<sup>321</sup> As such, Renamo observers at the voting booths and ballot counting sites would not only minimize fraud, but also provide reassurance that the elections were held freely and fairly. As was pointed out previously, in the 1994 elections, the questions surrounding the monitoring of the vote count and potential fraud had brought the National Elections Commission to an impasse. Second, also related to monitoring, in 1999, the National Elections Commissions had implemented a second, vote-tracking process. In a second database, the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration re-tabulated the incoming vote tally sheets arriving from the provinces as a double check on the results being announced by the provinces. Renamo members of the National

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<sup>317</sup> Carter Center (2000), 26

<sup>318</sup> "E.U. calls for probe into Mozambican 'election fraud'", Deutsche Presse-Agentur December 29, 1999. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. October 26, 2000.

<sup>319</sup> "Mozambique President, former rebel leader in new standoff" BBC Monitoring Africa – Political July 23, 2001. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. January 13, 2002.

<sup>320</sup> "Renamo Leader Addresses Congress, says some MP's lack discipline" BBC Monitoring Africa – Political October 30, 2001. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. January 13, 2002.

<sup>321</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Government and Renamo make similar proposals for new election law", Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 21a, (26 October 1998) [Online Database] <[www.mozambique.mz/awepa/extrawep/corpo.htm](http://www.mozambique.mz/awepa/extrawep/corpo.htm)> (cited on February 24, 2001).

Elections Commission and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration came to depend on this second database as verification of results since suspicions of the results had begun to develop due to delays in announcing outcomes.<sup>322</sup>

As the vote counting process continued, Renamo began to complain of marginalization by Frelimo – the Carter Center however was unable to verify this claim in its report.<sup>323</sup> Specifically, Renamo cited that they were prevented from entering election results in the computers when they were from districts in which Renamo was leading.<sup>324</sup> The Carter Center reports that Renamo’s questioning of the election results increased when it was revealed that 10 percent of the provinces had not been included in the vote tally. The final straw came with the National Elections Commission’s decision to stop the second database in order to meet the deadline for reporting results (December 20<sup>th</sup>); Renamo walked out hours later.<sup>325</sup>

#### ***Rationale for Ballot-Counting Changes***

The government incurred no negative cost for stopping the second database. The international community remained silent on the issue. It is possible that with the international community fairly neutral, the government decided to act in a strictly legal manner – closing down the vote count as required by law. More specifically, the apparent neutrality of the international entities allowed the government to carry out its intentions without the costs of going against sponsors’ preferences. Equally important, the decision-making process at the electoral commission, allowed the government to act without attaining consensus. The asymmetric

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<sup>322</sup> Carter Center (2000), 23, 24

<sup>323</sup> Carter Center (2000), 25

<sup>324</sup> “Mozambique: Electoral Office ‘Marginalized’ Renamo” Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1730 GMT 22 December 1999 (text). Translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Services. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa*. [Online Database; FBIS-AFR-1999-1223] (cited October 10, 2001).

<sup>325</sup> Carter Center (2000), 24-26



vulnerability created by this set of rules and international environment, I argue, lay behind the political instability that followed the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Questions surrounding the fairness and transparency of the election both incited Renamo to protest the election as well as gave them an excuse to do so. The credibility that Renamo could successfully participate politically was threatened because the decision to stop the second database and Renamo's alleged exclusion by the government had prevented adequate monitoring. With adequate monitoring, the parties tie their hands from cheating; a costly move that the government seemed to avoid by cutting short the second database and by possibly preventing Renamo from observing or participating in the vote count.

### **Summary**

The short history of electoral institutions in Mozambique shows two important points: 1) rules can create mutually vulnerable political situations; 2) the international community can affect the persistence of those rules through its financial and diplomatic support. As Mozambique moved away from the General Peace Agreement and began to create the electoral institutions to govern itself, the rules determined opposition parties' acceptance of the electoral system. For Mozambique, the most effective rules at maintaining political stability helped to provide the government and the opposition groups with leverage to enforce or block policies. Such rules made the parties mutually vulnerable.

In the 1994 election, the requirement of consensus prevented both parties from adopting positions that would threaten the other party politically. Abandoning the consensus rule after 1994, the National Elections Council, already over-represented by the government, was able to adopt rules in its favor. Without the consensus rule, the elections were accompanied by political instability because the electoral rules could not prevent the parties from acting in politically advantageous ways that may give rise to distrust. Notably, the case study shows that the preferences of the international community may have affected the incentive for consensus. In

1994, the pledge of consensus among the parties was maintained, whereas in 1998, the ambiguity among the international community arguably gave the government an opportunity to renege and Renamo an incentive to withdraw from the process. Alternatively, the international community's apparent neutrality in 1999 allowed the government, already holding more political influence, to skirt consensus when it became an inconvenience.

Renamo's continuing criticism of the electoral process does not necessarily mean a return to conflict for Mozambique; the conditions for civil conflict are not necessarily opposite those of peace. However, failure to make political reform credible to Renamo would most likely result in continuing political tension. As Mozambique's postaccord experience has shown, conceding does not necessarily amount to a zero-sum transfer of political influence. A consideration of mutual political vulnerability allows the parties to structure a political system where interests can be protected as well as promoted. It also prevents the opportunity for parties to destabilize a political system through claims of fraud and other suspicious activities. When Dhlakama called for a boycott of the 1998 local elections, some complained that Dhlakama seemed unable to break out of the patterns of the peace process.<sup>326</sup> From the continuing instability, perhaps the methods used for sustaining peace during the transition should not be abandoned. Indeed the experience in Mozambique indicates that when institutional rules change, so do the vested interests and their commitment to the process -- demonstrating Hirshman's (1970) claim that entities with no vested interests in an organization will exit.

## **SECTION 2.5 CONCLUSION**

As per the General Peace Accord signed by the two parties, Renamo promised to end hostilities against the government and recognize the government's sovereignty in exchange for gaining access to the political space. The General Peace Accord promised financing Renamo's

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transformation into a political party, some allowance for territorial administration, the holding of multiparty elections, and the demobilization of both groups. However, making these claims in the General Peace Accord did not suffice. In accordance with the hypotheses presented, the parties used them strategically to create mutual vulnerabilities in order to make the political reform credible and advance the implementation process.

At the start, given an environment without institutions, Renamo and the government realized the provisions of the General Peace Accord through the timing of actions and concessions which created mutual vulnerability. Specifically, mutual political vulnerability was created by substantial financial assistance from the international community for Renamo's transformation to a political party, the temporary territorial arrangements, and demobilization. As Ajello (1999) pointed out, financial assistance to Renamo in general, and Dhlakama in particular, helped Renamo participate in the peace building process, establish itself in the capital and remain intact as an organization. Significantly, Ajello retained Renamo's cohesion through the financial assistance – in this way, conflicting interests were minimized as Dhlakama continued to hold control over the group.<sup>327</sup> These developments made the government vulnerable to Renamo's political influence and therefore increased the probability that the promises of entering the political space would materialize. The international community's financial assistance and singularity of purpose (as exemplified by the swift response to financial requests [see table 2.2 ] and the neutralization of Mugabe's support for the government<sup>328</sup>) was instrumental in establishing mutual vulnerability. Likewise, the agreements reached over territorial administration prior to demobilization<sup>329</sup> at once reassured the government of its sovereignty over

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<sup>326</sup> Joseph Hanlon, "Can we return to 1994" Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 20,(20 March 1998). [Online Database] <[www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace98\\_1\\_2.html](http://www.geocities.com/Paris/1661/mozpeace98_1_2.html)> (cited on February 24, 2001).

<sup>327</sup> Ajello 637

<sup>328</sup> The account by Hume (1994) details Mugabe's role in ensuring Renamo's continued participation in the peace talks.

<sup>329</sup> Details of the summit decisions are found in: United Nations, "Letter dated 8 September 1993..." (S/26432), paras 1-13.

Mozambique and permitted Renamo's influence in the territories it controlled – creating mutual political and military vulnerability. Lastly, the process of demobilization by both groups served as the highest indicator that hostilities would cease. For Renamo, this was the last method by which it could threaten the government – it was increasing its vulnerability. Notably, the process of demobilization followed prior confidence building measures that made each side politically vulnerable to the other (see Table 2.3). Demobilization – and thus military vulnerability – was accelerated by the reintegration support provided by the international community.<sup>330</sup>

Also significant, the construction of mutual vulnerability was not equally balanced among the parties. Ajello (1999) states it clearly when he writes that “[after a peace accord the] ruling party keeps running the country and has the full control of the state machinery, while the rebellion often lacks even the basic instruments for effective political competition.”<sup>331</sup> The government, because of its control over the political structures bore the greater burden. Indeed, as was seen with the approval of the troop assembly areas, the government had to move more aggressively and move first with demobilization (see Table 2.3).

As the development of electoral institutions began, the rules and vested interests governing the electoral institutions advanced their progress. Specifically, the rules surrounding the decision-making process in the National Elections Commission created mutually vulnerable situations that resulted in compromises by both Renamo and the government. The changes in the institutional rules that occurred in 1998 and 1999 showed the dependence of stability on these vulnerabilities. In particular, rule changes, creating asymmetric vulnerability for Renamo, prompted Renamo and some of the other opposition parties to abandon the political process and caused instability.<sup>332</sup>

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<sup>330</sup> Syngé 66

<sup>331</sup> Ajello, 641.

<sup>332</sup> The accounts of the 1998 and 1999 electoral crises are summarized in Manning (2001).

For the most part, the conditions advancing the implementation process in Mozambique offer support for the hypotheses posed in the introductory chapter. These outcomes are summarized below.

**Table 2.5 Summary of Results of Hypotheses in Mozambique**

<i>Hypotheses</i>	<i>Mutual Vulnerability?</i>		<i>Implementation Outcome</i>	
			<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>
1. Timing of actions, concessions, and events	Yes		Advance	Advance
2. Electoral rules and vested interests	Yes (1994)		Political Stability	Political Stability
	No (1998, 1999)		Political Instability	Political Instability
3. Administrative rules and vested interests	Not applicable			
<i>International community</i>	<i>Effect on Mutual Vulnerability</i>		<i>Implementation Outcome</i>	
	<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>
4. International financial assistance	Positive	Positive	Advance	Advance
5. International cohesion	Positive	Positive	Advance	Advance
<i>Organization of factions</i>	<i>Effect on Mutual Vulnerability</i>		<i>Implementation Outcome</i>	
	<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>
6. Cohesive, leader compliant ( <i>pre-demobilization</i> )	Positive	Positive	Advance	Advance
7. Loosely organized, leader compliant	Not applicable			
8. Cohesive, leader not compliant	Not applicable			
9. Loosely organized, leader not compliant ( <i>post-demobilization</i> )	Weak	Positive	Advance	Advance
10. Proliferation of factions	Not applicable			

Mozambique shows that the mechanisms governing the behavior and response of the parties is an important component of keeping the peace. The outcome of the case study emphasizes that the provisions in the peace accord may be advanced when mutual vulnerability is constructed. A focus solely on external force involvement or the political provisions in General Peace Accord obscures this important feature. In the critical period following the settlement of the Mozambican civil war, the government and Renamo used strategies that consisted of costly concessions and the imposition of mutual vulnerabilities that made the promises for political reform credible. Each time the peace process advanced, mutual vulnerability was present.

**Likewise, the presence of mutual vulnerability advanced the peace process. Therefore, in Mozambique, the creation of mutual vulnerability was both a necessary as well as a sufficient condition for advancing the peace process.**

## **CHAPTER 3. ANGOLA: GOOD FENCES DON'T ALWAYS MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS**

### **SECTION 3.1 BACKGROUND TO ANGOLA**

Following its independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola's civil war, a battle for power among the three protagonists for independence, seemed to end with the signing of the Alvor Accords. Among other things, the Alvor Accords, outlined a system of power sharing between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)<sup>333</sup>, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the three factions vying for political power. Yet, the civil war resumed after Independence Day.<sup>334</sup> In fact, after two other peace accords, the 1991 Bicesse Accords<sup>335</sup> and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, Angola continues to suffer from civil war.<sup>336</sup> The Bicesse Accords brought relative peace for nearly 18 months during which time the parties, with the help of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), moved toward elections. After the first-ever elections in September 1992, Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA refused to accept that he received less votes than the MPLA's José Eduardo dos Santos, citing fraud. A few months thereafter, UNITA resumed hostilities against the MPLA and the civil war continued.<sup>337</sup> The next peace attempt resulted in the Lusaka Protocol, managed by UNAVEM III. But, in 1998, after four years

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<sup>333</sup> Throughout, I refer to the MPLA as the government.

<sup>334</sup> For overviews see: Yvonne C. Lodico. "A Peace that Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola" in UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Civil Wars of the 1990s, William Durch, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 103-134; Hare (1998); Inge Tvedten. Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

<sup>335</sup> The Bicesse Accords are sometimes referred to as the Estoril Accords or the Peace Accords for Angola. In this chapter, I refer to them as the Bicesse Accords.

<sup>336</sup> The civil war in Angola might be nearing an end. The death of Jonas Savimbi by government troops has been followed by a cease fire agreement between UNITA and the government.

<sup>337</sup> For a detailed accounting of the elections and the aftermath see Anstee (1996), 185-357.

of little progress with demobilization and political participation by UNITA, war resumed after the government refused to continue negotiations.<sup>338</sup>

In keeping with the post-cold war time frame of the dissertation, this chapter will examine the implementation period of the last two peace accords. First, the chapter examines the period from the signing of the Bicesse Accords until the rejection of the elections (May 1991 – October 1992). In the second part, the chapter deals with the period from the signing of the Lusaka Protocol to the refusal of the government to continue interacting with UNITA (November 1994 – September 1998). While the Bicesse Accords may be criticized for their lack of powersharing and UN involvement, the Lusaka Protocol seems to contain provisions widely seen as engendering peace, such as powersharing and UN involvement.<sup>339</sup> Therefore, based on the contents of the Lusaka Protocol, Angola should not have returned to war. In light of this apparent contradiction, I use salient incidents during the implementation processes of both accords to illustrate how the absence of mutual vulnerability resulted in the lack of credible political reform and subsequently contributed to continued instability. Then, in sections two and three, I discuss the implementation periods of the Bicesse Accords and Lusaka Protocol, respectively. Section four offers some concluding remarks.

## **SECTION 3.2 THE BICESSE ACCORDS, 1991-1994**

### **The outcome of the Bicesse Accords**

The Bicesse Accords represented the first attempt by the United Nations to end the post-independence civil war in Angola, which had been raging since the beginning of independence in 1975.<sup>340</sup> UNITA's main obligations under the Bicesse Accords were to disarm and extend the

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<sup>338</sup> For an account of the negotiation and implementation process of the Lusaka Protocol see: Hare (1998); see also Hodges (2001).

<sup>339</sup> see: Sisk (1996); Lijphart (1977; 1991); Horowitz (1985); Hampson (1996)



state's administration to all of Angola by returning all territory to the central administration. The extension of state administration was to take place with care and at a date not fixed by the Bicesse Accords.<sup>341</sup> In exchange, the government promised UNITA legality and participation in the political process through elections. The government also promised to disarm its troops.<sup>342</sup> Remarkably, there was no major violation of the cease-fire in the 18 months between the signing of the peace accord in May 1991 and the elections in October 1991 – yet, right after the election the civil war resumed.

After the initial rejection of the election results, Margaret Joan Anstee, the special representative of the secretary general in Angola, obtained Savimbi's acceptance of the announced results. Several meetings were also held between the government's and UNITA's delegation in the Joint Military and Political Committee. However, the atmosphere was one of false hopes and increasing violence by both sides. UNITA, while promising to work toward a solution and requesting a government of national unity, was also retaking municipalities. War effectively resumed in January 1993.<sup>343</sup> What impeded the smooth transition to political reform in Angola?

### **Competing Explanations for the Failure of the Bicesse Accords**

Existing reviews of the failure of the Bicesse Accords focus mainly on four factors: the weak mandate, poor funding and inadequate staffing of UNAVEM II, the lack of international

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<sup>340</sup> The Bicesse Accords are recorded as: UN Security Council, "Letter dated 17 May 1991 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Angola to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General", (S/22609), 17 May 1991 (Readex Microprint). The origin of the Bicesse Accords is found in the "Washington Concept Paper", designed in Washington by Herman Cohen, Portugal and the USSR (see Herman Cohen. "Angola: From Euphoria to Tragedy, in *Intervening in Africa* pp. 105-7).

<sup>341</sup> UN Security Council, S/22609, p. 51, para 3.

<sup>342</sup> United Nations, S/22609, p. 50, para 1, p. 52, para 9

<sup>343</sup> For a detailed recounting of Angola's descent into war, see Anstee chapters 18-20.

support for UNAVEM II, the failure of the parties (UNITA in particular) to disarm, and the lack of power sharing.<sup>344</sup>

Scholars generally agree on the weakness of UNAVEM II and the apparent lack of international support.<sup>345</sup> UNAVEM II was led by Margaret Joan Anstee, the special representative of the secretary general to Angola, and consisted of only 350 and 126 unarmed military and police observers, respectively, and 100 electoral observers.<sup>346</sup> In Anstee's (1996) memoir, a comprehensive and detailed diary of the implementation of the Bicesse Accords, it is clear that the number of peacekeeping officers were inadequate for carrying out even their weak mandate as mere observers to the accord implementation.<sup>347</sup> Additionally, UNAVEM II has been widely criticized as being poorly funded. Anstee remarked that she "had been given a 747 Jumbo to fly but provided with fuel sufficient only for a DC-3."<sup>348</sup> As a result, UNAVEM II was unable to monitor and manage violations of the peace accord effectively due to the lack of personnel and a narrow mandate.<sup>349</sup> In addition, the small UN presence afforded UNITA the opportunity to bury arms and place troops in parts of Angola they previously had no access to, which facilitated the return to war after the 1992 elections.<sup>350</sup> UNAVEM II's weakness, Anstee has written, was a

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<sup>344</sup> The failings of UNAVEM II are well documented. In addition to Anstee's (1996) memoir of her tenure as Special Representative of the Secretary General in Angola, see also the analysis by Jett (2000);

<sup>345</sup> See the work by Lodico (1996); Jett (2000); Anstee (1996)

<sup>346</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission" (S/22627) 20 May 1991, (Readex Microprint), para 15; UN Security Council, "Letter dated 14 May 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council" (S/23985, microfiche) 20 May 1992; Margaret Joan Anstee. "Background Paper: Angola" The Nexus between Peacekeeping and Peace-building: Debriefing and Lessons, Report of the 1999 Singapore Conference, Nassrine Azimi and Chang Li Lin, ed. (Boston: Kluwer Law International 2000), 87.

<sup>347</sup> Anstee (1996) 529

<sup>348</sup> Anstee (1996), 38.

<sup>349</sup> Anstee (2000), 89

<sup>350</sup> Herman Cohen, personal interview. July 18, 2001.

result of the lack of international support for peace in Angola.<sup>351</sup> Additionally constraining, according to Anstee, was UNAVEM II's inability to act as mediator in the Joint Political-Military Commission, which was organized to manage the implementation of the accord. In the Commission, the two parties were expected to police themselves while the UN acted only as an observer.<sup>352</sup>

While UNAVEM II may have been poorly equipped to work in Angola and the international support weak, it still does not answer how the internal dynamics between the parties led to the break down in cooperation between them. Moreover, even if the UN had a strong enough mandate to have acted as a mediator, it did not override the necessity for the two sides to agree on a particular action or live up to a promise.<sup>353</sup> Furthermore, since UNAVEM III, created to implement the Lusaka Protocol in 1994, comprised more than 7,000 peacekeepers and provides for a stronger role for the UN<sup>354</sup>, it is clear that the strength and role of UNAVEM were not the only factors in the failure of the Bicesse Accords.

Blame for the failure of the Bicesse Accords also falls on the rigidity of the accords themselves. In particular the inflexible date of elections, resulted in the holding of elections without complete demobilization. Here, scholars and practitioners point out that with a nearly intact army, Savimbi was able to pull his troops together and return to war when the 1992 elections did not bring him victory.<sup>355</sup> However, this view does not consider the government's own poor record of demobilization or other factors that diminished commitment to

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<sup>351</sup> Anstee (1996), 535-6; 541-2. On lack of international support see also Jett (2000) 97 and Tvedten, 42.

<sup>352</sup> UN Security Council (S/22609) para 3; see also UN Security Council (S/22627), para 16.

<sup>353</sup> In the account by Fabienne Hara (1999) on Burundi's peace processes, he criticizes that actions of the external actors were limited as they were unable to bring the political parties to make concessions.

<sup>354</sup> United Nations. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping. 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. (New York, NY: United Nations Department of Information, 1996), 255-7.

demobilization. As a result, it leaves out explanations that bring in the government's actions and does not describe the full context in which the civil war was able to resume. More specifically, it leaves out that in any given environment, parties take actions as a response to observed actions by the other party. Indeed, a fuller explanation should provide the context for Savimbi's actions by considering those of the government's.

The Bicesse Accords are also criticized because they did not contain any provision for power sharing. In fact, as adverse effects of a winner-take-all election are exacerbated in Angola due to the lack of decentralization, control of the state becomes the only route to political influence.<sup>356</sup> However, power sharing is not an obvious solution, as the failed Lusaka Protocol will demonstrate. Firstly, it is important to consider the political and military context in which power sharing takes place and how that advances or hinders political influence. Ian Spears (2000) points out that agreements to share power may be unstable due to the state's common position as the gate keeper of overall wealth and political power and unattractive due to the unwillingness of parties to surrender power, among other features.<sup>357</sup> As I described in the theory chapter, in my own preliminary analysis of 25 settlements in the post-cold war era, power sharing does not have a straightforward effect on peace (Appendix 1-A).

The listed shortcomings of the Bicesse Accords – the weak UNAVEM II mandate, absence of power sharing, and the insistence on a specific date for the elections – were corrected later in the Lusaka Protocol (which I discuss in Section 3.3). It is difficult to separate that second

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<sup>355</sup> See Cohen (2000), 114; C. Knudsen, A. Mundt, and I. W. Zartman. Peace Agreements: The Case of Angola, Case Study Series No. 1, (Mount Edgecombe, South Africa: ACCORD 2000), 14; Ohlson (1998), 79; Anstee (1996), 532-4.

<sup>356</sup> Anstee (2000), p. 87. For more on Angola's centralized state see the work by Tvedten (1997), especially chapter 3; Phillippe Le Billion. "Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000" African Affairs 100, (2001), 55-80. [Online Database] (cited on December 4, 2001); Christine Messiant. "The Eduardo Dos Santos Foundation: Or, How Angola's Regime is Taking Over Civil Society" African Affairs 100 (2001), 287-309. [Online Database] (cited on: November 13, 2001); Hodges (2001).

experience from the Bicesse Accords' implementation. Indeed, it adds to the puzzle of the failure of both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol. Further, it forces a greater attention on tactics between the parties during the implementation process. For this reason, I believe it is more informative to understand the context in which actions took place and the cost of concessions by both parties. In other words, I examine the credibility of key promises for political reform by both parties by looking for evidence of mutual vulnerability.

In this section on the Bicesse Accords, I attempt to frame the events differently than much of the existing literature. Rather than a chronological recounting of unfulfilled promises by both sides, I focus on the timing of particular action, events, and concessions during the implementation period. In Angola, a pattern of non-credible political promises formed due to the absence of mutual vulnerabilities at critical times. In particular, the timing of actions, events, and concessions became important because the parties operated in an environment largely devoid of institutional rules and the vested interests that support them. As a result, the parties relied heavily on overt actions and reactions. Thus, while not discounting the role played by the international community, the narrowness of the UNAVEM II mandate or the content of the accords itself, I illustrate how political promises in Angola were undermined through the timing of events, actions, and concessions by the factions, which in turn prevented the completion of the necessary tasks to consolidate peace. Additionally, the division in the international community, its poor response to humanitarian appeals, and the cohesiveness of UNITA under a non-compliant Savimbi, helped to undermine any mutual political and military vulnerability created.

### **The promise of Political Reform with the Bicesse Accord**

As the country moved towards Angola's first multi-party elections, the implementation of the Bicesse Accords consisted of two tasks: first, UNITA and the government were to

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<sup>357</sup> For a good outline of the difficulties of power sharing, see Ian Spears. "Understanding inclusive peace agreements in Africa: the problems of sharing power", *Third World Quarterly*, 21. 1, (2000). [Online

demobilize; second, by the extension of the state administration through UNITA's return of its territory to the government. The goal of the implementation period was to successfully complete these tasks before the holding of elections.<sup>358</sup> Because of their interdependence, demobilization and the extension of state administration could be used as pawns by UNITA and the government to either engender or undermine political or military vulnerability. Through the manipulation of demobilization and the extension of state administration and the mutual vulnerability each can create, UNITA and the government could potentially make credible promises. These possibilities are summarized in Table 3.1, below.

**Table 3.1. Elements of Political Reform**

Scheduled task	Beneficiary	Criteria for credibility: mutual vulnerability
Extension of the state administration	Government	<i>Vulnerability of UNITA:</i> The return of territory to the government by UNITA allows the government to consolidate its sovereignty. UNITA is rendered politically and strategically vulnerable because it loses its ability to challenge the government.
Disarmament, Demobilization, and formation of joint army	Government	<i>Vulnerability of UNITA:</i> By disarming, UNITA risks that the government may dominate if not reciprocated.  By agreeing to the joint army, UNITA risks the loss of control of its troops.
Disarmament, Demobilization, and formation of joint army	UNITA	<i>Vulnerability of Government:</i> By disarming, the government risks that UNITA will dominate it by not following through.  By agreeing to the joint army, the Government risks that UNITA gains access to a legitimate, military machine.

For UNITA, demobilizing its army, FALA, joining the new joint Angolan Armed Forces, and turning over its territories to the central administration were very costly moves. In essence, UNITA would have been left without any political or military influence. In exchange, it was able to gain a chance at political inclusion through presidential, parliamentary, and (later) local

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Database]. (cited on November 13, 2001): 105-108.

<sup>358</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 17 May 1991...", (S/22609), 4-7; 50-51.

elections.<sup>359</sup> Even with political participation, the legitimacy of UNITA's grievances would be diminished – there is a loss of autonomy by being part of the government. However, demobilization would have also been costly to the government. Essentially, by demobilizing, the government would reduce its security threat to UNITA. Yet, like UNITA, the government gained politically from the Bicesse Accords. In its case, the government could secure the tangible evidence of its sovereignty by the extension of the state administration. Still, having to contend with a UNITA presence in parliament, the government stood to lose some of its dominance. Finally, the joint army could deliver at once a mutually vulnerable situation and security for both sides. In sum, during this time of non-existent institutions, the extension of the state administration, demobilization, and the formation of the joint Angolan Armed Forces had the potential to form the mutual vulnerability necessary for credible political reform.<sup>360</sup>

In the next two parts, I describe the implementation of the Bicesse Accord. I discuss the process of the extension of the state administration, troop assembly, and demobilization, their contribution to the credibility of political reform, and the critical intervention of the anti-riot police. While the extension of state administration proceeded to begin the establishment of the credibility of political reform, the last two tasks were not.

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<sup>359</sup> Ibid, 4-7.

<sup>360</sup> Because the civil war resumed after the elections, it is reasonable to question the role of the Electoral Law and National Elections Commission in the failure of Angola's peace efforts. Reviewing the accounts of the days leading up to the elections, it is clear that the principal grievances and threats presented by the parties – security and political sovereignty found their roots in earlier actions taken by the parties. For this reason, I do not focus on the National Elections Commission. For more on the National Elections Commission see: Republic of Angola, Electoral Law no. 5/92, 16 April 1992, Article 14, as reproduced in I Encontro Eleitoral, Encontro dos Ministros Responsáveis pela Administração Eleitoral dos Países

## **Extension of the state administration**

### ***Promises of the extension of state administration***

Angola is divided into 18 provinces, each of which holds 163 districts/municipalities that in turn hold 532 communes.<sup>361</sup> At the start of the implementation process, UNITA stated that it controlled 128 districts<sup>362</sup>, out of the existing 163 districts in Angola. In this case, UNITA was actually in greater control of the country than the government. Thus, the stipulation of the extension of the state administration by the Bicesse Accords that all territory held by UNITA must be turned over to the government's administration,<sup>363</sup> was a great concession for UNITA.

### ***Mutual vulnerability through the extension of the state administration***

The extension of the state administration was declared successfully completed. During the implementation of the Bicesse Accords, the government made the extension of the state administration a condition of voter registration for the National legislative and presidential elections, which were scheduled for September 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> 1992. To obtain UNITA's compliance, the government stated that voter registration could not take place in areas outside its administration.<sup>364</sup> Notably, six days before elections, UNITA expressed concern regarding areas where government administrators had left.<sup>365</sup> UNITA thus developed a vested interest in linking voter registration to the extension of the state administration, especially in the areas it controlled.

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Africanos de Expressão Portuguesa e de Portugal, Volume I –Angola: Constituição, Lei Eleitoral E Legislação Complementar (Published by MAI/Stape, July 1994), 20.

<sup>361</sup> Hodges, 61

<sup>362</sup> "Government Said Inhibiting Electoral Registration" (Text). (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa, 0500 GMT, 29 April 1992. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report - Southern Africa* 30 April 1992. (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AR092-084; p. 24).

<sup>363</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 17 May 1991..." (S/22609), 50 –51.

<sup>364</sup> Anstee (1996), 135.

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid*, 135.



Table 3.2 below documents the extension of the state administration.

**Table 3.2 The process of centralization of territory**

Date	Chronology of centralization
November, 1991	The centralization of territory begins. <sup>366</sup>
April 30, 1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government controls 157 of 163 municipalities; this is <u>95 percent</u> of territory.<sup>367</sup></li> </ul>
June 20, 1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government now controls 161 of 163 municipalities; this is <u>98 percent</u> of territory.</li> <li>• Government controls 452 of 542 communes.<sup>368</sup></li> </ul>
June 28, 1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All municipalities under government control.</li> <li>• Jamba still under UNITA control.</li> <li>• Government controls 465 of 542 (all but 77) communes.<sup>369</sup></li> </ul>
September 17, 1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government controls 484 of 542 communes<sup>370</sup></li> </ul>

Although the extension of state administration appeared to proceed successfully, in reality it was a rocky road. Many times the extension of state administration was set back by UNITA's intimidation of government administrators, denying them access, running them out of the area, and subsequently taking back the town.<sup>371</sup> In fact, at the start of the extension of the state administration, UNITA had guidelines that prohibited access by government troops into UNITA held areas; government troops had to provide UNITA with prior notification of their

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<sup>366</sup> UN Security Council. "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)" (S/23671). 3 March 1992. (Readex microprint) para 14.

<sup>367</sup> UNITA announces that only six municipalities remain in its control (see article "Government said Inhibiting Electoral Registration").

<sup>368</sup> UN Security Council "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)" (S/24145). 24 June 1992 (Readex microprint), para 26.

<sup>369</sup> "State Administration Extended to all Districts" (Text) Luanda Radio National Network in Portuguese, 0700 GMT 28 June 1992. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa*, 29 June 1992, (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-125; p. 32). The article also discusses that because the outstanding 77 communes were not due to political reasons, the Joint Political and Military Commission decided that the goal of centralized authority had been met and all potential voters in Angola could be registered.

<sup>370</sup> Anstee, (1996), 135

<sup>371</sup> Anstee (1996), 135.

movement.<sup>372</sup> Commenting on the removal of the government administrator in Malange Province, the Chief of the Government's representative on the Joint Political and Military Commission stated, that in addition to UNITA's blocking of the government administrator by refusing to allow designated officials to occupy offices, UNITA also placed borders, customs, and an emigration system and went so far as to levy border duties.<sup>373</sup> In other areas, UNITA used armed force to remove government officials.<sup>374</sup> Still, in other areas, UNITA policemen were used to disrupt the administration of the territory.<sup>375</sup> And in some cases, UNITA reoccupied areas that had been turned over to the government.<sup>376</sup>

UNITA's actions exasperated the government. On June 29<sup>th</sup> 1992, UNITA still controlled 77 communes. Nonetheless, the Joint Political Military Commission decided these territories were not held back due to political reasons, and therefore declared that the extension of the state administration was complete.<sup>377</sup> However, the secretary general's report contradicted this statement by saying that the incomplete extension of the state administration was caused by

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<sup>372</sup> "UNITA Said Hampering Access to Jamba Areas" (Text) Luanda Jornal de Angola in Portuguese 27 Nov. 1991, p. 2. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report - Southern Africa*, 7 January 1992 (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-004; pp 14-15).

<sup>373</sup> "MPLA Official Says UNITA Not Obeying CCPM" (Text). Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese, 1200 GMT 3 Jan. 1992. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report -Southern Africa*, 3 January 1992. (GPO microfiche FBIS-AFR-92-002, p. 14).

<sup>374</sup> Several news accounts relate these stories: "UNITA Seizes Control of Bembe District" (Text) Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 24 Jun 1992. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Services. *FBIS Daily Report - Southern Africa*, 29 January 1992. (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-019, p. 24); "UNITA Reportedly Expels Chipipa Officials" (Text) Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1200 GMT 15 Mar 1992 (text) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report -Southern Africa*, 16 March 1992 (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-051, p. 24).

<sup>375</sup> "Government Wants Greater UNITA Flexibility" Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1200 GMT 9 Jun 1992 (Text). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report - Southern Africa*, 10 Jun 1992 (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-112, p. 21).

<sup>376</sup> "Minister Kassoma Comments" Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 1900 GMT 29 Apr 1992 (text). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report -Southern Africa*, 30 April 1992 (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-084, pp. 25-6).

<sup>377</sup> "State Administration Extended to All Districts".

political factors.<sup>378</sup> Even though the government contended that UNITA had forced administrators out of several localities, at that point, the government announced that having just one administrator could constitute effective administration and elections could be held in that locality.<sup>379</sup> Equally significant, UNITA still controlled Jamba, Savimbi's main stronghold. Margaret Anstee describes Jamba as "almost a separate kingdom, or enclave, and most certainly a law unto itself...[where UNITA expected] 100 per cent [electoral support]."<sup>380</sup> In order to prevent the government administration in Jamba, UNITA controlled entry to the area by requiring official permission.<sup>381</sup> On June 29, 1992, when the Joint Political Military Commission declared the completion of the extension of the state administration, it added that a solution to Jamba would be found "in due course."<sup>382</sup>

Due to the availability of UNITA's army to intimidate the government, the process for the extension of the state administration made each side politically vulnerable to the other. For the government, the extension of the state administration was able to advance because that was the only avenue to elections – a condition supported by the international community as well.<sup>383</sup> At the same time, UNITA was able to retain control of its most important territory, Jamba. Thus, while UNITA was seceding territory to the government, it was still controlling one important threat over the government, making both parties vulnerable to each other: the government

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<sup>378</sup> UN Security Council. "Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAMVEM II)" (S/24556). 9 September 1992 (Readex microprint) para 20.

<sup>379</sup> Anstee (1996), 135.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid, 136.

<sup>381</sup> see Ibid, 136; see also "CCPM Delegation Arrives for Visit to Jamba" (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern and Central Africa 0510 GMT 30 Jun 1991 (text). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report -Southern Africa*, 3 July 1991 (GPO microfiche); FBIS-AFR-91-128, p. 23).

<sup>382</sup> "State Administration Extended to All Districts", *FBIS Daily Report -Southern Africa*, 29 Jun 1992 (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-125, p. 32).

<sup>383</sup> Anstee criticizes that the single mindedness to rely on elections as the sole agency for peace disregarded

threatened UNITA with political exclusion, while UNITA exerted some control over the extension of the state administration, denying the government absolute dominance. Additionally, the state administration extended to UNITA's former areas was not a full-fledged institution of government, but as little as one administrator. The timing of these concessions led to the creation of mutual vulnerability between UNITA and the government.

The extension of administration was not 100 percent complete, but it was complete enough to bring the parties to start the next stage. In other words, moving to the next stage in the implementation process required that the government compromise its insistence on extending complete control over Angola and allow a *de facto* dual administration. The settlement of the centralization of territory contrasts with the stalling of the implementation process during the troop assembling and demobilization phases.

#### **Assembly<sup>384</sup> and Demobilization of troops**

##### ***Requirements of the Bicesse Accords***

The assembling of troops was to have been finished by August 1, 1991<sup>385</sup>, but it was not completed until April 1992 – and even by then, the two armies had not fully assembled their troops. Assembling troops and demobilization form part of the most important concessions any party can make. Moreover, being the last tasks before elections greatly increased their significance.

After the assembling of troops, the Bicesse Accords called for some soldiers to be selected for the new joint army, the Angolan Armed Forces, while the others were to be demobilized. For UNITA, demobilization was the complete surrender of the threat to the

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that Angola's centralized system exacerbated losses at the ballot box (Anstee [2000], 87).

<sup>384</sup> The reports on Angola use the term quartering of troops to mean assembly of troops. For consistency, in this dissertation, I use the term assembly of troops to refer to quartering of troops.

<sup>385</sup> UN Security Council. "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations in Angola Verification

government; an unarmed insurgent force ends the civil war and conceivably stops the government from having to negotiate. Understandably, Kingma (1997) states that one lesson learned is that demobilization will not occur if the insurgents believe that only the military option can be used to influence the government.<sup>386</sup> Indeed, the fragile power of military threat is captured, *ex post facto* in Savimbi's comments regarding demobilization during a rally in Bailundo on March 13, 1996:

[T]o confine soldiers is not a problem, but disarmament is....My task is to disarm....You must understand how difficult and critical this is for me. I would prefer to surrender weapons and die afterwards: my life will become meaningless....[O]nce you disarm, I will have nothing else to do...I have not known of any historic leader who has disarmed his forces and stayed in power.<sup>387</sup>

The Angolan government faced a cost in disarming its forces, as well. For the Angolan government, demobilization reduced its ability to keep the insurgents at bay. A reduced government force may facilitate the continuation of the civil war if UNITA would not reciprocate. For these reasons, demobilization in Angola had the potential to produce the most vulnerability between the parties. For demobilization to succeed, it should have been accomplished bilaterally and at an equal pace.

### ***Hindering mutual vulnerability***

Two contrasting features marked the troop assembly and demobilization processes in Angola: (1) UNITA quartered troops at a faster pace than the government (see table 3.3), but demobilized at a slower pace (see table 3.4);<sup>388</sup> (2) although it demobilized more quickly than

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Mission II (UNAVEM II)" (S/23191). 31 October 1991, (Readex microprint) para 24.

<sup>386</sup> Kees Kingma. "Demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa and their reintegration into civilian life" *Policy Sciences*, 30 (1997):151-165.

<sup>387</sup> "Savimbi speech sends mixed signals". *Angola Peace Monitor*, Volume II, issue 7, 29 March 1996. [Online Database]: [www.anc.org.za/angola/amp0207.html](http://www.anc.org.za/angola/amp0207.html) on February 24, 2001.

<sup>388</sup> See also comments in: Anstee, (1996), 52; Juan Rial, Dennis J. Culkin, and Roberto Lima Siqueira. *Angola: A Pre-election Assessment*, (Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, March 1992), 11

UNITA, the government did not demobilize completely. Indeed, despite the perception that the government was successfully demobilizing, (Herman Cohen has written of the government's "spontaneous demobilization"<sup>389</sup>) more than 55 percent of the government's troops remained mobilized. As I will show, from this phase until the holding of elections, the government pursued a pattern of limiting the amount of military threat UNITA could pose. As a result of the government's diminishing vulnerability to UNITA's threats, the credibility of its promise to demobilize as part of the political reform, weakened.

**Table 3.3. The pace of troop assembly**

Date	Proportion of troops assembled	
	Government	UNITA
October 22, 1991	68,666 (60 percent)	26,968 (54 percent) <sup>390</sup>
February 26, 1992	62,446 (54 percent)	46,314 (93 percent) <sup>391</sup>
June 17, 1992	42,600 (37 percent)	31,700 (85 percent) <sup>392</sup>

At the end of the process, there existed more government than UNITA troops, who could potentially pose security threats, outside the assembly areas. In explaining the government's poor record of assembling troops, the election observers remarked that it reflected the weak hold the government had on its soldiers, and the general disorganization of its forces.<sup>393</sup> In addition, the conditions at the assembly areas led some troops to leave – citing poor living areas, late salaries, insufficient food and medicine shortages, and very lengthy stays at the assembly areas.<sup>394</sup> The attempts by both the government and UNITA to try to stem this effect through improving

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<sup>389</sup> Cohen (2000), 114

<sup>390</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/23191), para 24; Anstee (1996), 48

<sup>391</sup> UN Security Council. "Further Report of the Secretary-General ..." (S/23671), para 11. The secretary general's report states that the number of government troops in the camps had decreased as a result of poor conditions there.

<sup>392</sup> UN Security Council (S/24145) para 16. Here the secretary general suggests a plausible reason for the decrease in the number of troop confinement is the poor conditions of the Assembly areas.

<sup>393</sup> Rial et al (March 1992), 11.

conditions at the assembly areas did not change things.<sup>395</sup> The appeal to the international community for \$447 million did not materialize<sup>396</sup> – reducing further the amount available to reintegrate each demobilized soldier.

Scheduled to start two months following the signing of the Bicesse Accords in July 1991<sup>397</sup>, demobilization did not begin until almost a year later in April 1992. The delays in the troop assembly caused delays in demobilization. In all, the government was to demobilize a total to 115,640 troops and UNITA was to demobilize 49,800.<sup>398</sup> Demobilization in Angola began with an experimental phase that was divided into three parts. In the experimental phase, the Joint Political-Military Commission agreed that demobilization of a first batch of 30,537 government troops and 3,000 UNITA troops would take place between March and April 1992. The first part of this experimental phase would begin with the demobilization of 2,945 government (FAPLA) troops and 180 UNITA (FALA) troops. The parties would complete the subsequent phases by the following dates:

Experimental phase, part 2 - April 8: 12,135 FAPLA troops and 820 FALA troops  
Experimental phase, part 3 - April 15: 15,457 FAPLA troops and 2,000 FALA troops<sup>399</sup>

Table 3.4 below shows that the parties did not meet these goals. In fact, neither side completed demobilization by September 29, 1992 – Election Day. Although the government demobilized more, it did not demobilize completely. While, the incomplete demobilization of UNITA troops has been well documented<sup>400</sup>, that of the government has been less emphasized.

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<sup>394</sup> UN Security Council. "Further Report of the Secretary-General..."(S/24556), para 12; Rial et al, 11.

<sup>395</sup> UN Security Council, "Further Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/24556), para 13.

<sup>396</sup> Jett , 97

<sup>397</sup> Anstee (1996), 47.

<sup>398</sup> Ibid, 48

<sup>399</sup> "CCPM Outlines Troops' Demobilization Procedure" Luanda Radio Nacional Network in Portuguese 0600 GMT 27 Mar 1992 (text). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report -Southern Africa*, 27 Mar 1992 (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-060, p. 13).

Noting the incomplete demobilization of both armies during a meeting on September 7 and again two days before the elections, on September 27, 1992, dos Santos and Savimbi agreed, essentially on paper, to join both armies into the Angolan Armed Forces and dissolve their FAPLA and FALA forces.<sup>401</sup>

The failure of demobilization, it is acknowledged, facilitated the return to war. Besides an element of non-commitment, what can explain the failure of this important step? The chronology in Table 3.4 includes three other events affecting the degree of mutual vulnerability caused by demobilization. First, the allegations of UNITA's 20,000 hidden army were disproved (although several hundred unaccounted for men were found).<sup>402</sup> Conversely, the government's anti-riot force, an emergency police force that the government had assembled, was certified and operating in plain view. Third, when the rate of the troop assembly and the extension of state administration are accounted for, the chronology shows that the government's announcement of anti-riot police occurred at the start of demobilization *and* at the time that the Government regained control of 95 percent of the territory (see Table 3.4).

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<sup>400</sup> See Anstee (1996), 52, Cohen (2000), various UN Security Council "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations in Angola Verification Mission II" as listed in the bibliography.

<sup>401</sup> Anstee (1996), 59; 157

<sup>402</sup> UN Security Council, "Further report of the Secretary-General..." (S/24145), para 13b



**Table 3.4 The pace of demobilization in Angola**

Date	Demobilization started April 1, 1992 <sup>403</sup>	
	(Government)	(UNITA)
<i>Experimental phase, part I</i>		
March 31, 1992	2,945 (14 percent of experimental phase)	180 <sup>404</sup> (6 percent of experimental phase)
April 15, 1992	9,994 (49 percent of experimental phase)	180 <sup>405</sup> (6 percent of experimental phase)
<i>End Experimental phase</i>		
April 1992	The government announces the creation of the anti-riot troops. <sup>406</sup>	
April 30, 1992	Government in control of 95 percent of territory. <sup>407</sup>	
April 1992	UNITA has approximately 90 percent of troops assembled <sup>408</sup>	
June 20, 1992	18,400 (16 percent of total)	1,500 <sup>409</sup> (4 percent of total)
August 6, 1992	27,504 (24 percent of total)	7,257 (24 percent of total) <sup>410</sup>
August 6, 1992	Anti-riot police attack Savimbi residence. <sup>411</sup>	
August 15, 1992	UNITA demands demobilization of anti-riot police. <sup>412</sup>	
September 2, 1992	54, 737 (45 percent of total)	7,257 (24 percent of total) <sup>413</sup>
September 27, 1992	Savimbi and dos Santos join the two forces into one and disband the respective armies of the Government and UNITA. <sup>414</sup>	

Table 3.4 brings out the appearance of the anti-riot police during a very politically and militarily vulnerable time for UNITA and the government in the implementation period. I suggest that the appearance of the anti-riot police effectively neutralized much of the mutual vulnerability that could have been created during the extension of state administration or in the

<sup>403</sup> UN Security Council, (S/24145), para 19

<sup>404</sup> "CCPM Outlines Troops' Demobilization Procedure"

<sup>405</sup> Anstee (1996), 51.

<sup>406</sup> Anstee (1996), 71;72

<sup>407</sup> "Government Said Inhibiting Electoral Administration" UNITA states still controlled six municipalities.

<sup>408</sup> Anstee (1996), 52.

<sup>409</sup> UN Security Council, "Further report of the Secretary-General..." (S/24145), para 19.

<sup>410</sup> Anstee (1996), 66. Note that on page 56 this is reported as 34 percent.

<sup>411</sup> Ibid, 72

<sup>412</sup> Ibid, 73

<sup>413</sup> UN Security Council, "Further report of the Secretary-General..." (S/24556), para 13

course of a phased demobilization. The timing of the discovery of the anti-riot police at the confluence of the end of the extension of the state administration and the assembling of troops increased UNITA's perceived vulnerability to retaliation by the government. In contrast, at that time, the government was technically in control of the country, had not completely demobilized and had just unveiled a new secret force. The appearance of the anti-riot police undid the credibility of the government's commitment of demobilization and subsequent political reform, especially since the government itself confirmed their existence. Since the government had outpaced UNITA in demobilization, by creating the anti-riot police, the government conceivably insulated itself against any military vulnerability it would suffer from demobilization.

The effect of the anti-riot police is well documented in Anstee's (1996) account. Notably, from August 6, the date of the attack on Savimbi's residence by the anti-riot police, no more UNITA troops were demobilized. Anstee admits, "that from then on, the issue hotted up in an atmosphere of tension and deteriorating relations that worsened as the election date drew near."<sup>415</sup> The issue of the anti-riot police became the topic of two emergency Joint Political-Military Commission meetings later in August and a topic during the next to last meeting in September 1992 between Dos Santos and Savimbi.<sup>416</sup>

According to Savimbi, the anti-riot police were not, as the government asserted, legitimate under its right to develop emergency security agents, but rather "a parallel army".<sup>417</sup> He further stated that its existence made demobilization unattractive.<sup>418</sup> Indeed, Herman Cohen states that UNITA kept weapons hidden because of the anti-riot police.<sup>419</sup> Moreover, UNITA

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<sup>414</sup> Anstee (1996), 67

<sup>415</sup> Ibid, 73

<sup>416</sup> Anstee (1996), 73-76

<sup>417</sup> Ibid, 154

<sup>418</sup> Ibid, 154

<sup>419</sup> Cohen (2000), 114-5

accused the government of breaking the Triple Zero Clause<sup>420</sup> because the establishment of the anti-riot police was being assisted by Spain.<sup>421</sup> Despite all the trouble caused by the anti-riot police, the UN simply told the government to emphasize that they would only be used in times of crises.<sup>422</sup>

The harm caused by the anti-riot police was further compounded by the unwillingness of the government to include UNITA members in the police force. When the government refused Savimbi's request to confine the anti-riot police to barracks, UNITA eventually requested that 7,000 to 8,000 of its members join the police and anti-riot police. However, the Government provided only 1,200 spots for both. The government justified the low number of police force and anti-riot recruits offered to UNITA by stating that the Bicesse Accords stipulated that UNITA's involvement in the police was to be "at the invitation of the government".<sup>423</sup> At this remark, UNITA stopped sending potential recruits.<sup>424</sup> On September 7<sup>th</sup>, when the government finally did offer UNITA 8,000 positions in its national police and anti-riot forces, the elections were three weeks away, and the implementation was slow. At the time of the elections, only 39 of the 183 UNITA members that were selected for inclusion in the national police were being trained.<sup>425</sup> To

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<sup>420</sup> The Triple Zero Clause refers to the cessation of the supplying of lethal materials by the United States, the USSR, and other countries. It was established in the precursor to the Bicesse Accords, the "Washington Concepts Paper", which was drawn up by Former US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa during the Bush Administration, Herman Cohen, and Yuri Yukalev, the USSR's Foreign Ministry Director for African nations. The "Washington Concepts Paper" served as one of many attempts to bring UNITA and the MPLA to peace talks. (see Cohen (2000) ,105-7) and footnote numbers 41 and 43).

<sup>421</sup> Anstee (1996) 71.

<sup>422</sup> UN Security Council, "Further report of the Secretary-General..." (S/24556), para 19.

<sup>423</sup> Anstee (1996), 70. This condition by the government found in the Bicesse Accords: UN Security Council, "Letter dated 17 May 1991..." (S/22609), Attachment IV, Part III, para 3.1; see also UN Security Council, "Further report of the Secretary-General..." (S/24556), para 19.

<sup>424</sup> Anstee (1996), 70

<sup>425</sup> UN Security Council, "Further report of the Secretary-General..." (S/24556) para 19.

this, the Joint Political Military Commission's and the Secretary General's report responded by saying that more inclusion was needed.<sup>426</sup>

### **Failed Peace**

Jonas Savimbi warned, on September 2 that he "still [had] the capacity for war".<sup>427</sup> On September 9, 1992, at the end of a meeting with Herman Cohen, Savimbi stated that his commanders had pointed out that since the troop assembly process and demobilization had afforded UNITA forces to move all around the country and the government had demobilized, UNITA did not have to obtain power through elections. Cohen writes that Savimbi assured him of his commitment to the peace process.<sup>428</sup> But the observation by UNITA's commanders is correct: the government had demobilized at a higher rate than UNITA, as pointed out before, and UNITA forces were located at troop assembly areas in different parts of the country.<sup>429</sup> More worrying, Savimbi stated that should UNITA not attain victory, it would be due to electoral fraud.<sup>430</sup>

After the decision to join the armies of the government and UNITA on September 27, National elections were held two days later from September 29-30, 1992. Dos Santos and the MPLA received 49.56 and 53.74 percent respectively, and Savimbi and UNITA received 40.07 and 34.09 percent respectively. A runoff election had to take place as neither candidate received

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<sup>426</sup> UN Security Council, (S/24556), para 19

<sup>427</sup> Guy Rogers, "Savimbi Holds Press Conference: On " 'Riot Police' " " Johannesburg SAPA in English 1906 GMT 2 Sep 1992 (text). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS-Daily Report - Southern Africa*; 3 September 1992 (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-172; p. 14 p. 13-14)

<sup>428</sup> Cohen (2000), 116

<sup>429</sup> UN Security Council, (S/23191), paras 18-19. See also attached map in (S/23191) "UNAVEM II DEPLOYMENT", page 12.

<sup>430</sup> Anstee (1996), 151

50 percent of the vote, as per the electoral law.<sup>431</sup> Anstee reports that UNAVEM II tried to delay the announcement of the vote due to fear of Savimbi's reaction, in light of comments he had been making similar to that made on September 2 to Herman Cohen, as well as UNITA's allegations of fraud.<sup>432</sup> Over the next three months, Anstee attempted to bring the parties to a cease-fire agreement, but by January, war had returned to Angola.<sup>433</sup>

Besides being desirable because of the government's actions, what made the war option so feasible? Indeed, many point to the minimal demobilization of UNITA. As suggested by observers' reports,<sup>434</sup> UNITA had more troops in the assembly areas than the government and thus could more easily re-organize its troops. It has also been mentioned that the \$447 million of humanitarian aid requested by the Angolans did not materialize.<sup>435</sup> Equally important, it appears that members of FAPLA, the government's soldiers, received a better demobilization package than FALA, UNITA's troops. In terms of direct subsidies, the government planned to give salaries in arrears to FAPLA troops, citing that "FALA troops were never paid salaries".<sup>436</sup> Only after demobilization would both FALA and FAPLA troops would receive 10 allowances. The soldiers would receive five times their salaries upon demobilization, while officers would receive two times their salaries. The remaining five allowances to soldiers would accrue over the following 10 months, with one allowance every two months. Meanwhile, officers would receive the remaining eight allowances over the next eight months following demobilization.<sup>437</sup>

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<sup>431</sup> Tom Bayer, *Angola: Presidential and Legislative Elections, September 29-30, 1992 Report of the IFES Observation Mission*, Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, n.d.

<sup>432</sup> Anstee (1996), 205. The government also shared this view Anstee (1996) 230.

<sup>433</sup> *Ibid*, chapters 18-20

<sup>434</sup> Rial et al, 11.

<sup>435</sup> Jett, 97

<sup>436</sup> "CCPM Outlines Troops' Demobilization Procedures"

<sup>437</sup> *Ibid*.

Equally important, accounts from the period point out the organizational differences between UNITA and government troops. News accounts report that the government troops did not remain organized once in the assembly areas. On the other hand, the UNITA troops still followed the commands of the officers.<sup>438</sup> Some observers felt that given that UNITA was also not turning over its best weapons, UNITA would be in a better position to start military operations, should the leadership take that course.<sup>439</sup>

In sum, the demobilization and reintegration programs did not make civilian life more attractive. Furthermore, due to UNITA's strong organization, Savimbi and other UNITA elite who may not have desired to comply with the Bicesse Accords, were able to mobilize soldiers to resume war.

### **Summary**

Angola managed to make it to the elections, but the process preceding them had been devoid of credibility at the end. The lack of mutual political and military vulnerability between UNITA and the government during the implementation period of the Bicesse Accords did not offer credible indications that political participation would allow parties to promote their policies or protect themselves from adverse actions. The process of the extension of the state administration was managed by the government's threat that voter registration would only occur in places under its control and UNITA's periodic threats on government officials. As a result, not all of the territory was consolidated and, importantly, UNITA's stronghold remained under its control. As such, the process of the extension of the state administration made the government and UNITA politically vulnerable to each other.

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<sup>438</sup> Dale Lautenbach. "MPLA, UNITA Military Forces Compared" Johannesburg THE STAR in English 22 Jun 92 p. 11 (text). *FBIS Daily Report-Southern Africa* 23 June 1992 (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-121; 21).

<sup>439</sup> Rial et al, 10.

However, troop assembly and demobilization had no such controls. While UNITA conceded to assemble its troops, the government did not reciprocate. In like manner, the government undermined demobilization by creating the anti-riot police. Equally important, the small number of UNITA members who were offered positions in the anti-riot police force exacerbated the government's intentions to limit its vulnerability to UNITA. In response, UNITA halted demobilization. As a result, at this last important stage of the implementation period, the actions of the government and UNITA did not create credibility in the government's promise of political reform or UNITA's promise of demobilization. Given the strong organization of UNITA and the lack of options besides military service, it proved relatively easy for Savimbi to resume war.

### **SECTION 3.3 THE LUSAKA PROTOCOL: 1994 - 1998**

Following the resumption of war in 1992, the United Nations, under the auspices of Margaret Anstee again and later Special Representative, Maître Alioune Blondin Beye, undertook another negotiation process that culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on November 15, 1994. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) managed the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

#### **The outcome of the Lusaka Protocol**

As stated in the first section, the Lusaka Protocol aimed to correct the perceived deficiencies of the failed Bicesse Accords. In this respect, the Lusaka Protocol featured a greater emphasis on power sharing by allotting particular ministries to UNITA and explicitly provided for a 'special status' for Jonas Savimbi, focused on the demobilization of UNITA, and outlined a significant role for the United Nations.<sup>440</sup> At its peak, UNAVEM III was to have 7,000

peacekeeping officers. (In contrast, UNAVEM II only had 350 unarmed military and 126 police officers).<sup>441</sup> Furthermore, the Lusaka Protocol seemed to deal with UNITA's fears of the Rapid Reaction Police (as the anti-riot police were renamed) by requiring the government to place them in barracks, until after UNITA had been quartered, and also to incorporate UNITA members in their ranks.<sup>442</sup> As in the Bicesse Accords, under the Lusaka Protocol UNITA traded demobilization, and the transfer of UNITA-controlled territory for political inclusion. The government, on the other hand, was to disengage its forces, repatriate the mercenaries, assemble its Rapid Reaction Police, and incorporate UNITA into its police. In the end, UNITA and government forces were to form a single army and hold the run-off for the 1992 elections.<sup>443</sup>

Despite these provisions, peace did not come to Angola. Both demobilization and the extension of the state administration were incomplete. Similarly, the government displayed some ambiguity with the assembly of the Rapid Reaction Police. By September 1998, war had effectively resumed.

### **Why Angola keeps failing**

The failure of the Lusaka Protocol deepens the puzzles surrounding Angola. Most obviously, the important question about the Lusaka Protocol is why it failed despite the attempts to correct for the shortcomings of the Bicesse Accords. Many explanations rest on the fact that so

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<sup>440</sup> The Lusaka Protocol is recorded as: UN Security Council. "Letter dated 9 December 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council" (S/1994/1441, Annex). 22 December 1994 (Readex microprint). The specific reference to Savimbi's special status is found in: Annex 6, Agenda Item II.4: National Reconciliation, Specific Principles, para 6.

<sup>441</sup> On size of Lusaka Protocol: UN Security Council, 3499<sup>th</sup> Meeting. "Resolution 976 (1995) on the establishment of the UN Angola Verification Mission III" (S/RES/976). 8 February 1995 para 1. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Doc/scres/1995/9503814e.htm](http://www.un.org/Doc/scres/1995/9503814e.htm)> (cited on October 12, 2001). See also United Nations. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 257; On size of Bicesse Accords: UN Security Council (S/22627) para 15; UN Security Council (S/23985); Anstee (2000), 86.

<sup>442</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 9 December..." (S/1994/1441, Annex 5), para 10; p. 24, paras 3-4.

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid.*, (S/1994/1441, Annexes 3 – 7).



many promises were unfulfilled that eventually, trust between the parties eroded. Maître Alioune Beye succinctly summarized Angola by saying: "...the Angolan matter is centered totally on the problem of distrust".<sup>444</sup> Within that explanation, scholars and practitioners advance other explanations. As will be reviewed below, the existing literature places the blame on three main agents for eroding the trust between the parties: UNITA and Savimbi, the failure of the international community to monitor human rights, and the presence of a rich endowment of oil and diamonds.

Overwhelmingly, scholars and practitioners place the blame for the failure of the Lusaka Protocol on UNITA and Savimbi's refusal to follow through on promises and the ensuing lack of trust between the parties.<sup>445</sup> Inevitably, the emphasis lies on the string on dishonored promises by UNITA. Arguably, the UN sanctions against UNITA and Savimbi are a manifestation of blaming UNITA for the failure of the Lusaka Protocol. Some practitioners have described Savimbi as being unwilling to compromise for less than leader of the country.<sup>446</sup> More forcefully, Hodges (2001) describes Savimbi as having a "messianic sense of destiny" and "driven [by]...a quest for absolute power...."<sup>447</sup> Such a characterization of the conflict limits the paths to resolution and may even render it intractable. Additionally, such a one-sided view implicitly absolves the government of wrongdoing. The context of the actions by either side is lost in the explanations.

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<sup>444</sup> "Beye on Armed " 'Incidents' ", Resolving Distrust" (text) Lisbon Diario de Noticias in Portuguese 11 Jan 1995, pp. 2-3. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Services. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa*; Jan 11, 1995. [Online Database]: November 12, 2001; FBIS-AFR-95-010).

<sup>445</sup> This view is advanced by Hare (1999); Hodges (2001); Barry Munslow. "Angola: the politics of unsustainable development" *Third World Quarterly*, 20. 3, (1999) [Online Database]. (cited on December 3, 2001): 555; Donald Steinberg, Former US Ambassador to Angola, personal interview. July 2, 2001; and Paul Hare, Former US Special Envoy to Angola, personal interview, June 25 2001. See also a review by Ian S. Spears. "Angola's elusive peace: The collapse of the Lusaka accord", *International Journal* 4 (Autumn 1999): 562-581.

<sup>446</sup> Hodges 18-19, 47; Spears (1999), 572. These general sentiments were also reinforced in interviews with Donald Steinberg and Paul Hare

Alex Vines (1999) of Human Rights Watch argues that greater monitoring and repercussions for violations of human rights would have resulted in a smaller number of peace accord violations, and therefore peace. Vines discusses the weakening of the troop assembly processes by the government and UNITA's strategy of forcibly conscripting people<sup>448</sup>, the killing of government officials and traditional chiefs<sup>449</sup>, and the government's arbitrary killing, assault and harassment of UNITA members.<sup>450</sup> As a result of inadequate attention to human rights abuses, the confidence of Angolans in the peace process diminished and allowed the government and UNITA to commit increasingly worse abuses.<sup>451</sup> However, it is not clear that a careful monitoring of human rights would encourage the parties to honor their agreements regarding the political and military aspects of the Lusaka Protocol. Although not completely unrelated, they do not appear as close as Vines suggests.

A final factor rapidly gaining ground in the literature is the role played by the plentiful diamond and oil reserves in sustaining the war. Angola is the second largest producer of oil in Africa<sup>452</sup> and the diamonds found in Angola are of the highest quality.<sup>453</sup> Specifically, the literature in this area argues that settlement is not possible because the presence of these natural resources enable both sides to continue to purchase weapons. Of the two, UNITA has been more penalized for its use of diamonds to purchase weapons than the government's use of oil for the

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<sup>447</sup> Hodges, 18.

<sup>448</sup> Vines (1999), 34-36; 73-5.

<sup>449</sup> Ibid, 63-2

<sup>450</sup> Ibid, 67-71.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid, 32; especially chapter VI.

<sup>452</sup> See Global Witness. A Crude Awakening: the Role of Oil and Banking Industries in Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets. (1999). [Online Database]. <[www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/angola99/cruderep.doc](http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/angola99/cruderep.doc) > (cited on November 3, 2001). *Le Billion* (2001)

<sup>453</sup> On the role of resources see: See Global Witness. A Rough Trade The Role of Companies and Government in the Angolan Conflict. (1998; see also Assis Malaquais. "Diamond are a guerrilla's best

same purpose.<sup>454</sup> In an effort to cripple the ability of UNITA to wage war, the UN has imposed sanctions on these so-called conflict diamonds.<sup>455</sup> Additionally, the diamond industry, in cooperation with several non-governmental organizations and international state institutions, has begun the Kimberly Process, which seeks to devise a tagging mechanism to ensure that diamonds brought to the market are not conflict diamonds.<sup>456</sup>

While Savimbi acknowledged that diamonds provide much needed revenue to UNITA – they are “a question of [political] survival”<sup>457</sup> – the literature on the role of diamonds is weakened by some of the concessions given by UNITA. For example, in January 1998, UNITA turned over Luzamba, a diamond-rich area, to the government– which is said to have provided 80 percent of UNITA’s revenues.<sup>458</sup> Concessions by the government were also given; UNITA and the government arrived at agreements by which UNITA could extract diamonds and a member of UNITA held the post of Minister of Geology and Mines.<sup>459</sup> If diamonds were all-important, why did UNITA turn over Luzamba to the government or fail to take advantage of its political posts and mining contract? Moreover, the territorial disputes that eventually re-ignited the war were over symbolic strongholds of UNITA; the strategic diamond areas had already been turned over to the government. These questions indicate that part of the explanation for persistent war in

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friend: the impact of illicit wealth on insurgent strategy”. *Third World Quarterly*, 22. 3 (2001), [Online Database] (cited on November 13, 2001): 311-325. Le Billion (2001).

<sup>454</sup> For information on oil in Angola see: see Le Billion (2001); Global Witness (1999); Munslow (1999), Malaquais (2001).

<sup>455</sup> UN Security Council, 3827<sup>th</sup> Meeting. “Resolution 1135 (1997) on the situation in Angola” (S/RES/1135), para 6. 29 October 1997 (Readex microprint); UN Security Council, 3894<sup>th</sup> Meeting. “Resolution 1176 (1998) [On the situation in Angola]” (S/RES/1176) (1998), para 2. 24 June 1998 [Online Database]: [www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1176.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1176.htm) on October 12, 2001.

<sup>456</sup> For information on the Kimberley Process see the web site: [www.kimberleyprocess.com](http://www.kimberleyprocess.com). (cited January 8, 2002). A good review on the role of diamonds may be found in the following: Munslow (1999); Hodges (2001), Malaquias (2001), Global Witness (1999; 2000), Spears (1999),

<sup>457</sup> “UNITA leader hints at accepting vice-presidency” II.9 *Angola Peace Monitor* (27 May 1996) [Online Database] <[www.anc.org.za/angola/apm0209.html](http://www.anc.org.za/angola/apm0209.html)> (cited on February 24, 2001).

<sup>458</sup> Hare, 143

Angola does not only lie in the availability of diamonds, but also in understanding how the actions by one party were perceived by the other.

The unanswered questions raised by the existing literature coupled with the compensatory provisions of the Lusaka Protocol mandate a closer look at the environment in which actions and responses took place. I will use this section to illustrate how once again the timing of actions, events, and concessions can lead to asymmetric vulnerability, and subsequently fail to create credible promises of political reform and demobilization. As in the last section, I identify the areas that show the role played by the international community and the organization of the warring groups on the notion on timing.

### **Elements of Political Reform**

The main tasks were to be fulfilled during the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol before the run-off elections were the following: UNITA's demobilization and incorporation into the national army, the assembly of the Rapid Reaction Police, the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), and the extension of the state administration.<sup>460</sup> These issues could potentially work together to create credible promises of political reform and demobilization because of the vulnerabilities UNITA and the government would, in theory, have toward each other. Specifically, while successful demobilization was the key for UNITA's incorporation into the GURN, the date of its formation depended on UNITA's demobilization. In addition, the government had agreed that the extension of the state administration would not begin until the GURN had been established.<sup>461</sup> Originally, state administration was to come after

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<sup>459</sup> Le Billon, 68; see also UN Security Council (S/1994/1441), p. 35 on the positions allotted to UNITA.

<sup>460</sup> This timetable is found in UN Security Council (S/1994/1441), Annex 9

<sup>461</sup> UN Security Council "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)" (S/1997/248) [Online Database] < [www.un.org/Doc/sc/reports/1997/s1997248.htm](http://www.un.org/Doc/sc/reports/1997/s1997248.htm) > (cited on October 24, 2001), para 4

demobilization<sup>462</sup>, but the government conceded to UNITA's desire to reverse the order.<sup>463</sup>

Structured in this manner, the security concerns that UNITA felt by demobilization could be assuaged by both the assembly of the Rapid Reaction Police and by its political incorporation into government through the GURN. Likewise, the government's sovereignty would be reaffirmed by the demobilization and extension of the state administration. As outlined in Table 3.5 below, these actions could have left both the government and UNITA mutually vulnerable to each other and therefore constituted credible political reform. Yet, the actions taken by both parties did not lead to the realization of this credible political reform. Looking at the Angolan case through these three lenses, rather than the linear way in which it is normally recounted, shows the formation of asymmetric vulnerability.

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<sup>462</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 9 December..." (S/1994/1441, Annex, 3), para 7.

<sup>463</sup> Hare, 116-7

**Table 3.5. Lusaka Protocol - Elements of Political Reform**

<b>Scheduled Tasks</b>	<b>Beneficiary</b>	<b>Criteria for Credibility: Mutual Vulnerability</b>
<b><i>Troop Assembly &amp; Demobilization</i></b>		
Troop Assembly and Demobilization of UNITA	Government	<i>Vulnerability to UNITA:</i> UNITA surrenders its most important threat against the government. Without an armed faction, the government has no incentive to address UNITA's concerns.
Troop Assembly ( <i>but not demobilization</i> ) of Rapid Reaction Police.	UNITA	<i>Vulnerability to Government:</i> The government's ability to use its special force will be curtailed & military superiority reduced.
Integration of UNITA in the Angolan Armed Forces, Angolan Police Force, & Rapid Reaction Police.	UNITA	<i>Vulnerability to Government:</i> UNITA would have access to the government's military strength; could retaliate for dishonored promises.
	Government	<i>Vulnerability to UNITA:</i> UNITA gave up some of its military autonomy; posed a decreased threat to the government.
<b><i>The Government of National Unity and Reconciliation</i></b>		
UNITA offered government posts and Savimbi offered a special status	UNITA	<i>Vulnerability to Government:</i> Grants legitimacy to UNITA; The government cedes controls over public administration and has a potential spoiler within its administration.
	Government	<i>Vulnerability to UNITA:</i> Granting legitimacy to government recognizes the legitimacy of the administration; grievances against the government may not be as threatening because now part of the administration.
<b><i>Extension of the state administration</i></b>	Government	<i>Vulnerability to UNITA:</i> UNITA provides government territorial legitimacy and cedes control over issues in 'its' areas.

These features of the Lusaka Protocol to engender credibility through mutual vulnerabilities did not materialize. Troop assembly and demobilization was delayed, integration was difficult, the 'special status' for Savimbi was eventually rescinded, and extension state administration was not attained. The absence of mutual vulnerabilities in the Lusaka Protocol implementation process lay in the tactic of a party's appearance to offer a concession that would render it vulnerable, but then covering up its loss with some other action. In the first half of the Lusaka Protocol, the government used this tactic more prominently, while UNITA is to blame for later destructive behavior. Just as the international community determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Bicesse Accords, neither did the government. During the first two years, it was clear that it would not place itself in a vulnerable situation. I focus on two important issues that

fit into the government's tactic of offering a concession but covering up its loss elsewhere: the government's handling of the Rapid Reaction Police and Executive Outcomes, a well-known private military group. UNITA followed the government's tactic during demobilization and by continually stalling on the extension of the state administration in the face of the government's concessions for political inclusion.

### **Assembly of UNITA, Rapid Reaction Police and Executive Outcomes**

In the pre-Lusaka Protocol talks, Paul Hare, the United States Special Envoy for Angola, cabled to Washington, DC that the Angolan government did not feel it could trust UNITA, and feared that not only would UNITA rise militarily and politically, but that it would be outwitted by them. As a result, the government wanted a 'pre-cooked' deal for the Lusaka Protocol. In other words, the government wanted no negotiations, for fear that UNITA would change the outcome.<sup>464</sup> This theme of distrust and unpredictability manifested itself throughout the implementation period. For example, one day after the deadline for the second phase of the disengagement of forces, the Angolan Armed Forces' head of secret services, General Mario de Sa Ita, voiced an indication of the government's determination to avoid a mutually vulnerable situation:

'We have sufficient forces and the necessary preparation not to allow UNITA to do what it did in 1992. In 1992, [during the implementation of Bicesse Accords], the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola [the Government's army] were forcibly disbanded but the Lusaka Protocol does not envisage the winding-up of [the Angolan army]'.<sup>465</sup>

General Sa Ita's remarks manifested themselves in the government's mixed signals surrounding the Rapid Reaction Police and Executive Outcomes, two of the most contentious issues at the

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<sup>464</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>465</sup> "FAA General Says Nobody Will Kill Savimbi" Lisbon *Diario de Noticias* in Portuguese 11 Apr 1995, p. 13, Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Services. *FBIS Daily Report-Southern Africa*, 11 April 1995 [Online Database] November 12, 2001; FBIS-AFR-95-071).

start of the demobilization period. Notably, the second phase of disengagement was never completed.

### ***Assembly of UNITA***

In return for the assembly of UNITA forces, the government was to assemble the Rapid Reaction Police and withdraw its forces from defensive positions.<sup>466</sup> Earlier, I argued that the appearance of the Rapid Reaction Police at a critical time was one of the factors that hampered the Bicesse Accords. For this reason, the Lusaka Protocol explicitly stated that a plan for the assembly of the Rapid Reaction Police was to be developed 10 days following the initialing of the Protocol.<sup>467</sup> Until the end of 1995, the secretary general's reports on Angola show that the government consistently avoided providing information regarding the strength and location of the Rapid Reaction Police, thereby slowing down plans for its assembly.<sup>468</sup> Indeed, observers note that during this time, the government's actions and words were only slightly restrained.<sup>469</sup> Moreover, even when the information on the Rapid Reaction Police was given, there was confusion about whether the government would begin assembling them simultaneously with UNITA's troop assembly, as it had announced earlier.<sup>470</sup>

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<sup>466</sup> Creative Associates International/CREA Angola. Angola Quartering Process: Taking Stock, One Year After the Lusaka Protocol, (n.p: Washington, DC, December 1995), 2.

<sup>467</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 9 December..." (S/1994/1441, Annex 9), p. 60.

<sup>468</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). (S/1995/588) 4 June 1995. [Online Database] <[gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95\\_07/588](http://gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95_07/588)> (cited on October 4, 2001), para 20; UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). (S/1995/1012) 7 December 1995. [Online Database] <[gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95\\_12/1012](http://gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95_12/1012)> (cited on October 4, 2001), para 24.

<sup>469</sup> Creative Associates International, 6

<sup>470</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). (S/1995/842). 4 October, 1995 [Online database] <[gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95\\_10/842](http://gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95_10/842)> (cited on October 4, 2001), paras 24, 25.



Because of the lack of this reciprocity, the assembly of UNITA forces did not begin until November after the UN constructed the assembly areas in an effort to jump-start the process.<sup>471</sup> By constructing the assembly areas, the UN was able to focus the discussion between the parties back on the peace process for the simple reason that they could not longer ignore it.<sup>472</sup> Still, the government's vagueness about the Rapid Reaction Police brought to life its intention to avoid vulnerability. Only after UNITA had begun troop assembly did information about the Rapid Reaction Police begin to emerge.

**Table 3.6 Assembly of the Rapid Reaction Police**

Date	Event
March 21, 1995	First phase of disengagement of UNITA and Government troops completed and verified. <sup>473</sup>
April 11, 1995	Announcement by Gen. Sa Ita that the government will not disband the Angolan Armed Forces. <sup>474</sup>
May 3, 1995	Information on number of Rapid Reaction Police still unknown. <sup>475</sup>
July 17, 1995	As of July 17, UNAVEM still unable to verify numbers and weapons of Rapid Reaction Police. <sup>476</sup>
October 4 1995	Mixed signals on if assembly of Rapid Reaction Police will occur simultaneously with UNITA. <sup>477</sup>
Nov 20 1995	UNITA begins assembling its troops on 20 Nov. <sup>478</sup>

<sup>471</sup> Creative Associates International, 6-7; UN Security Council (S/1995/842), para 24, 25; see also "Troop confinement begins" *Angola Peace Monitor* 2.3 (30 November 1995) [Online Database] <[www.anc.org.za/angola/apm0203.html](http://www.anc.org.za/angola/apm0203.html)> (cited on February 24, 2001).

<sup>472</sup> Creative Associates International, 6

<sup>473</sup> UN Security Council, "Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). (S/1995/274) 7 April 1995; [Online Database] <[gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95\\_04/274](http://gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95_04/274)> (cited on October 4, 2001), para 12.

<sup>474</sup> "FAA General Says Nobody Will Kill Savimbi"

<sup>475</sup> UN Security Council, "Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). (S/1995/350). 3 May 1995 [Online Database] <[gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95\\_05/350](http://gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95_05/350)> (cited on October 4, 2001), para 15.

<sup>476</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1995/588), para 20.

<sup>477</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1995/842), para 24, 25.

<sup>478</sup> "Troop confinement begins"

(Table 3.6 Continued)

Nov/ Dec 1995	The government provides UNAVEM with information on Rapid Reaction Police. <sup>479</sup>
Dec 9, 1995	Government requests Executive outcomes to leave. <sup>480</sup>
Dec 11, 1995	The government launches an attack on UNITA in Soyo and Lunda Norte.
Dec 11, 1995	Disarmament and troop assembly process for UNITA on hold. <sup>481</sup>
Jan 31 1996	Government begins to assemble the Rapid Reaction Police. <sup>482</sup>

If by providing information on the Rapid Reaction Police, the government attempted to show the credibility of the government's promise of political reform, it seemed to reinforce its intentions through its actions with Executive Outcomes. In December 1995, encouraged by the international community, the government followed up the disclosure of the Rapid Reaction Police by requesting that Executive Outcomes leave Angola.<sup>483</sup> Both acts increased the military vulnerability of one group to the other: the government was beginning to limit its ability to use its specially trained forces and UNITA had begun to limit the number of troops in the field. As a result, demobilization of forces could have become credible. However, shortly after, the government undermined this act by launching an attack on UNITA forces in the oil-rich Soyo region and the diamond-rich Lunda North region. At the same time, UNITA stopped the troop assembly process.<sup>484</sup> (See Table 3.6).

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<sup>479</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1995/1012), para 24.

<sup>480</sup> Chris Simpson, Inter Press Service December 9, 1995. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. December 12 2001

<sup>481</sup> "UNITA Envoy says Government Forces " 'Want War' " Paris AFP in French, 2151 GMT 11 Dec 1995. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report-Southern Africa* 11 Dec 1995 ([Online Database]: November 12, 2001; FBIS-AFR-95-238).

<sup>482</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)" (S/1996/75), 31 Jan 1996 [Online Database] < [www.un.org/Doc/s/199675.htm](http://www.un.org/Doc/s/199675.htm) > (cited on October 4, 2001), para 7.

<sup>483</sup> UN Security Council (S/1995/842), para 51; UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 15 January 1996 From the President of the Security Council Addressed to the President of the Republic of Angola" (S/1996/31). 16 January 1996 (Readex microprint).

<sup>484</sup> "UNITA Envoy says Government Forces Want War".

The issue of Rapid Reaction Police did not begin to be resolved until UNITA began troop assembly.<sup>485</sup> It is reasonable to argue that the government's measures to protect itself from UNITA, such as not completely disbanding the Rapid Reaction Police or obscuring its intentions through cloudy language reflected the past experience with the Bicesse Accords' implementation. The government tried to walk a line between commitment and non-commitment, as evidenced with the decision to declare a simultaneous troop assembly with UNITA, but then at the same time, hinted that it may not occur exactly in that manner. As I will discuss next, the costly effort shown by the government by asking Executive Outcomes was soon undermined, again. Furthermore, the government's intentions with the Rapid Reaction Police continued to affect the Lusaka Protocol's implementation after the resumption of the assembling of UNITA's troops in January 1996.

### ***Executive Outcomes***

When the government began using Executive Outcomes in 1993, at first, they were used to protect the government's oil enterprise, Sonangol, from UNITA. After 1993, the government contracted with Executive Outcomes yearly, until mid-1996 (it later became known), to provide military supplies.<sup>486</sup> In all, there were about 550 Executive Outcomes personnel in Angola.<sup>487</sup> As a "force multiplier", Executive Outcomes trained more than 5,000 troops and 30 pilots during its contract period.<sup>488</sup> The Executive Outcomes were instrumental in getting Dos Santos the help the government needed; without Executive Outcomes, the government would not have been able to

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<sup>485</sup> For documentation on the meetings see: UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General ..." (S/1995/842) paras 2,3

<sup>486</sup> Alex Vines. "Mercenaries and the Privatisation of Security in Africa in the 1990s" in The Privatisation of Security in Africa, ed. Greg Mills and John Stremmlau, (Johannesburg: The South African Institution of International Affairs, March 1995), 51.

<sup>487</sup> Ibid.

<sup>488</sup> Ibid.

capture Ndlatando city in May 1994 – a feat that convinced it of the need for training by Executive Outcomes. Later that year, the government was able to re-take diamond areas in Cafunfo and the oil installations in Soyo.<sup>489</sup>

In January 1996, as UNITA resumed troop assembly,<sup>490</sup> Executive Outcomes continued the process of leaving Angola that it had begun the previous December. It was an important concession by the government as a year before, Savimbi had charged the Angolan government with keeping Executive Outcomes in order to retain its fighting capability.<sup>491</sup> At the time, UNITA said, it was a way for the government to retain its ‘strike capacity’ in the transition period.<sup>492</sup> Yet, accounts later in January indicated that, in fact, Executive Outcomes simply turned into another form of private security for the government. Furthermore, it was revealed that the government was replacing its contract with Executive Outcomes with the US based Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI).<sup>493</sup>

Former members of Executive Outcomes remaining in Angola took positions with private security firms that had ties to Executive Outcomes.<sup>494</sup> Moreover, the personnel of Executive Outcomes received contracts to explore diamond mines in exchange for their continued involvement in Angola. Equally important, the personnel at these private security firms could

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<sup>489</sup> Ibid.

<sup>490</sup> UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)” (S/1996/171). 6 March 1996 [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/s1996/171.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/s1996/171.htm)> (cited on October 4 2001), para 32.

<sup>491</sup> “Angola: “Many” Executive Outcomes Mercenaries to Stay Behind” Johannesburg Mail and Guardian in English, 19-25 Jan 1996, p. 4. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa* Jan 22, 1996. [Online Database] (cited on November 12, 2001).

<sup>492</sup> Ibid.

<sup>493</sup> Vines (March 1995), 52.

<sup>494</sup> Ibid. Vines names the companies of Branch Mining, Shibita Security, Stuart Mills Associates, Saracen and Alpha 5.

easily be called to participate in Executive Outcome missions.<sup>495</sup> UNITA's troop assembly process slowed after it had met the first stage of its requirement (see Table 3.7). Notably, even as the full deployment of UNAVEM III approached, UNITA did not proceed with demobilization. This weakens Walter's (1999) emphasis on an external force as a catalyst for demobilization – due to its ability to offer credible guarantees.<sup>496</sup>

**Table 3.7 Executive Outcomes and undermining credibility.**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>
Dec 12, 1995	The Angolan government asks Executive Outcomes to leave. <sup>497</sup>
January 10, 1996	New agreements lead the government to begin the assembly of 1,762 Rapid Reaction Police. <sup>498</sup>
January 18, 1996	US Ambassador to UN, Albright, pressures Savimbi to assemble troops before February 8. <sup>499</sup>
January 19, 1996	Savimbi promises that 16,500 troops will be confined to assembly areas by February 8, 1996. <sup>500</sup>
January 22 1996	Revelation that some members of Executive Outcomes remain to “‘train and advise’ the Angolan armed forces.” <sup>501</sup> Governments seeks to contract with MPRI. <sup>502</sup>
January 25, 1996	UNITA has 693 troops in assembly areas. <sup>503</sup>
March 1, 1996	UNITA registers that 16,699 soldiers are quartered. <sup>504</sup>
March 26, 1996	Entire 7,071 UNAVEM III force deployed. <sup>505</sup>
March 29, 1996	UNITA registers that 18,595 soldiers are quartered. The pace assembling of UNITA had slowed down from the last week of February. <sup>506</sup>

<sup>495</sup> Ibid.

<sup>496</sup> Walter (1999),149 (Walter discusses this within the context of Mozambique).

<sup>497</sup> “Executive Outcomes Announces Withdrawal Plans” Johannesburg SAPA in English, 1156 GMT 12 Dec 95. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa*. December 14, 1995 [Online Database]: (cited on November 12, 2001); FBIS-AFR-95-238).

<sup>498</sup> UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General...” (S/1996/75), para 22.

<sup>499</sup> Hare, 99

<sup>500</sup> UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General ...” (S/1996/75), para. 15.

<sup>501</sup> “Angola: “‘Many’” Executive Outcomes Mercenaries to Stay Behind”

<sup>502</sup> Vines (March 1995), 52.

<sup>503</sup> UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General...” ( S/1996/75), para. 15.

<sup>504</sup> UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General ...” (S/1996/171), para 10.

<sup>505</sup> UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General...” (S/1996/248), para 10

<sup>506</sup> Ibid, para 12.

### ***Rapid Reaction Police***

UNITA's resumption of troop assembly in January occurred following the government's withdrawal of some of its forces and its assembling of the Rapid Reaction Police.<sup>507</sup> However, further uncertainty regarding the Rapid Reaction Police followed that of Executive Outcomes. The number of soldiers who formed the Rapid Reaction Police was unclear from March 1996 until October 1996 because of changing announcements by the government. Still more damaging, the revelations of new numbers of Rapid Reaction Police came during a point of major government concessions – the willingness to integrate UNITA's into the Angolan Armed Forces despite having quartered less than the agreed 20,000.<sup>508</sup>

The decision for the incorporation of UNITA into the Angolan Armed Forces made the government more vulnerable to military action by UNITA. Hence, announcing the willingness of incorporating UNITA before the promised assembling of 20,000 had occurred seemed to reinforce the government's commitment. Similarly, UNITA would be sacrificing autonomy in military decisions and the acceptance of monitoring by the government. Together these actions constituted the government's credible promises of political reform, to include UNITA politically, and UNITA's credible promises to eventually demobilize. Yet, in June, two months after UNITA was offered early integration into the Angolan Armed Forces and the government's announcement that almost all its 3,504 Rapid Reaction Police had been quartered, it became known that the actual number of Rapid Reaction Police was 5,385. At that time, UNITA had quartered nearly 52,000, almost all its declared army (see table 3.8). It was thus in a very vulnerable position. From July to August, UNITA's refused to cooperate with the integration of the Angolan Armed Forces, began the formation of its own police force, and rejected the offer of

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<sup>507</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1996/75), para 7; UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1996/171), para 32

the vice-presidency. The announcements surrounding the Rapid Reaction Police seemed to undermine the effect of the concessions the government appeared to be giving (see Table 3.8).

**Table 3.8. The Rapid Reaction Police**

Mar. 6, 1996	The government announces that assembling of the Rapid Reaction Police is almost finished. Of 2,444 Rapid Reaction Police, government reports 2,293 are quartered. <sup>509</sup>
Mar. 29, 1996	Government registers that 3,386 personnel of the Rapid Reaction Police out of 3,504 quartered - <sup>510</sup> an increase of 942 Rapid Reaction Police reported on March 6, 1996. <sup>511</sup>
Apr. 10 1996	UNITA offered integration even if 20,000 not quartered. <sup>512</sup>
Apr. 23, 1996	Government withdraws from Joint Commission due to UNITA's slow troop assembly. <sup>513</sup>
May 14, 1996	Savimbi promises to assemble 50,000 out of 62,500 troops by June 15. <sup>514</sup>
June 11, 1996	Government states that nearly completed the assembling of Rapid Reaction Police. Of 5,385, personnel, 5,222 are quartered. <sup>515</sup>
June 14, 1996	First UNITA officers incorporated into the Angolan Armed Forces. <sup>516</sup>
June 25, 1996	UNITA assembles 51,597 troops. <sup>517</sup>
July 15, 1996	UNITA refuses to name soldiers for the Angolan Armed Forces. <sup>518</sup>

<sup>508</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1996/171), para 9. In March the Angolan government stated that UNITA's integration into the FAA could only begin once 20,000 UNITA troops had been quartered. In at the beginning of March 1996, UNITA had quartered 16,699 (para 10).

<sup>509</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1996/171) para 18,

<sup>510</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..."(S/1996/248), para 18.

<sup>511</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General ..." (S/1996/171) para 18

<sup>512</sup> "Government Ready to Bring UNITA into FAA" *Angola Peace Monitor* 2. 8 (29 April, 1996). [Online Database] <[www.anc.org.za/angola/amp0208.html](http://www.anc.org.za/angola/amp0208.html)> (cited on February 24, 2001).

<sup>513</sup> "Angolan Government withdraws from Joint Commission" *Angola Peace Monitor*, 2.8 (29 April, 1996). [Online Database] <[www.anc.org.za/angola/amp0208.html](http://www.anc.org.za/angola/amp0208.html)> (cited on February 24, 2001).

<sup>514</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)" (S/1996/503). 27 June, 1996 [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/s1996503.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/s1996503.htm)> (cited on October 14, 2001) , para 11.

<sup>515</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1996/503) para 22

<sup>516</sup> "First Unita Officers Incorporate into Angolan National Army" *Angolan Peace Monitor* 2.10 (14 June, 1996). [Online Database] <[www.anc.org.za/angola/apm0210.html](http://www.anc.org.za/angola/apm0210.html)> (cited on February 24, 2001); S/1996/503, para 16

<sup>517</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1996/503), para 11.

<sup>518</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 11 July 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council" (S/1996/553). 15 July 1996, para 1 (Readex microprint); UN Security Council. "Letter Dated 22 August 1996 from the Permanent Representatives of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council" (S/1996/681). 22 August 1996 (Readex microprint).

(Table 3.8 Continued)

Aug. 19, 1996	UNITA begins to place "UNITA police" in areas from which it has disengaged. <sup>519</sup>
Aug. 5, 1996	Jonas Savimbi officially rejects the Vice Presidency position. <sup>520</sup>
Sept 9, 1996	Five of Ten UNITA generals arrive for incorporation into Angolan Armed Forces. <sup>521</sup>
Oct 4, 1996	Number of Rapid Reaction Police increases to 5,458. <sup>522</sup>

In dealing with both the Rapid Reaction Police and Executive Outcomes, the government introduced actions that could serve to make commitments credible. Taking place during UNITA's assembling process, the assembling of the Rapid Reaction Police and the Executive Outcomes made both the government and UNITA vulnerable due to the diminished security. However, the government undermined its own actions by recycling the Executive Outcomes and having more Rapid Reaction Police than declared.

#### **The Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, Demobilization, and the Extension of the State Administration**

During the last two years of the Lusaka Protocol, the remaining tasks included the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN), demobilization, and the extension of the state administration. Reversing tactics, the last half of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was characterized by increased concessions by the government and the avoidance of vulnerability by UNITA. Reminiscent of the Bicesse Accords, between March and June 1998, a confluence of events placed the government in a sufficiently dominant position to offer concessions that coincided with UNITA's lack of cooperation and open war option. The

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<sup>519</sup> UN Security Council. "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)" (S/1996/827). 4 October 1996. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/s/1996827.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/s/1996827.htm)> (cited on October 4, 2001), para 15.

<sup>520</sup> "Angola: UNITA Leader Savimbi Reportedly "'Rejects' " Vice Presidency" Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese, 1730 GMT 5 Aug 1996. Translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report – Southern Africa*. August 5, 1996 [Online Database]: (cited on November 12, 2001); FBIS-AFR-96-152).

<sup>521</sup> UN Security Council, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General..."(S/1996/827), para 19.



ensuing descriptions of the events surrounding the GURN, demobilization, and the extension of the state administration during the critical months in early 1998 bring these tensions to the fore and illustrate the absence of mutual vulnerability.

### ***The Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN)***

At the most basic level, the success of the GURN to create credible political reform depended on both getting UNITA's parliamentary members to Luanda (from the 1992 elections, UNITA gained 70 seats in parliament<sup>523</sup>), obtaining UNITA's nominations for the various posts at the central, provincial, and administrative level, and the government's approval of these UNITA nominees. The date of the GURN depended on the arrival of UNITA in Luanda. In this case, the international community seemed to be instrumental in prompting UNITA officials to come to Luanda; the Security Council issued a resolution that indicated that sanctions would be levied against the delaying party if the government officials were not in place by March 20, 1997.<sup>524</sup> UNITA tentatively complied. By March 19<sup>th</sup>, 43 parliamentarians and seven (out of 11) officials in the central government were in Luanda.<sup>525</sup> By April 9<sup>th</sup>, 63 parliamentarians and all 11 officials had arrived in Luanda.<sup>526</sup> Perhaps the security council threats were effective that time, unlike on other occasions, since at that time UNITA still controlled territory and its army had not demobilized, sending officials to participate in the government was not as threatening to the integrity of the party. The GURN was sworn in on April 11, 1997 – without Savimbi's presence.

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<sup>522</sup> Ibid, para 23.

<sup>523</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 9 December 1994..." (S/1994/1441), Annexes 6, 29

<sup>524</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1997/248) para 2.

<sup>525</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)" (S/1997/239). 19 March 1997. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997239.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997239.htm)> (cited on October 4, 2001), para 5.

<sup>526</sup> UN Security Council, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)" (S/1997/304). 14 April 1997. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997304.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997304.htm)> (cited on October 4, 2001), para 2.

By the presence of UNITA members, the GURN lent some credibility to the promise of political reform offered by the government and UNITA's promise to participate politically and not through violent means.

***Attempts at Mutual Vulnerability: GURN***

From March to June 1998, the government made several significant concessions to include UNITA in the political space. Accepting them would have benefited UNITA politically, but as pointed out earlier, it would also come at a cost. Namely, UNITA's inclusion in the government gave the MPLA legitimacy, while it reduced that of UNITA's grievances. The following concessions were made:

- The government legalized UNITA after it announced the complete demobilization of its forces and a special arrangement was made to demobilize remaining registered UNITA troops.<sup>527</sup>
- A law was promulgated that gave Savimbi special status as leader of the largest opposition party<sup>528</sup> (Savimbi having rejected the post of vice-presidency in September 1996 – which was offered in August 1995<sup>529</sup>);
- The government incorporated UNITA nominated-members, some of whom had arrived in March 1997, into the central government<sup>530</sup>
- The government provided 400 bodyguards for Savimbi.<sup>531</sup>

Why, after the experience with the Rapid Reaction Police and Executive Outcomes, would the government turn to more conciliatory methods? After all, it did not yet have control

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<sup>527</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)" (S/1998/236). 13 March 1998. [Online Database]. <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998236.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998236.htm)> (cited on October 4, 2001), para 5.

<sup>528</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola" (S/1998/333). 16 April 1998. [Online Database]. <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998333.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998333.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001), para 3.

<sup>529</sup> On offer of vice-presidency position: UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1995/842), para 2. On rejection of offer: UN Security Council, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General" (S/1996/827), para 5.

<sup>530</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1997/239), para 5; UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1998/333), para 3.

<sup>531</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1998/333), para 5

of the entire state administration. One answer may be found in the international community. Increasingly, the United Nations Security Council placed the blame for the slow implementation of the Lusaka Protocol on UNITA. The frequency of Security Council resolutions calling for UNITA in particular (as opposed to the government) to take more concrete steps to fulfill the Lusaka Protocol increased progressively and became especially critical in 1998. Moreover, as the penalty of sanctions lay on UNITA for non-compliance, the government may have felt more confident in making concessions in the hopes of a positive UNITA response. On October 29, 1997 and again on June 24, 1998, the UN imposed sanctions on UNITA for its failure to comply with the requirements of the Lusaka Protocol.<sup>532</sup> Similarly on July 24, 1998, the Organization of African Unity adopted a resolution condemning UNITA and calling on member states to observe the sanctions measures adopted by the UN.<sup>533</sup> It is also during 1998 that major concessions by the government took place. In table 3.9, I document how government concessions closely followed international criticisms and penalties on UNITA.

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<sup>532</sup> UN Security Council, 3827<sup>th</sup> meeting. "Resolution 1135 (1997) [On the Situation in Angola]" (S/RES/1135). 29 October 1997 (Readex microprint), para 6; UN Security Council, UN Security Council, "Resolution 1176 (1998) [On the Situation in Angola]" (S/RES/1176). 24 June 1998. [Online Database]. <[www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1176.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1176.htm)> (cited October 12, 2001), para 2.

<sup>533</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 27 July 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General" (S/1998/695). 27 July 1998. (Readex microprint), paras 3,6

**Table 3.9 International Action (IA) and Government Concessions (GC) in 1998**

IA	GC	Date	Event
x		January 27	UN Threatens sanctions. <sup>534</sup>
x		February 19	UN issues updated list of UNITA members affected by sanctions. <sup>535</sup>
x		March 4	President of Sanctions Committee announces plans to visit to review implementation. <sup>536</sup>
	x	March 11	Government to legalize UNITA as a political party as a condition for demilitarization. <sup>537</sup>
	x	March 16	Government appoints three governors, seven vice-governors, and six ambassadors nominated by UNITA and passed law on Savimbi special status. <sup>538</sup>
x		March 21-29	Visit by Chairman of Sanctions Committee. <sup>539</sup>
	x	April 10	400-person security detail formed for Savimbi. <sup>540</sup>
x		April 29	UN Requests compliance on sanctions from member states. <sup>541</sup>
x		June 12	Security council condemns <i>UNITA</i> (as opposed to its <i>actions</i> ) for first time. <sup>542</sup>
	x	June 17	The government complies with new plan for Bailundo, Andulo, Mungo, and N'Harêa) and Savimbi asked for more time to prepare the constituents. <sup>543</sup>
x		June 24	Second UN sanctions against UNITA
x		July 24	OAU condemnation of UNITA.
	x	August 7	Government accepts new agreement with UNITA on turning over Bailundo, Andulo, Mungo, and N'Harêa. <sup>544</sup>

<sup>534</sup> UN Security Council, 3850<sup>th</sup> meeting. "Resolution 1149 (1998) [On the Situation in Angola]" (S/RES/1149). 27 January 1998. (Readex microprint), para 8.

<sup>535</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)" (S/1998/236). 13 March 1998. [Online Database]. <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998236.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998236.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001), para 14.

<sup>536</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1998/236), para 14.

<sup>537</sup> Ibid, para 5

<sup>538</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1998/333), para 3.

<sup>539</sup> Ibid, para 8.

<sup>540</sup> Ibid, para 5

<sup>541</sup> UN Security Council, 3876<sup>th</sup> Meeting "Resolution 1164 (1998) [On the Situation of Angola]" (S/RES/1164). 29 April 1998. (Readex microprint), para 14.

<sup>542</sup> UN Security Council, 3891<sup>st</sup> Meeting. "Resolution 1173 (1998) [On the situation in Angola]" (S/RES/1173). 12 June 1998. (Readex microprint). para 1.

<sup>543</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola" (S/1998/524). 17 June 998. [Online Database]. <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998524.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998524.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001), paras 2-4,7.

<sup>544</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola" (S/1998/838). 7 September 1998. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998838.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998838.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001, para 6.

The trend exhibited between UN actions and the actions of the government suggest that international pressure can lead some parties to take conciliatory actions. In this case, it provided the government with a penalty to impose on UNITA. Equally important, it shows the power of unanimity in the international community. The concessions by the government could create credible political reform if they encouraged UNITA to make equally costly concessions. In order for actions to create mutual vulnerability, Savimbi would have had to move to Luanda, demobilize fully, and comply with the requirements of the extension of state administration. For its part, the government surrenders political autonomy to accommodate Savimbi. As the next part shows, only half of UNITA's troops demobilized between March and June 1998 and the extension of state administration remained stalled during this period as well.

### ***Demobilization***

With the beginning of the GURN, demobilization, which began three days afterward, also seemed to pick up speed. In June 1997, 10,321 UNITA soldiers had demobilized.<sup>545</sup> In December, 40,059 UNITA soldiers had demobilized.<sup>546</sup> However, the pace would slow down over the next year, with demobilization officially ending in April 1998 at the end of the UNAVEM III mandate with 49,851 UNITA soldiers demobilization (even though 87,514 were registered in the troop assembly areas).<sup>547</sup> Of the 87,514 troops in the troop assembly areas, 76,360 were eligible for demobilization – the rest would be incorporated into the Angolan Armed Forces. Given that 49,851 had already been demobilized, it left 26,509 either in the troop

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<sup>545</sup> UN Security Council, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)" (S/1997/438). 5 June 1997. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997438.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997438.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001), para 23

<sup>546</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)" (S/1997/959). 4 December 1997. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997959.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997959.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001), para 18.

<sup>547</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1998/333), para 25.

assembly areas or as simply absent. It was determined that these remaining soldiers would be demobilized at the completion of the extension of the state administration.<sup>548</sup>

### *Failing Demobilization*

Despite the pace of demobilization in 1997, UNITA was also limiting its vulnerability to military threats from the government during the establishment of the GURN as demonstrated by the number of absentees and the number of troops it claimed. The number of absentees or deserters from the troop assembly areas rose between 1996 and 1998. In November 1996, the number of absentees/deserters stood at 12,494.<sup>549</sup> By April 1998, the number of absentee/deserters stood at 26,509.<sup>550</sup> Furthermore, the number of UNITA troops at the assembly areas grew. Whereas in November 1996, there were 65,362 (above the total originally declared of 62,500)<sup>551</sup>, by April 1998, there were 87,514 troops.<sup>552</sup> Allowing UNITA to keep such a large number of soldiers in the assembly areas or knowing that they existed outside as deserters, given the experience in 1992, placed the government in a vulnerable position. Nonetheless, such vulnerability on the part of the government did not entice UNITA to move the extension of the state administration forward in 1998.

Even if all the soldiers could have been demobilized, it is questionable if they could have been successfully integrated. The appeal for humanitarian aid had faltered since the

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<sup>548</sup>Ibid, para 25.

<sup>549</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)" (S/1996/960). 19 November 1996. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/s1996960.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/s1996960.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001), para 6.

<sup>550</sup> UN Security Council, (S/1998/333), para 25. UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)" (S/1998/17). 12 January 1998. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s199817.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s199817.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001), para 17.

<sup>551</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General..." (S/1996/960), para 6; for original total see UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..."(S/1996/75), para 15.

<sup>552</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..."(S/1998/333), para 25.

implementation began; between 1995 and 1998, the appeal for humanitarian aid was never fully funded. In October 1995, approximately 36.5 percent had been received.<sup>553</sup> In August 1997, less than 30 percent had been received;<sup>554</sup> at the end of 1997, the secretary general's report complained that the donor response was still inadequate.<sup>555</sup> In September 1998, only 42.2 percent of donor aid had been received.<sup>556</sup> Given that this aid was to be used for various programs such as the reintegration and demobilization of former soldiers, the poor response did not increase the incentive for soldiers to demobilize, making the war option even more feasible. Moreover, the government's own reintegration program, the Social and Counselling Program (SeCOR), which was developed in August 1996, had not been able to start operations until mid 1997. Through SeCOR, demobilized soldiers were exposed to vocational training and funding for quick impact projects.<sup>557</sup> By mid-March 1998, only 26,300 demobilized soldiers (52 percent of all demobilized) were enrolled.<sup>558</sup> As of the end of July 1998, one month before the government ceased negotiations with UNITA, 34,000 demobilized soldiers (68 percent of all demobilized) were registered.<sup>559</sup>

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<sup>553</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1995/842), para 35.

<sup>554</sup> UN Security Council, "Progress Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)" (S/1997/640). 13 August 1997. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997640.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997640.htm)> (cited on October 4, 2001), para 30.

<sup>555</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1997/959), para 20.

<sup>556</sup> Volunteers in Technical Assistance Disaster Information Center. Compiled from information from United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in Luanda. "Humanitarian Operations in Angola" 10-16 Sept 1998. [Online Database] <[www.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/98a/0023.html](http://www.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/98a/0023.html)> (cited December 11, 2001).

<sup>557</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1998/17), para 18.

<sup>558</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1998/333), para 26.

### ***The Failure of the Extension of the state administration***

Following the official end of demobilization, the extension of the state administration was the last task in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Like demobilization, it began after the GURN was established in April 1997.<sup>560</sup> Not only was the extension of the state administration the last important tool UNITA had, it was also the most important piece of the puzzle the government wanted. At the time of the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA controlled 40 percent of Angola.<sup>561</sup> The completion of the extension of the state administration would have consolidated the government's legitimacy in Angola.

### ***Attempts at Mutual Vulnerability: Extension of State Administration***

The extension for state administration proceeded unevenly during 1997 and 1998. On a few occasions when the government took steps to pull back militarily, the extension of the state administration resumed as evidenced when in November 1997, the government ceased the activities of the Angolan Armed Forces in the areas that were under UNITA control.<sup>562</sup> Concessions by the government also moved the process forward; twice, the government accepted UNITA's proposals on extending state administration to Bailundo and Andulo and extending the deadline for UNITA to do so.<sup>563</sup> By December 1997, UNITA had already given up Cuango and Lunda Norte, both diamond-producing areas, and Negage, its headquarters in Uíge Province<sup>564</sup>,

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<sup>559</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola" (S/1998/723). 6 August 1998. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998723.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1998/s1998723.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001), para 27.

<sup>560</sup> UN Security Council, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1997/438), para 4.

<sup>561</sup> Vines (1999) 16

<sup>562</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1997/959), para 12

<sup>563</sup> "Angola's UNITA Wants Savimbi's Residence Issue Resolved", Lisbon Diario de Noticias (Internet Version) in Portuguese 23 Oct 1997 (excerpt) Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report - Southern Africa* Oct 23 1997 ([Online Database]: November 12, 2001; FBIS-AFR-97-296); UN Security Council, (S/1998/524) , paras 8,9



but Bailundo and Andulo remained in UNITA control. Dos Santos even appealed to Savimbi directly in two phone calls to complete of the remaining tasks of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.<sup>565</sup> However, by March 1998, it was clear that while the government had made many political concessions and UNITA could give up diamond areas such as Cuango and Lunda Norte, it was unable to give up its Headquarters of Bailundo and Andulo, located in Huambo and Bié provinces, respectively. Indeed, while 60 other areas remained under UNITA control<sup>566</sup>, they did not get the attention that Bailundo and Andulo received. Dos Santos attempted to appeal directly to Savimbi through a letter at the end of March in 1998 to extend the state administration to Andulo and Bailundo and two other areas, but was unable to push the process forward.<sup>567</sup> In the end, the extension of the state administration could not be completed as UNITA kept putting forward proposals to postpone the extension of the state administration. The government faced an asymmetric vulnerability through the concessions it offered on the extension of state administration.

Thus from March to June 1998 while several costly concessions were being made by the government, UNITA reinforced its losses from demobilization and did not concede its headquarters. Savimbi may have believed that he would be harmed if he engaged in normal politics. Moreover, he did not believe he would ever obtain any meaningful positions in the government.<sup>568</sup> Other statements Savimbi made, similar to that regarding demobilization in

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<sup>564</sup> For Cuango and Negage Dates: UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer in Angola" (S/1997/807). 17 October 1997. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997807.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1997/s1997807.htm)> (cited October 4, 2001), para 5; On other localities: "Commission Rejects UNITA's Proposal" Lisbon Diario de Noticias (Internet Version) in Portuguese 4 Dec 1997. (text). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report-Southern Africa*; Dec 5, 1997 ([Online Database]: November 12, 2001; FBIS-AFR-97-338)

<sup>565</sup> On phone calls see: UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1997/959) para 3; UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General ..." (S/1998/17), para 2.

<sup>566</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1998/333), para 49.

<sup>567</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General ..." (S/1998/524), para 2,3.

<sup>568</sup> Interview with Herman Cohen, July 18, 2001, Rosslyn VA.

March 1996, also revealed fears that complying with the tasks of the Luanda Protocol would entail not just granting legitimacy to the government, but also losing some leverage within UNITA itself, as evidenced from the comments he made regarding the vice presidency position he eventually turned down:

“[D]o you really need Savimbi as Vice-President of the Republic? Do you? Perhaps I would be more useful telling the truths I do, rather than being gagged. I would also not like to die of a heart attack just because I was not received by the director of the Office of the President. I think I would be much more useful outside than inside”<sup>569</sup>

With demobilization over in April 1998 and at least 26,000 UNITA troops available with little incentive to reintegrate, UNITA could keep the option of war open. Additionally, by 1997, there was increasing evidence that the neighboring war in Zaire provided a market for UNITA’s diamonds, as did sanctions busting by Zambia, Togo, and Ivory Coast.<sup>570</sup> UNITA’s continual failure of compliance led to the government decision to break all ties. On August 31, 1998, the government suspended UNITA from parliament because of its non-compliance and on September 11, it broke all ties with UNITA. From September 11, the government stated that it would only interact with UNITA-Renovada, a group that had broken away from UNITA.<sup>571</sup>

## Summary

The last two years of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol depict a fairly conciliatory government and a non-responsive UNITA. Once UNITA formed part of the GURN, the government adopted several concessions toward Savimbi. Nonetheless, demobilization and

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<sup>569</sup> “New conditions raised” in Angola Peace Monitor 2.7 (29 March 1996). [Online Database] <[www.anc.org.za/angola/amp0207.html](http://www.anc.org.za/angola/amp0207.html)> (cited February 24, 2001).

<sup>570</sup> see UN Security Council. “Letter dated 21 December 2000 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to the President of the Security Council” (S/2001/1225) (Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions); See also Malaquais (2001); Munslow (1999); Global Witness (1998)

<sup>571</sup> There are questions as to whether UNITA-Renovada is a true break away group or one that was encouraged by the government to disassociate itself. (Paul Hare, personal interview. June 25, 2001).

the extension of the state administration were not completed by UNITA. Because UNITA refused to take steps that would increase its vulnerability to the government during a time of great concessions, the credibility of the promises of political reform and demobilization did not form. It is not surprising that the government decided to cease its negotiations with UNITA.

The international community played a strong role in both enhancing as well as detracting credibility. Importantly, the government seemed to have been able to take conciliatory steps when UN threatened sanctions and made other public reprimands for UNITA's delaying tactics. Yet, the international community was divided on their policy toward Angola the imposition of sanctions was undermined through the sale of diamonds from countries willing to circumvent them. The result was an inability to realize the full effects of the penalties for renegeing on promised actions. In other words, while the penalty for renegeing on promises to purchase conflict-diamonds was sanctions –

Intended to prevent UNITA from acquiring funds and munitions – the willingness of other countries to purchase its diamonds essentially weakened the effects of sanctions. Moreover, the poor response to the humanitarian appeal did not provide resources to create an incentive to choose civilian over military life, thus assisting UNITA in limiting its vulnerability.

#### **SECTION 3.4 CONCLUSIONS**

Angola's experience demonstrates that the timing of actions can be important in creating mutual vulnerability; it signals credible promises of political reform and demobilization. Importantly, it is not so much a string of unbroken promises that weakens a peace accord, but rather the time when those promises were broken can determine the creation of the mutual vulnerability needed for credible political reform. Both peace processes in Angola contained examples of the avoidance of costly concessions that would yield both political influence and political participation. At different times, both parties used strategies that seemed to rest on providing the illusion of compliance while undermining or protecting themselves by other means

– thus avoiding the creation of mutually vulnerable situations. As a result, the promises of political reform were not credible. The role of the international community and the effect of organization stand out prominently in Angola.

After the signing of the Bicesse Accord, the incomplete extension of central administration – which allowed UNITA to control its traditional stronghold of Jamba as well as 77 other communes<sup>572</sup> - allowed the implementation process to proceed to troop assembly and demobilization. As such, the political and military concessions of this arrangement created mutual vulnerability between the government and UNITA. However, during demobilization, the government's revelation of the anti-riot police<sup>573</sup> created asymmetric vulnerability, stalling the implementation process. Moreover, the cohesion of UNITA<sup>574</sup> and the poor international response to requests for financial assistance<sup>575</sup> for demobilization facilitated the return to war.

Similarly, the implementation of the Lusaka Accords could not proceed due to the presence of asymmetric vulnerability. Although the assembly of UNITA troops proceeded when the government made promises to cancel its contract with executive outcomes, it stalled as it was revealed that instead, they used them to staff other security companies.<sup>576</sup> Likewise, the government's reporting of the number of Rapid Reaction Police was consistently wrong. As a result, the process of troop assembly by UNITA did not proceed (see Table 3.8). UNITA also took steps to limit its vulnerability. While the government accommodated UNITA in the political space, UNITA did not reciprocate with requests to return territory to the central administration or with demobilization – rendering the government asymmetrically vulnerable. As a result, the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol eventually stalled.

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<sup>572</sup> “State Administration Extended to all Districts.”

<sup>573</sup> See the account in Anstee (1996), 73.

<sup>574</sup> See observation in Rial et al, 11.

<sup>575</sup> Jett, 97

Importantly, Angola showed some specific areas through which the international community may apply pressure. In particular, during the administration of the GURN, the backing of the international community to impose sanctions for non-compliance on UNITA seemed to persuade the Angolan government to offer UNITA political concessions (see Table 3.9). UNITA was also persuaded to comply a few times, under the threat of UN sanctions. Notably, UNITA seemed to comply when doing so would not expose it to the threat of government military action – as in the case of resuming the extension of administration. Therefore, there are some windows for international pressure. On the other hand, the international community can also reinforce intentions to avoid vulnerable situations. In particular, during both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka Protocol, the lack of an adequate reintegration package from the international community<sup>577</sup> and the willingness of neighboring states to purchase diamonds from UNITA<sup>578</sup> reinforced the asymmetric vulnerability.

UNITA's strong organization proved instrumental as a means for avoiding mutual vulnerability. At the end of the Bicesse Accords, UNITA knew that the government was weak because of its relative disorganization.<sup>579</sup> As a result, it was able to resume military conflict rather than accept the election results. During the Bicesse Accords, there were times when the UN could have been more forceful. Specifically, the UN could have done more if it broke the loyalty of the UNITA troops, provided the government with an incentive to either disband the anti-riot police or encourage more UNITA integration in the police force. Instead, the UN responded meekly – by emphasizing that the anti-riot policy should only be used in emergency situations and stated that the government should include more UNITA in the police force.<sup>580</sup>

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<sup>576</sup>Vines (March 1995), 52.

<sup>577</sup> See for example, Jett, 97; Volunteers in Technical Assistance Disaster Information Center (10-16 Sept 1998); UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..."(S/1998/723), para 27.

<sup>578</sup> See Malaquais (2001); Global Witness (1998).

<sup>579</sup> See Savimbi's comment in Cohen (2000), 116.

The ultimate outcome of such asymmetric vulnerability in the Bicesse Accord and Lusaka Protocol follows the hypothesized effects of the timing of actions and concessions, the international community, and the organization of factions on the advancement of an implementation process as summarized in the table below.

**Table 3.10 Results of Hypotheses in Angola**

<i>Hypotheses</i>	<i>Mutual Vulnerability?</i>		<i>Implementation Outcome</i>	
			<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>
1. Timing of actions, concessions, and events	No		Stall	Stall
2. Electoral rules and vested interests	Not applicable			
3. Administrative rules and vested interests	Not applicable			
<i>International community</i>	<i>Effect on Mutual Vulnerability</i>		<i>Implementation Outcome</i>	
	<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>
4. Low International financial assistance	Negative	Negative	Stall	Stall
5. No International cohesion	Negative	Negative	Stall	Stall
<i>Organization of factions</i>	<i>Effect on Mutual Vulnerability</i>		<i>Implementation Outcome</i>	
	<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Predicted</i>	<i>Actual</i>
6. Cohesive, leader compliant	Not applicable			
7. Loosely organized, leader compliant	Not applicable			
8. Cohesive, leader not compliant	Negative	Negative	Stall	Stall
9. Loosely organized, leader not compliant	Not applicable			
10. Proliferation of factions	Not applicable			

In Angola, unlike Mozambique, asymmetric vulnerability serves as a necessary and sufficient condition for the failure of the advancement of the Bicesse Accord and the Lusaka Protocol. In the absence of mutual vulnerability, as demonstrated by the timing of the appearance of the anti-riot police, implementation stalls. Moreover, looking specifically at the creation of vulnerability in Angola has offered lessons not only on the importance of the timing of events in creating credible political reform and demobilization, but also how the international community and the organizational structure may help to advance or prevent mutually vulnerable actions. In order to engender the necessary atmosphere that create mutual vulnerability, the international community

<sup>580</sup> UN Security Council, "Further Report of the Secretary-General..."(S/24556), para 19

**should focus firstly, on being unified, and secondly, on affecting the cohesion of UNITA by working with the government to offer insurgents greater incentives to demobilize.**

## **CHAPTER 4. LIBERIA'S PIECEMEAL PEACE**

### **SECTION 4.1 BACKGROUND ON LIBERIA**

Seeking to overthrow Liberia's president, Samuel K. Doe, Charles Taylor, leader of a group of 100 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) combatants entered Liberia from its border with Côte d'Ivoire on Christmas Eve 1989. Ironically, Doe himself had wrested power from William Tolbert through a coup d'état in 1980. Over the course of his nine years in office, Doe, an ethnic Krahn, constructed political power around the Krahns, which constituted about four percent of the population.<sup>581</sup> Essentially, Doe perpetuated the political marginalization that had occurred during the rule of William Tolbert and his Americo-Liberian predecessors – former slaves repatriated by the United States in the 1800s. Americo-Liberians, composing about five percent<sup>582</sup> of the population, had ruled the country exclusively since their settlement in the 1820s.<sup>583</sup> Perhaps, most significantly, Doe cultivated a circle of patronage and used the state's enterprises such as the Forestry Development Authority and the Liberian Produce Marketing Corporation to support it and himself.<sup>584</sup> Ostensibly, for the repression and hollowing out of the country, Charles Taylor claimed he sought to overthrow Doe.<sup>585</sup>

Seven years after it began and with the help of 14 peace and cease-fire agreements, the Liberian civil war finally came to an end in 1996. Eight warring parties – reflecting the

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<sup>581</sup> William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 81; Amos Sawyer, The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and Challenge (San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1992), 295.

<sup>582</sup> Max Ahmadu Sesay, "Bringing Peace to Liberia" in Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, The Liberian Peace Process: 1990-1996, ed. Jeremy Armon and Andy Carl. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1996), 11

<sup>583</sup> Many works outline the history of Liberia and the Americo-Liberian period and Doe's rule: Reno (1998), p. 80- Sawyer(1992); Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil War (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), xvi-xviii.; Cohen (2000), 126-128; Wippman, 160-162; George Klay Kieh, Jr. Ending the Liberian Civil War: Implications for United States Policy Toward West Africa (Washington, DC: TransAfrica Forum, 1996), 6-11.

<sup>584</sup> Reno (1998), 82-86.



fractionalization of the factions characteristic of Liberia's conflict – signed the last peace accord, the Abuja II Accord. The peace process in Liberia culminated in the 1997 election of Charles Taylor, the former warlord of the NPFL, as President. Taylor won an overwhelming 75 percent of the presidential vote. The NPFL party won 21 of the 26 seats in the Senate and 49 of the 64 seats in the House of Representatives.<sup>586</sup> While civil war has not returned to Liberia, civil unrest persists today in the northern county of Lofa. Since 2000, Taylor has been fighting unrest with the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).<sup>587</sup>

By several measures the Liberian civil war is among the most complex and contains several anomalies. As will be covered at various points in this chapter, the Liberian peace process was distinguished by its many peace accords, changing alliances and factional splintering. Furthermore, while the United Nations was involved, the members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), served as the primary mediators between the Liberian warring factions and designed the agreements. Indeed, the subsequent partnership with the United Nations (UN) marked the first time that the UN had collaborated with a regional organization in bringing about a resolution to a civil war.<sup>588</sup> The ECOWAS also served as peacekeepers through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), created specifically for Liberia.<sup>589</sup> Also different from many UN-mediated conflicts, rather than a long negotiation process, peace agreements often

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<sup>585</sup> See Sesay (1996), 11-12; Cohen (2000), 133; Ellis, 65-74.

<sup>586</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 1997-98, New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997, 67-68; The Carter Center, Observing the 1997 Special Elections Process in Liberia (Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center), 61.

<sup>587</sup> Amnesty International, Liberia: Killings, torture and rape continue in Lofa County, 1 August 2001. [Online Database] <[www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org)> (cited March 6, 2002); Mark Doyle, "Liberia's Unusual War", BBC News, 23 February 2002. [Online Database] <[www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com)> (cited on March 6, 2002).

<sup>588</sup> Abiodun Alao. The Burden of Collective Goodwill: The International Involvement in the Liberian Civil War. (Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd 1998), 129.

<sup>589</sup> ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, "Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, on the Cease-fire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group for Liberian, Banjul, Republic of Gambia", 7 August 1990, reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), English Edition. 21 (1992), 6.

emerged after summits that lasted just a few days. Perhaps for this reason, unlike many of the peace agreements that other countries have signed, the Liberian peace agreements are not comprehensive political and military arrangements; I suggest that they are step-by-step negotiations toward a political and military agreement.

The very incremental quality of the Liberian peace process provides an opportunity to learn about how the factions were accommodated such that the incentive to return to conflict was diminished even if it only produced short periods of peace between agreements. As new factions and alliances showed changing political and military strengths, they offer an insight into how and when mutual vulnerability created between warring factions, through governing and administrative structures, voting procedures, and security partnerships, portended credible political reform and demobilization and subsequently, moved the peace process forward. Similarly, it is possible to see where the creation of mutual military and political vulnerabilities could not occur or became muted because of the influence of regional biases, resources, and organizational structures. In the absence of mutual vulnerability created by an accord, the intervention of ECOMOG to guarantee military security and the close interaction of the heads of state of ECOWAS countries helped to move the peace process forward.

Five sections follow this background. In the next section, I review some of the literature surrounding the civil war and the peace processes in Liberia, as well as some reasons behind its eventual resolution. The subsequent three sections after the literature review discuss the three periods of the peace process. The fifth section offers some concluding remarks.

#### **SECTION 4.2 COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR**

Due to the number of peace agreements, the literature divides broadly into that which describes the intractability of the conflict and that which describes its resolution. As I will briefly review below, the intractability of the Liberian crisis was characterized by a lack of cohesion among external actors regarding strategies for its resolution. Additionally, the regular splitting of

and the warring between factions and the presence of natural resources resulted in difficulties in implementing agreements. Indeed, the resolution of the war, some argue occurred due to the unity and resolve of the external actors, the co-optation and cooperation of the factions, and the reduction of gains from natural resources.<sup>590</sup>

### **The Intractability of the Liberian Conflict**

#### ***ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and international division***

One of the most discussed features of the ECOMOG intervention is the degree of the internal division in ECOWAS that existed regarding its role as mediator and peacekeeper and the perceived and real bias it exhibited against some of the warring factions. The suggestion is that lack of unity for ECOMOG's mission delayed the resolution of the war.<sup>591</sup> In the beginning of the civil war, the francophone countries, except Guinea, were against intervention, while the anglophone countries supported it.<sup>592</sup> Of the Francophone countries, the policies of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso were most critical to the Liberian conflict. Specifically, Côte d'Ivoire had

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<sup>590</sup> For perspectives on external actors see: Alao, et al, 100; Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2002), see "Chapter 2. Liberia: A Banquet for the Warlords"; Cohen (2000), 160-161; Lyons(1998). 40-41; For perspectives on factions see: Alao et al, 116-7; Adebajo (2002); For perspectives on natural resources see; Werner Korte and Robert Kappel, "Crisis and Intervention: How ECOMOG Brought About Peace in Liberia, but Was Still Unable to Guarantee a Democratic New Beginning". Liberian Studies Journal, XXV. 2 (2000), 94; William Reno, "Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor's Liberia", Third World Quarterly, 16, 1 (1995), 109-120, ; William Reno, "Foreign Firms and the Financing of Charles Taylor's NPFL", Liberian Studies Journal, XVIII. 2 (1993), 175-187.

<sup>591</sup> see for example: Yekutiel Gershoni. "War without End and an End to A War: the Prolonged Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone". African Studies Review 40. 3 (December 1997), 65-67 ; Adebajo, 43-44; Alao et al, 100.

<sup>592</sup> On ECOMOG bias see: Ellis, 98-99; Professor Ibrahim James. "ECOMOG Under Attack" in The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping, Margaret A. Vogt, ed. (Lagos, Nigeria: Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd, 1992), 127-8; Emmanuel Kwezi Aning. "Managing Regional Security in West Africa: ECOWAS, ECOMOG and Liberia". CDR Working Paper, 94.2, (Copenhagen, Denmark: Centre for Development Research, February 1994), 10 –12; Yekutiel Gershoni. "From ECOWAS to ECOMOG: The Liberian Crisis and the Struggle for Political Hegemony in West Africa", Liberian Studies Journal, XVIII. 1 (1993), 26-27; Emmanuel Kwezi Aning. "The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict" The case of Liberia and West Africa", CDR Working Paper, 97.4, Copenhagen, Denmark: Centre for Development Research, June 1997.

provided Taylor with weapons and allowed him to launch the invasion into Liberia from inside its border, while, Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso had allowed Taylor to train his troops in Burkina Faso.<sup>593</sup> Also, there were reportedly, between 400 and 1,000 Burkinabè troops who formed part of the NPFL.<sup>594</sup> The support from Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso seemed to have had personal ties, as well: Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of Côte d'Ivoire was also the adoptive father to Adolphus Tolbert's wife; Doe had killed both Adolphus Tolbert and his father, President William Tolbert, in the 1980 coup.<sup>595</sup> Houphouët -Boigny's widowed, adopted daughter then became closely associated with Compaore, who was married to Chantale Terrason, an Ivorian.<sup>596</sup> It has also been alleged that Compaore, who came to power through a coup d'état, was assisted by Liberian dissidents who had been trained in Libya.<sup>597</sup> The other francophone members, Mali, Senegal and Togo did not supply troops until much later.<sup>598</sup> Guinea, the lone exception, was likely supportive due to its shared border with Liberia; they had fears of an invasion should the NPFL come to power.<sup>599</sup>

Among the anglophone ECOWAS members, Ghana and Nigeria constituted the two important countries supporting the intervention by ECOMOG. Ghana's support for ECOMOG stemmed from President Jerry John Rawlings' fear that similar revolutionary movements may spring up in Ghana, as Rawlings himself had come to power through a coup d'état.<sup>600</sup> Nigeria's

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<sup>593</sup> Ellis, 65-74, 90; Aning (1997).

<sup>594</sup> Aning (1994), 12.

<sup>595</sup> Huband (1998) 105

<sup>596</sup> Ibid, 105.

<sup>597</sup> Gershoni (1997), 66

<sup>598</sup> Sesay (1996), 19.

<sup>599</sup> Aning (1994), 11

<sup>600</sup> Aning (1997)

support was most significant and controversial. Not only did Nigeria initiate ECOMOG<sup>601</sup>, but, by all accounts, without Nigeria's contribution, ECOMOG would not have been viable.<sup>602</sup>

Overall, Nigeria provided 80 percent of all troops and 90 percent of the financing for ECOMOG.<sup>603</sup> Nigeria's over-representation only worsened suspicions that Nigeria aimed to prevent Taylor's ascendancy to the presidency.<sup>604</sup> In large part, suspicions by the NPFL of Nigeria's bias stemmed from the strong relationship between Nigerian Head of State, Ibrahim Babangida, with Doe.<sup>605</sup> For instance, in return for Nigeria's payment of Liberia's debt to the African Development Bank, Doe built the Ibrahim Babangida School of Political Science<sup>606</sup>, whose \$20 million cost was absorbed by Babangida.<sup>607</sup> In fact, one account even asserts that Doe's only ally in West Africa was Babangida.<sup>608</sup>

The larger international community seemed disinterested in resolving the crisis. The United States, which was viewed as one of the most important allies given Liberia's history, did not want to intervene in the conflict.<sup>609</sup> Similarly, the United Nations was slow in involving itself

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<sup>601</sup> Olonisakin, Funmi. Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations. Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000, 119

<sup>602</sup> Margaret A. Vogt, "The Involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia's Peace-Keeping" in Peace Keeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies, volume 1, M.A. Vogt and L.S. Aminu, editors. Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd., 1996, 350.

<sup>603</sup> Adebajo (2002), 48

<sup>604</sup> James, 326

<sup>605</sup> A number of works account for the relationship between Babangida and Doe. See for example, Ademola Adeleke, "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia", Journal of Modern African Studies 33.4 (1995), 578; Herbert Howe. "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping", International Security, 21.3 (Winter 1996/97), 148; Festus B Aboagye, (Lt. Col.). ECOMOG: A Sub-regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management, and Peacekeeping in Liberia. (Accra, Ghana, Sedco Enterprise, 1999), 154; Huband, 104.

<sup>606</sup> Huband (1998), 104

<sup>607</sup> Adeleke, 578.

<sup>608</sup> Huband (1998), 103.

<sup>609</sup> See Cohen (2000) and Kieh (1996) for a review of the US response to Liberia's civil war.

in the Liberian crisis; it did not send a special representative until 1993.<sup>610</sup> A number of scholars also point out the special role of French firms.<sup>611</sup> Over time, research has revealed that in 1991, the area controlled by Taylor, 'Greater Liberia' was France's third biggest source of timber.<sup>612</sup> Additional research suggests that France's state-owned steel mills also purchased iron ore from Taylor through a private firm, Sollac, in 1991.<sup>613</sup> Another instance of France's connection with Taylor reveals itself through one of Taylor's main business connections in Côte d'Ivoire, Robert Saint-Pai. Mr. Saint-Pai, a French businessman in Abidjan, had strong connections to Côte d'Ivoire's French Ambassador, Michele Dupuch, who later became France's principal advisor on African Affairs.<sup>614</sup>

Although the external intervention had divisions, this was not a static situation. During certain periods, the francophone/anglophone split was remedied and the international community became more involved. However, given that at the end of the war, ECOWAS appeared biased toward the NPFL and the UN greatly diminished its force, there is not such a direct relationship between the cohesiveness of the external actors and the resolution of the Liberian conflict.

### ***Factional Splitting***

Liberia's intransigent civil war is also blamed on the appearance of new factions.<sup>615</sup> Liberia's civil war, which began with two factions, the NPFL and the government's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) ended with eight signatories to the final peace agreement, the Abuja-II

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<sup>610</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 23 November 1992 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Secretary-General" (S/24835). 23 November 1992.

<sup>611</sup> Reno (1993), 180-1.

<sup>612</sup> Ibid, 180. The term 'Greater Liberia' refers to most of Liberia, along with some portions of Guinea and Sierra Leone, that Taylor controlled (Reno [1993], 178).

<sup>613</sup> Reno (1995), 115.

<sup>614</sup> Ellis, 93

Accord. The splitting factions not only made the civil war more complex, but also contributed to the unraveling of some of the agreements. For example, the Akosombo and Accra agreements could not be implemented because of the splits in the NPFL and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO).<sup>616</sup> Indeed, Alao et al (1999) and Lyons (1998) claim that failing to recognize the balance of power among the factions contributed to the failure of implementing the peace agreements.<sup>617</sup> Notably, Trevor Gordon-Somers, the first Special Representative of the Secretary General stated that there seemed to be two parallel negotiation tracts – one between the major factions and the external mediators and another among the factions themselves.<sup>618</sup> Voicing another point of view, Ellis (1999) and Gershoni (1997) claim that the major factions created smaller factions in order to circumvent the constraints of the agreements they had signed.<sup>619</sup> However, some work also suggests that the large number of factions increased the NPFL's insecurity and thus, encouraged them to sign agreements.<sup>620</sup> Hence, the effect of the number of factions is also unclear. In this chapter, I look at the effect of factional splitting on the military and political vulnerability felt by the groups towards each other and in turn, its effect on compliance with peace agreements.

### ***Natural Resources***

More recently, economic considerations for civil wars have been advanced. In Liberia's case, attention has focused on the use of timber and iron-ore in Liberia and diamonds in nearby Sierra Leone by Charles Taylor to sustain the war. William Reno (1993; 1995) argues that in this

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<sup>615</sup> see for example Gershoni (1997), 60.

<sup>616</sup> See for example, Sesay (1996), 76.

<sup>617</sup> Alao et al, 116-7; Lyons, 36.

<sup>618</sup> Trevor Gordon-Somers, personal interview. August 16, 2001.

<sup>619</sup> Ellis, 101-2; Gershoni (1997), 60.

<sup>620</sup> Sesay (1996b), 397-8.

new configuration of a state, Charles Taylor has more to gain by working outside internationally accepted norms. Unlike in the NPFL-controlled areas, unrecognized by the international community, the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU)– set up by ECOWAS and recognized by the international community – was also subject to conditions on international aid and responsible for \$4 billion in debt accumulated under the previous government. On the other hand, Taylor was able to skirt such constraints; by directly granting contracts to foreign firms for mining rights, Taylor was able to obtain foreign exchange.<sup>621</sup> For this reason, Reno argues that the acceptance of the international community or even the institutions of the state are not important in the short term to rebel leaders like Charles Taylor, who rely on commercial links to survive.<sup>622</sup>

Reno (1995) does not state when international recognition and the state apparatus become important, but it is evident that Taylor wanted to create a sense of legitimacy. For example, Charles Taylor’s “Greater Liberia” also had an administration, a parliament, and rudimentary institutions.<sup>623</sup> Moreover, the height of Taylor’s control over greater Liberia, in terms of commercial and political organization, occurred between 1990-1992<sup>624</sup> - yet, the war continued for another four years. Thus, there are limitations to the argument that the rebel movements are driven by commercial reasons only.

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<sup>621</sup> Reno (1993), 179.

<sup>622</sup> Reno (1995), 111; 113.

<sup>623</sup> Quentin Outram, “Liberia: roots and fruits of the emergency”, *Third World Quarterly*, 20. 1 (1999) [Online Database] (cited January 29, 2002), 168; Gershoni (1997), p. 69; Reno (1993), pp.178-179.

<sup>624</sup> This point is also made by Ellis, 92. As the chapter will discuss later, after 1992, many more factions emerged in Liberia and competed with each other for territory. For the commercial competition between factions see Reno (1998); Olonisakin, 136.



## **The Resolution of the Liberian Conflict**

### ***Changes with ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and the International Community***

As the war continued, some of the literature argues, ECOMOG and the larger international community began to operate in a more coordinated manner and the warring factions came to accept ECOMOG as a solution to the conflict. In fact, it was this attitudinal change, Alao et al (1999) argue, that held the key to the eventual end of the conflict. In a thorough review of each of the major peace agreements, Alao et al (1999) assert that over the course of the peace agreements, Taylor had come to believe that he could gain from abiding by the accords and in standing for elections. Of particular importance were the end of Nigeria's bias against the NPFL and the willingness of ECOWAS to impose sanctions.<sup>625</sup> For this reason, they claim, Taylor conceded to demobilize his forces and cooperate to hold the 1997 elections.<sup>626</sup> However, this explanation does not account for the periods during the seven-year war when the cease-fire held and it seemed as if progress toward demobilization would occur. The periods during which there was a lull in the fighting also offer important lessons for understanding the conditions under which a peace process will succeed.

ECOMOG's periodic switch to peace enforcement – establishing peace through the use of force –is also cited as a reason for the war's resolution. Switching between peace enforcement and peacekeeping is sometimes called "peace creation"<sup>627</sup> because it implies a conscious effort to adopt different tactics in bringing peace to a country. ECOMOG engaged in such 'peace creation' at two points in the war in 1990 and 1992.<sup>628</sup> The discussion of the effectiveness of 'peace creation' begins to delve into the factors that pushed factions to honor or renege on promises to cease-fire and disarm. It begins to examine which factors led to the eventual

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<sup>625</sup> Alao et al, 100

<sup>626</sup> Alao et al, 102-3.

<sup>627</sup> Olonisakin, 100; 126-127.

resolution of the civil war. After all, it was the violation of these promises that made ECOMOG switch to a peace enforcement role in 1990 and 1992.<sup>629</sup> In Olonisakin's (2000) extensive inquiry into the effectiveness of 'peace creation', she acknowledges that the different strategies used were dependent on the strategies or behavior of the NPFL. When the NPFL was aggressive, such as in the assault on Monrovia with Operation Octopus in 1992, ECOMOG would switch to peace enforcement. Similarly, only NPFL compliance would allow a switch back to traditional peacekeeping.<sup>630</sup> Left unexplained however, is what conditions coincided with NPFL cooperation.

### ***Predicting Compliance***

Earl Conteh-Morgan (1998) provides some insight for the factions' eventual compliance with agreements. Conteh-Morgan makes the general argument that the conflict could not subside after the earlier agreements because the parties were afraid to cooperate – terming this “cooperational insecurity”.<sup>631</sup> Focusing on the earlier part of the war, Conteh-Morgan, argues that Taylor was afraid that abiding by the Yamoussoukro IV agreement (1991), the agreements reached at Geneva (1991) and the Cotonou Accord (1993), would diminish his power and thwart his plans for assuming the presidency of Liberia.<sup>632</sup> In other words, the NPFL and Taylor were uncertain about gains in the post-accord period.<sup>633</sup>

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<sup>628</sup> Olonisakin, 122-135; Alao et al, 30.

<sup>629</sup> See Olonisakin, especially pages 122-135.

<sup>630</sup> Olonisakin, 227.

<sup>631</sup> Earl Conteh-Morgan, “The Politics and Diplomacy of the Liberian Peace Process” in Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia, Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 32-51; “cooperational insecurity” appears on page 33.

<sup>632</sup> Conteh-Morgan, 33; the Cotonou Accord is mentioned on page 38.

<sup>633</sup> Conteh-Morgan, 34-35

Conteh-Morgan (1998) uses “cooperational insecurity” to explain several of the aggressive tactics undertaken by the NPFL. For example, Conteh-Morgan (1998) states that the NPFL’s kidnapping of ECOMOG peacekeepers and the October attack on ECOMOG and the AFL in Monrovia, (the NPFL’s notorious Operation Octopus) stemmed from fear that the peace that would result from the various accords would not be suitable to its goals.<sup>634</sup> Foreshadowing Olonisakin’s (2000) discussion of “peace creation”, Conteh-Morgan writes that the presence of “cooperational insecurity” also determined the amount of force ECOMOG used. During the time period he examines, the early half of the war, ECOMOG’s use of peacekeeping, followed by peace enforcement and peace offensive coincided with progressively lower levels of NPFL cooperation.<sup>635</sup>

Changes in the external actors’ involvement and bias took place at a few points in the war – such as Cote d’Ivoire’s management of the peace process in 1991 and the broadening of ECOMOG participation by Tanzanian and Ugandan troops<sup>636</sup> – but the accords were still violated. Hence, attitudinal changes and cohesiveness do not provide a straightforward answer. While “cooperation insecurity” may have led the factions to resume war, it sheds little light on why the factions went for almost two years, in the time frame explored by Conteh-Morgan (1998), without major violations of the cease-fires. While peace creation may have brought order, it is still unclear why the warring parties were uncooperative to warrant the use of peace creation. Additionally, despite ECOMOG’s proven ability to enforce the peace, subsequent threats of peace enforcement<sup>637</sup> did not stop the factions from stalling the peace process.

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<sup>634</sup> Conteh-Morgan, 39-40

<sup>635</sup> Conteh-Morgan, 49.

<sup>636</sup> The Yamoussoukro Agreements were chaired by Cote d’Ivoire’s President, Houphouët-Boigny (Huband 209-211) Tanzania and Uganda joined ECOMOG in 1994 (UN Security Council, “Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia”, (S/1994/168), 14 February 1994, para 24)

## **Elements of Political and Military Vulnerability in Liberia**

In this case study, I test the notion that the presence of mutual political and military vulnerability among the factions helped to settle political instability and engendered compliance with agreements. In particular, I examine the international community's financial and diplomatic involvement, ECOWAS' mediation and peacekeeping efforts, and the factions' organization as variables that help the parties establish their sense of vulnerability to adverse political and military situations. In the absence of mutual vulnerability, I argue that warring parties may renege not just because of fear of reprisal, but also an inability to advance their own interests and retaliate against others' adverse actions. There is an asymmetric vulnerability. Equally important, in the absence of weak or no institutions, groups react to overt actions. In these situations, relationships are constantly being renegotiated.<sup>638</sup> As a result, the timing of events, actions, and concessions is a critical component of establishing or eroding mutual vulnerability. To avoid such an outcome, Liberia's case shows the positive impact of relationships between regional actors in effecting compliance with peace agreements.

Because of the many peace accords, the periods of civil war and peace process in Liberia intertwine. In this analysis, I divide the resolution of the Liberian conflict into three periods.<sup>639</sup> The first period covers the two years between the Bamako Agreement and the Operation Octopus, that launched the country into renewed war (1990-1992). The second period covers the three years following the Cotonou Accord until the Abuja Agreements (1993-1996). The third period covers the post-Abuja accords, when the demobilization and planning for the elections occurred

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<sup>637</sup> The Cotonou Accord provided for peace enforcement (UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 6 August 1993 from the Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Benin to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General" (S/26272, Annex) 9 August 1993, Part I, Military Issues, Section G, Article 8.

<sup>638</sup> This point is clearly made in an article on the workings of the US Congress by Weingast and Marshall (1988).

<sup>639</sup> Others have also divided the Liberian period into three phases. Alao (1998) divides the Liberian civil war into three war periods, while Outram (1997) divides the Liberian period into three peace periods [see: Quentin Outram, "Cruel Wars and Safe Havens: Humanitarian Aid in Liberia, 1989 – 1996." *Disasters* 21. 3 (1997), 189-205].

(1996-1997). The current unrest is not covered in this chapter as information on the LURD and the government's management of the situation is unclear.

#### **SECTION 4.3 The Bamako Agreement, November 1990 – Operation Octopus, October 1992**

From the time ECOMOG became involved in Liberia until Operation Octopus in October 1992, 11 agreements were signed: three Banjul Agreements (two in August 1990 and a third in October), the Bamako Agreement (November 1990), a fourth Banjul Agreement (December 1990), the Lomé Agreement (February 1991), four Yamoussoukro Agreements (June – October 1991), and the Geneva Agreement (April 1992). In examining the actions of the NPFL until Operation Octopus, I focus on the Bamako Agreement onwards (eight agreements). The Banjul Agreements preceding the Bamako agreement did not bear the signature of the NPFL; thus, there is no accord to which to bind them. In fact, during this time, the NPFL did not abide by the cease fire agreements. Still, the Banjul Agreements bear mentioning because they set the platform of the agreements that followed. Specifically, these agreements proposed the formation of an intervention force and an interim government, and called for a cease-fire and demobilization.<sup>640</sup> The Banjul (I) Agreement created ECOMOG, the peacekeeping force in Liberia, not just to

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<sup>640</sup> ***Banjul (I) August 7, 1990:*** ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, ..., 7 August 1990; and ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC. 2/8/90, on the Constitution of an Interim Government in the Republic of Liberia, Banjul, 7 August 1990, as reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), English Edition, 21, (1992), 8

***Banjul (II) August 29, 1990:*** Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia, Final Communiqué of the National Conference of All Liberian Political Parties, Patriotic Fronts, Interest Groups and Concerned Citizens, Banjul, The Gambia, August 27 – September 1, 1990, reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), English Edition, 21 (1992), 29-32

***Banjul (III) October 24, 1990:*** Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict Between The Armed Forces of Liberia Represented by Lieutenant-General John Hezekiah Bowen, Head of Delegation, of the First Part, and The National Patriotic Front of Liberia Represented by...[*Not Represented*], of the Second Part, and The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia Represented by Dr. Peter Lorkula Naigow, Head of Delegation, of the Third Part, Banjul, Republic of Gambia, 24 October 1990; as reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), English Edition, 21 (1992), 10-11.

restore peace, but also to form a “broad-based Interim Government.”<sup>641</sup> The Banjul (II) Agreement of August 1990 elected Amos Sawyer as interim government president.<sup>642</sup>

### **Explaining Operation Octopus**

In the literature, scholars treat this nearly two-year period of the Liberian crisis as evidence of Taylor spoiling the peace process<sup>643</sup>, a case for peace enforcement, and one effect of the manipulation engaged in by ECOMOG as new factions appeared. After almost two years in which a cease-fire held and a small amount of progress occurred on a few peace agreements, Taylor launched Operation Octopus to attempt to take Monrovia which, at that time, was protected by ECOMOG; it was the only part of Liberia he did not control.<sup>644</sup> As I will briefly summarize, the literature places the unraveling of the cease-fire on Taylor’s perception of ECOMOG, a growing threat from a new faction, ULIMO, which emerged in 1990 from Guinea under the leadership of Alhaji Kromah<sup>645</sup> and economic uncertainty at the time.

Some cite that Taylor launched Operation Octopus to retaliate against ULIMO. In September 1991, ULIMO launched Operation Jungle Fire<sup>646</sup> and over the course of the preceding period, Taylor had lost control of some NPFL-held territory.<sup>647</sup> In addition to having worked with ECOMOG against the NPFL, ULIMO had the backing of the Nigerian, Sierra Leonean, and the

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<sup>641</sup> ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, ..., 7 August 1990; and ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC. 2/8/90, ... 7 August 1990.

<sup>642</sup> Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia... 29 August 1990.

<sup>643</sup> The notion of “spoilers” appears in Stedman (1997).

<sup>644</sup> See the following accounts of this period: Conteh-Morgan (1998); Outram (1997, 190); Magyar (1998, 59 – 60); Olonisakin (2000; especially chapter 4); For peace enforcement, see especially Olonisakin.

<sup>645</sup> For more on ULIMO see: Elwood D. Dunn. “Liberia’s Internal Responses to ECOMOG’s Interventionist Efforts” in *Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia*, Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, ed. (1998), 76-105, 98; Gershoni (1997), 59.

<sup>646</sup> Festus B. Aboagye (Lt. Col.), *ECOMOG: A Sub-regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management, and Peacekeeping in Liberia*. Accra, Ghana, Sedco Enterprise, 1999, 102; 106.

Guinean ECOMOG members<sup>648</sup> and was closely associated with Samuel Doe, further inciting Taylor.<sup>649</sup>

Equally important, Alao (1998) states that Taylor believed that ECOMOG was relatively weak and hence, Operation Octopus had a chance of success.<sup>650</sup> Also focusing on ECOMOG, Aboagye (1999) summarized that ECOMOG's disregard for the military option in favor of political negotiation in the two years before Operation Octopus served Taylor well.<sup>651</sup> Some argue that Taylor used the time of the cease-fire to re-build his army.<sup>652</sup> In fact, Huband notes that in December 1991 not only was it revealed that Taylor had been training troops in Burkina Faso, but that Libya's Moammar Gadaffi had been supplying him with weapons.<sup>653</sup>

While these events occurred – Taylor may have indeed felt that ECOMOG was weak and taken advantage of the cease fire, as well as felt threatened by ULIMO – it still does not say fully why the NPFL abided with an (admittedly fragile) cease-fire the previous two years. I intend to shed some light on why the cease-fire was able to hold from the Bamako agreement in November 1990 until Operation Octopus in October 1992. It is clear that Taylor made a decision in October to break the cease-fire. Testing the notion that mutual vulnerability existed between the NPFL and ULIMO, reveals some of the conditions that perhaps persuaded him to refrain from doing so earlier by providing a richer context of the political, military, and economic situation.

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<sup>647</sup> Olonisakin, 133.

<sup>648</sup> Ellis, 95

<sup>649</sup> Dunn, 98

<sup>650</sup> Alao, 27.

<sup>651</sup> Aboagye, 106

<sup>652</sup> see for example Aboagye, 106; Olonisakin, 133

<sup>653</sup> Huband (1998), 211-2

## **The Bamako and Post-Bamako Agreements**

As the descriptions of the Bamako and post-Bamako Agreements will show below, the principle reason behind the Bamako and Post-Bamako accords were to attain a cease-fire, demobilize the rebels, form an interim administration, and eventually hold elections. The timing and process of achieving these accords seemed to build in mutual vulnerability after the Bamako Agreement. As a result, promises for political participation and demobilization were made credible.

For a short period, the mutual vulnerability created by this demobilization and the formation of an interim government helped to produce progress in the peace process. However, the imbalance created by outside warring factions and the peacekeepers that threatened the military, economic, and political viability of the NPFL, contributed to the resumption of war. Specifically, I will juxtapose the findings of the financial strategies of the NPFL with the politics between the warring factions and ECOMOG to show how mutual vulnerability, and thus the credibility of promises, could no longer hold the peace during this time. With the exception of the Bamako Agreement and the Yamoussoukro-IV Agreement, which served as blue prints for future accords, I do not review the other seven accords individually. With a few exceptions, the other seven accords usually reaffirmed each other. Instead, I focus on the main features of the period – namely, the recognized dual administration – and the tasks required of the parties during this period – cease fire agreements, demobilization, and the formation of an interim government.

### **The Bamako Agreement, 28 November 1990**

Given that the NPFL was not a signatory to any agreements before the Bamako summit, it did not recognize the interim government of Liberia<sup>654</sup> or abide by the previous cease fire agreements. Accordingly, the Bamako Agreement, which was signed by all three warring

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factions, had only loose provisions for a cease-fire – saying “[t]he modalities for the implementation of the cease-fire will be worked out later”<sup>655</sup> – and made no concrete provisions for the interim government – stating simply the goal of “[resolving] their differences with regard to an Interim Government for Liberia as envisaged in the ECOWAS Peace Plan.”<sup>656</sup> Calling the interim government a “puppet of Liberia’s West African neighbors”<sup>657</sup>, Taylor is also quoted as stating that he did not recognize any group as the interim government.<sup>658</sup> As Aboagye notes, by taking this middle road, the Bamako Agreement recognized that Liberia had two governments.<sup>659</sup> The Bamako Agreement was the first of seven other agreements (the Banjul (IV) Agreement, Lomé agreement, Yamoussoukro Agreements (I – IV), and Geneva Agreement) that over the course of nearly two years furthered the plans for a cease-fire, interim government, elections and demobilization.

The post-Bamako Agreements continued to reduce the presence of the interim government while attempting to make agreements for cease-fires, encampment, and demobilization. As constructed, the interim government would cede political influence as the warring factions ceded military power. While this arrangement creates mutual military and political vulnerability among the warring parties (see Table 4.1), commitments were not kept due to increased military and political insecurity that threatened to increase the vulnerability of the

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<sup>654</sup> Mark Huband, “Liberian rebel leader forced to sign cease-fire” November 28, 1990. United Press International. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 18, 2001.

<sup>655</sup> Joint Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict by The Armed Forces of Liberia Represented by Col. Wilmot F.R. Diggs AFL, of the First Part, and The National Patriotic Front of Liberia Represented by Charles Ghankay Taylor, of the Second Part, and The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia Represented by Hon. Noah A Bordolo SR, of the Third Part, Bamako, Republic of Mali, 28 November 1990, reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), English Edition, 21 (1992), para 1;

<sup>656</sup> Joint Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict...November 28<sup>th</sup> 1990, para 2

<sup>657</sup> “Liberian Factions Plan Peace Talks”, Associated Press January 17, 1991. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 18, 2001.

<sup>658</sup> Huband (November 28, 1990).

NPFL. Below, I discuss the structure that led to the beginning of the formation of the interim government and demobilization.

**Table 4.1. Elements of Mutual Vulnerability (November 1990 – October 1992).**

Scheduled Tasks	Beneficiary	Criteria for Credibility: Mutual Vulnerability
Work out modalities for Cease-fire	Interim Government (IGNU)	<i>Vulnerability to WP:</i> They surrender their threat over the government
	All Warring Parties (WP)	<i>Vulnerability to IGNU:</i> The warring parties still have a chance to negotiate the terms of the cease-fire.
	All Warring Parties	<i>Vulnerability to IGNU:</i> The government is not fully recognized by ECOWAS. This removes some of its earlier legitimacy
Organization of national conference to form Interim Government	Interim Government	<i>Vulnerability to WP:</i> The warring parties are constrained to agreeing on a formula for an interim government – something the NPFL had to date refused. <sup>660</sup>
Recognition of dual administrations	Interim Government	<i>Vulnerability to NPFL:</i> Provides the NPFL a legitimate reason to avoid granting sovereignty to IGNU.
	NPFL	<i>Vulnerability to IGNU:</i> Provides the IGNU a legitimate reason to avoid granting sovereignty to NPFL.
NPFL invited to patrol borders with ECOMOG	NPFL	<i>Vulnerability to ECOMOG:</i> Some of ECOMOG's sovereignty and independence are lost.
	ECOMOG	<i>Vulnerability to NPFL:</i> The NPFL subjects itself to monitoring by ECOMOG.
Disarmament	All Warring Parties	<i>Vulnerabilities to IGNU:</i> Surrender of most significant threat to the interim government.

In Liberia, the timing of events in 1992 unraveled the mutual vulnerability that had held the cease-fire together. As I will describe below, tasks undertaken by the parties and the formation on a new rebel group in an economically, politically, and militarily critical area for the NPFL during a period of increased vulnerability, may explain the resumption of hostilities and the eventual return to war.

<sup>659</sup> Aboagye, 94.

<sup>660</sup> Huband (November 28, 1990).

## ***Forming the Interim Government***

### ***Promises of Political Participation***

From the December 1990 meeting in Banjul onward, which resulted in the Banjul (IV) Agreement, the formation of the interim government was paired with demobilization. In Banjul, the parties agreed that an interim government would form after disarmament had taken place.<sup>661</sup> Two months later, at a meeting in Lomé, in February 1991, the Final Communiqué of the conference “recognized the necessity for the formation of an Interim Government acceptable to the people of Liberia.”<sup>662</sup> In fact, in the agreement signed by the three warring factions at Lomé, it refers to a future formation of an interim Government at a national conference to be held on March 15, 1991.<sup>663</sup> Reinforcing the Banjul (IV) Agreement, the Lomé agreement states that ECOMOG will only supervise the cease-fire and demobilization once the Interim Government is formed.<sup>664</sup> Thus, there was an incentive to refrain from demobilizing until some agreement could be reached on an Interim Government.

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<sup>661</sup> Joint Statement of the Warring Parties (INPFD [*sic*], NPFL, AFL) in Liberia, Banjul Republic of Gambia, 21 December 1990, para 4, reproduced as document 107 in Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Conflict, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol 6. Mark Weller, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>662</sup> ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Final Communiqué of the Third Summit Meeting of the Community Standing Mediation Committee, Lomé, Togo, 13 February 1991, para 13, reproduced as document 121 in Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Conflict, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol 6. Mark Weller, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>663</sup> Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict Between The Armed Forces of Liberia Represented by Lt-General J. Hezekiah Bowen, of the First Part, and The National Patriotic Front of Liberia Represented by Mr. Charles Ghankay Taylor, of the Second Part, and The Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia Represented by Mr. Prince Yeduo Johnson, of the Third Part, Lome, Togo, 13 February 1991, para. 1(h); Annex, para 8, reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) . English edition, 21 (1992), para 1(h); Annex, para 8,

<sup>664</sup> *Ibid*, para 8.

### *A first step at Political Vulnerability*

The National Conference on the selection of the Interim Government began on March 15, as planned, and spanned one month.<sup>665</sup> After a month of deliberation at the National Conference, Amos Sawyer, who had been chosen by ECOWAS in October 1990 and who the NPFL did not recognize at the time, was re-elected the interim president. His election came with the withdrawal of the NPFL from the process.<sup>666</sup> Still, the holding of the national conference was important for its own sake; it illustrated the influence on national affairs by the NPFL. Taylor was well aware of this show of influence. On the first day of the conference he states in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation:

“The only reason why there is a national conference today ... is because we did not agree with those rules in Banjul and this is why we have to put a president into place now, because if those rules were acceptable, we would not be trying to elect an interim government.”<sup>667</sup>

### *Recognition of dual Administrations and Demobilization*

#### *Promises of Political Participation and Demobilization*

Perhaps a reason why Taylor continued to negotiate even after the selection of Amos Sawyer as interim president lay in the fact that Taylor controlled almost all of Liberia except Monrovia.<sup>668</sup> By July 1990, Taylor had formed his own government in the portion of Liberian territory the NPFL controlled.<sup>669</sup> Taylor set up a capital, a parliament and other administrative

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<sup>665</sup> “Amos Sawyer Reelected Interim President” (text). Paris AFP in English 2141 GMT 19 Apr 1991. *FBIS Daily Reports – West Africa*. (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-91-077; 22 April 1991, p. 13-14).

<sup>666</sup> Ibid.

<sup>667</sup> Focus on Africa Program, “National Peace Conference Begins in Monrovia, Taylor Sends Proxy” (text). London BBC World Service in English 1709 GMT 13 March 1991; *FBIS Daily Reports – West Africa*; (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-91-053, 19 March 1991, p. 25).

<sup>668</sup> There are varying figures on how much Taylor controlled. However, it is agreed that he controlled everything but Monrovia. See: Ellis (1999), 88; Reno (1998), 92;

<sup>669</sup> “Taylor Names First Ministers in Government” (text). Paris AFP in English, 1708 GMT, 28 Jul 1990. *FBIS Daily Reports – West Africa* 30 July 1990. (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-90-146; p. 37).

structures under NPFL control.<sup>670</sup> The 24 parliamentarians in the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly (NPRAG) in Gbarnga included five members of the NPFL, a representative from each of Liberia's 13 counties and six political parties. Three seats were left open for the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).<sup>671</sup> The dual administration worked in Taylor's favor financially as well. As a result of Taylor's control of territory that was rich in natural resources<sup>672</sup>, he was able to grant contracts for mining diamonds and gold to French and German firms. In effect, accruing revenue that would have otherwise gone to the central government in Monrovia.<sup>673</sup> Later, Taylor went so far as refusing to recognize the new currency issued in Monrovia. In his view, Taylor thought of the new currency as an attempt to weaken the NPFL. He threatened that anyone with the new notes would be arrested.<sup>674</sup>

Three months following the election of Amos Sawyer as president of the IGNU, ECOWAS officially recognized the existence of a dual administration in the first of four Yamoussoukro Agreements. With respect to security, it states explicitly that each party "would undertake to maintain security in each of the zones under their control, until the conclusion of elections."<sup>675</sup>

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<sup>670</sup> Outram (1997)

<sup>671</sup> "Report : Taylor Sets Up Interim National Assembly, 22 October 1992" BBC Monitoring Report, 23 October, 1990, reproduced as document 89 in Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Conflict, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol 6. Mark Weller, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); The INPFL was the first faction to split from the NPFL. After the murder of Samuel Doe by the INPFL in 1990, the faction receded from the conflict. The INPFL disappeared after the Operation Octopus (see Dunn, 94-95)

<sup>672</sup> Ellis, 89-92.

<sup>673</sup> Kenneth B. Noble. "In Liberia's Illusory Peace, Rebel Leader Rules Empire of His Own Design", The New York Times April 14, 1992. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 19, 2001.

<sup>674</sup> "Taylor, Prince Johnson Comment on New Currency", Paris AFP in English, 1204 GMT, 7 Jan 1992. FBIS Daily Reports – West Africa, 8 January 1992. (GPO microfiche, FBIS-AFR-92-005; p. 26).

### *A Second Step at Political Vulnerability*

Thus, the Yamoussoukro-I agreement reinforced the Bamako Agreement's minimization of the IGNU. Notably, the following week, in his assessment of the Yamoussoukro-I accord, Taylor pointed out that it described two administrations: "There was nothing in the agreement accepting the Sawyer government as the only legitimate government of this country."<sup>676</sup> The second and third Yamoussoukro Accords were essentially pledges to continue on the present course to resolve the conflict, to cooperate with ECOMOG and the interim administration, and the commencement of plans for elections.<sup>677</sup>

In addition to solidifying the dual administration, the Yamoussoukro Agreements were significant because Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of Côte d'Ivoire, managed them. Additionally, the first Yamoussoukro Agreement created a *Committee of Five* that was comprised of non-anglophone countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Togo) to work with the four-member *Standing Mediation Committee* advance the ECOWAS peace plan.<sup>678</sup> This is the beginning of the closing of the gap between the anglophone and francophone countries' views on the resolution of the Liberian crises.<sup>679</sup> Importantly, at the fourth Yamoussoukro Agreement, the parties accepted the participation of a Senegalese contingent in an effort to

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<sup>675</sup> Outcome of Deliberations of the Meeting of Heads of State, Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, 30 June 1991, reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), English edition. 19 (July 1991), 22-23.

<sup>676</sup> James Dorbor, "Charles Taylor Denies Plans to Disarm Forces" (text). Paris AFP in English, 1351 GMT, 8 Jul 1991. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa*. (GPO microfiche; FBIS-AFR-90-131, 9 July 1991; p. 27-28).

<sup>677</sup> ***Yamoussoukro II Agreement***: ECOWAS Final Communiqué of the First Meeting of the Committee of Five on Liberia, Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, 29 July 1991, reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), English edition. Vol 19, July 1991, p 23.

***Yamoussoukro III Agreement***: ECOWAS Committee of Five, Final Communiqué of the Second Meeting on the Liberian Crisis, Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, 17 September 1991, reproduced in Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), English edition. Vol 19, July 1991, pp. 24-25.

<sup>678</sup> Economic Community of West African States, "Final Communiqué of the Fourteenth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, July 1991", Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), English edition. Vol 19, July 1991, para 22, p. 61.

broaden participation.<sup>680</sup> Moreover, according to Mark Huband (1998), a journalist present at the signing of the Agreement, Taylor was persuaded by Nigeria's Foreign Minister to sign "[or] everything would become very unpleasant for him".<sup>681</sup> Thus, there are two reversals in the external entities: Cote d'Ivoire managed a series of peace agreements, providing some support to the NPFL, and Nigeria was influential in obtaining Taylor's signature. While the divisions between the ECOMOG members still existed, the Yamoussoukro Agreements were the beginning of increased cooperation. Although, the fact that it still took six years before the last peace agreement was implemented indicates other mechanisms besides the unity of the external entities were at work.

### ***Demobilization***

#### ***Promises of Compliance***

The fourth Yamoussoukro Agreement called for the commencement of troop assembling and demobilization by November 15<sup>th</sup>.<sup>682</sup> On January 3, 1992, ECOMOG ventured into NPFL territory to begin deployment exercises.<sup>683</sup> But, on January 7, the ECOMOG troops were unable to go forward as planned. The ECOMOG Field Commander blamed it on the fighting between ULIMO and the NPFL along the Liberia-Sierra Leone Border.<sup>684</sup> The Geneva Agreement in

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<sup>679</sup> Huband (1998), 209-211;

<sup>680</sup> Cohen (2000), 158 -9 .

<sup>681</sup> Huband (1998), 210-211.

<sup>682</sup> ***Yamoussoukro IV Agreement***: UN Security Council, "Letter dated 17 November 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Benin to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council" (S/24815, Annex) 17 November 1992. (Readex Microprint).  
See also: "ECOMOG Commander on Disarmament, Encampment" (text). Monrovia Radio ELBC in English, 0900 GMT, 9 Dec 1991. *FBIS Daily Reports - West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-91-237, 10 December 1991, p. 27).

<sup>683</sup> "ECOMOG Deploys Troops Into NPFL Territory" (text). Paris AFP in French, 1402 GMT, 4 Jan 1992. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Reports - West Africa*. (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-003; 6 January 1992, p. 28-29).

April offered a solution to the NPFL's security fears. First, it called for the creation of a buffer zone along the Sierra Leonean-Liberian and the Guinean-Liberian borders, as well as supervised demobilization. Secondly, perhaps most importantly, the Geneva Agreement allowed for Charles Taylor's "Security Company" to continue to bear arms after disarmament of the troops.<sup>685</sup>

Earlier, Taylor had stated, 'I will never disarm my security to a point where I will get my head blown off'.<sup>686</sup> The Geneva Agreement provided some guarantee of safety.

### *Eroding Military Vulnerability*

Because of the acknowledgement of the dual administration, Taylor was able to obtain an agreement at the Geneva conference in April 1992 that allowed the NPFL to send unarmed "police, customs, and immigration" administrative officers to the areas targeted for ECOMOG deployment. In addition, the NPFL was permitted to send in unarmed observers to the buffer zone set up between the Liberia and Sierra Leone border.<sup>687</sup> As a result, the degree of insecurity that would have been felt had ECOMOG been the sole military force in the area was diminished. The arrangement made each group subject to each other's monitoring and therefore increased the chance that commitments would be upheld.

However, just a few months into this phase, the exercise was cut short. Accounts of the period indicate that at the same time, Taylor began to suspect that ECOMOG was meeting with

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<sup>684</sup> Africa Network Program, "ECOMOG Field Commander on Forces Deployment" (text). London BBC World Service in English, 0630 GMT, 7 Jan 1992. *FBIS Daily Reports – West Africa*. (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-92-005; 8 January 1992, p. 25-26).

<sup>685</sup> ECOWAS Committee of Five, Final Communiqué of the Informal Consultative Group Meeting, Geneva, 7 April 1992, reproduced as document 156 in Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Conflict, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol 6. Mark Weller, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), paras 4, 5, Annex.

<sup>686</sup> Klon Hinneh, "Peacekeepers to Deploy in Liberia, Taylor Backs Down", The Associated Press April 20, 1992. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 19, 2001.

<sup>687</sup> ECOWAS Committee of Five...7 April 1992, para 5.



and assisting ULIMO.<sup>688</sup> As stated before, ULIMO was formed by Sierra Leone-based Doe supporters – the NPFL’s opponents.<sup>689</sup> Toward the middle of 1992, ULIMO began to attack the NPFL in Lofa County.<sup>690</sup> The NPFL had been in control of the diamond trade in Lofa County, across the border from Sierra Leone and Guinea since 1990.<sup>691</sup> Thus ULIMO posed a threat to the NPFL’s income and sovereignty. Concurrently, in July 1992 ECOWAS applied comprehensive economic sanctions to stem NPFL exports.<sup>692</sup> Thus, at the point when ECOMOG began to make inroads into the NPFL’s territory, ULIMO and ECOMOG seem to be collaborating against the NPFL. The mutual military vulnerability that had been created after the Geneva Agreement was eroded due to ECOMOG’s apparent bias and role in exacerbating ULIMO’s economic and military threat to the NPFL.

While the assembling and demobilization commenced, it was slow. Sawyer cites that in June 1992, only 600 former combatants had taken advantage of reintegration programs.<sup>693</sup> Part of the problem lay in the difficulty encountered by ECOMOG in planning and assessing the progress of demobilization due to the little amount of information known about the combatants.<sup>694</sup> The other reason that parties were not forthcoming may have been due to the increased military insecurity in the region. Noting the slow pace, ECOWAS announced that if it were not

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<sup>688</sup> Wippman, 172.

<sup>689</sup> See for example Gershoni (1997), 59.

<sup>690</sup> Reno (1998), 102.

<sup>691</sup> Ibid, 97.

<sup>692</sup> UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia” (S/25402), 12 March 1993 (Readex Microprint), para 7.

<sup>693</sup> “Report: Interim President on Policy for Disarming Combatants and Rehabilitating Them” 26 June 1992. Radio ELBC, Monrovia, 26 June 1992, reproduced as document 168 in Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Conflict, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol 6. Mark Weller, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>694</sup> UN General Assembly. “Special Economic and Disaster Relief Assistance: Special Programmes of Economic Assistance, Assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Liberia, Report of the Secretary General”, paras 49-51, (A/47/528). 16 October 1992 (Readex Microfiche).

completed within 30 days, sanctions would be imposed against Taylor and NPFL territories.<sup>695</sup>

On October 20, 1992, noting the incomplete disarmament and assembly of NPFL troops, the NPFL's thwarting of ECOMOG's attempts to create a buffer zone along the Sierra Leone-Liberia border, and failing to ensure conditions for holding elections, ECOWAS decided to impose sanctions on the NPFL and Taylor.<sup>696</sup> On October 22, 1992, the NPFL retaliated with Operation Octopus on Monrovia, restarting the civil war.<sup>697</sup> This is summarized in Table 4.2 below.

**Table 4.2 Post-Bamako Agreement to Operation Octopus**

Date	Event
March 15, 1991	Amos Sawyer re-elected Interim President. <sup>698</sup>
June 30, 1991	Yamoussoukro-I Agreement recognizes dual administration. <sup>699</sup>
January 3, 1992	ECOMOG ventures into NPFL-areas to begin demobilization. <sup>700</sup>
January 5, 1992	ULIMO and NPFL fighting in Lofa County.
January 7, 1992	ECOMOG deployment stalled. <sup>701</sup>
April 1992	Geneva Agreement allows NPFL to accompany ECOMOG on deployment. <sup>702</sup>
June 1992	ULIMO continues attacks NPFL; NPFL suspects ECOMOG-ULIMO cooperation. <sup>703</sup>
July 1992	ECOWAS threatens to apply economic sanctions to NPFL. <sup>704</sup>
October 20, 1992	ECOWAS applies sanctions to NPFL and Taylor. <sup>705</sup>
October 22, 1992	Operation Octopus.

<sup>695</sup> Economic Community of West African States, Fifteenth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Dakar, 27-29 July 1992, Decision A/DEC.8/7/92 Relating to Sanctions Against Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, reproduced as document 172 in Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Conflict, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol 6. Mark Weller, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>696</sup> UN Security Council. "Letter dated 30 October 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Benin to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council"; see in particular, Articles 1-3, (S/24811). 16 November 1992 (Readex Microprint).

<sup>697</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General ...". (S/25402), para 37.

<sup>698</sup> "Amos Sawyer reelected Interim President".

<sup>699</sup> Outcome of Deliberations... Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire.

<sup>700</sup> "ECOMOG Deploys Troops into NPFL Territory"

<sup>701</sup> Africa Network Program... 7 Jan 1992.

<sup>702</sup> ECOWAS Committee of Five... 7 April 1992.

<sup>703</sup> Wippman, p. 172

<sup>704</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/25402), para 7.

<sup>705</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 30 October 1992..." (S/24811).

## **Summary of the Post-Bamako Agreement**

The Bamako Agreement and the accords following it left the question of the interim government and the logistics of a cease-fire and disarmament open for negotiation. Consequently, this lessened the insecurity that the NPFL would have felt had there been, instead, a complete surrender to ECOMOG's plan for Liberia. At the same time, this arrangement increased the insecurity felt by ECOMOG and the other parties as the time for a settlement lengthened. Furthermore, during this time, the NPFL began to develop its administration outside of Monrovia. Such an environment created mutual political vulnerability between Taylor and the IGNU that allowed each party to begin to follow through on some of its commitments. Notably, during this time, deployment of ECOMOG began. However, at the critical time that deployment of ECOMOG and demobilization began, ULIMO began to threaten the source of the NPFL's financing. Worse, it appeared to be assisted by ECOMOG in its endeavors. As a result, the balance of vulnerability was undone – Taylor retaliated with Operation Octopus.

## **The Cotonou Agreement (1993-1994)**

Following Taylor's Operation Octopus, ECOMOG re-assumed a peace enforcement role – nearly doubling its troops to 14,000.<sup>706</sup> The Committee of Nine<sup>707</sup> at the ECOWAS summit meeting held on November 7, following the Operation Octopus attack on Monrovia, concluded that ECOMOG had a right “to defend itself decisively against armed attacks from any quarter.”<sup>708</sup> This period also marks the involvement of the United Nations in the Liberian conflict. Upon ECOWAS' request for greater UN involvement in the assembly and disarmament of the warring

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<sup>706</sup> Olonisakin, 137

<sup>707</sup> The combination of the four member Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee of Five established at Yamoussoukro - I.

<sup>708</sup> UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 13 November 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Benin to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council” (S/24812, Annex, para 9). 16 November 1992. (Readex Microprint).

factions and electoral observation<sup>709</sup>, the UN dispatched Trevor Gordon-Somers to Liberia as the first of four special representatives of the secretary general<sup>710</sup> and formed the United Nations Observer Mission to Liberia (UNOMIL).<sup>711</sup> The negotiations that ensued with Gordon-Somers during a summit in July<sup>712</sup> resulted in the Cotonou Agreement in July 1993.

At the time of the UN involvement, the NPFL did not enjoy the control it once did over Liberia. Now apportioned among the three warring factions, the NPFL controlled 10 of the 13 counties in Liberia, ULIMO controlled two, and the IGNU controlled Monrovia. (In truth, the IGNU did not have a military wing; it was protected by ECOMOG). Additionally, areas administered by the NPFL and ULIMO contained the richest deposits of resources, including minerals and timber.<sup>713</sup> However, ECOMOG's newly-obtained control (as a result of the peace enforcement) over Robertsfield International Airport, the port at Harbel, and the military base of Kakata – compromised the NPFL's ability to export.<sup>714</sup>

As designed, the Cotonou Accord had the potential to create a situation of mutual political and military vulnerability among the factions (see Table 4.3). Militarily, the Cotonou Accord called for a cease-fire and the assembly and disarmament of ULIMO and NPFL troops. ECOMOG and UNOMIL were to observe and verify these tasks. Additionally, the Cotonou

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<sup>709</sup> UN Security Council, 3138<sup>th</sup> meeting, "Resolution 788 (1992) [On the situation in Liberia]" (S/RES/788). 19 November 1992. (Readex Microprint).

<sup>710</sup> UN Security Council, (S/24835).

<sup>711</sup> UN Security Council, 3281<sup>st</sup> meeting, "Resolution 866 (1992) [On the establishment of UNOMIL]" (S/RES/866). 22 September 1993.

<sup>712</sup> The text of the "Peace talks on Liberia" that took place in Geneva during July 1993 are reproduced as documents 221-235 in Regional Peace-Keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Conflict, Mark Weller, editor, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol 6. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

<sup>713</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/25402), para 7.

<sup>714</sup> Olonisakin, 136.

Accord allowed ECOMOG to undertake peace enforcement should cease fire violations occur.<sup>715</sup> This provision had the potential to dissipate fears that demobilization would place one group at the mercy of the other. Additionally, in a move to address the mistrust between ECOMOG and the NPFL<sup>716</sup>, ECOMOG would no longer just comprise West African states; Ugandan and Tanzanian troops joined the peacekeeping force.<sup>717</sup> Politically, the Cotonou Accord provided for the eventual dissolution of the IGNU and for the NPFL's government, the NPRAG, in favor of the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG). Thus, neither entity would emerge with a more advantageous position. Additionally, the LNTG executive branch would be made up of a five-member Council of State, which would include NPFL and ULIMO, in addition to the IGNU and two other jointly agreed members.<sup>718</sup> The participation of the warring parties in the Council of State seemed to ensure a place in political participation.<sup>719</sup> Importantly, each task required of the parties depended on the other: the process for disarming the approximately 60,000 soldiers<sup>720</sup> and the installation of the LNTG would begin on the same day.<sup>721</sup> Per the Cotonou Accord, the

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<sup>715</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1995..." (S/26272), Annex. For the modalities of the cease-fire, assembly (encampment), disarmament, verification, and peace enforcement powers see, respectively: Part I, Military Issues, section C, article 4; section F, article 7; Section E, article 6; section B, article 3; section G, article 8.

<sup>716</sup> UN Security Council, "Further Report of the Secretary General on Liberia" (S/26200). 2 August 1993, para 7. (Readex Microprint).

<sup>717</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1995..." (S/26272, Annex). See in particular: Part I Military Issues, Section B, Article 3, no. 2; on arrival of Ugandan and Tanzanian troops: UN Security Council, "Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia", (S/1994/168), 14 February 1994, para 24.

<sup>718</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1995..." (S/26272, Annex), Part II, Political Issues, Section B, article 14.

<sup>719</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1995..." (S/26272, Annex), Part II Political Issues, Section B, Article 14, no. 7(i).

<sup>720</sup> Originally, a figure of 60,000 was used. But the number of combatants was revised to 30,000 in March 1994 (see: "UN Mission Chief Says Fewer Factions Need Disarming" (text). Paris AFP in English, 1512 GMT, 8 Mar 1994. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-046; 9 March 1994, p.22-23).

installation of the LNTG would be preceded by the dissolution of the Interim government and the NPFL's government.<sup>722</sup> As a result, the political and military promises in the Cotonou Accord seemed credible because of the vulnerability that each exhibited: reneging on the cease fire not only brought military retaliation, but also prevented the commencement of the political aspects of the Accord.

**Table 4.3 Mutual Vulnerability in the Cotonou Accord**

<b>Element of Cotonou Accord</b>	<b>Beneficiary</b>	<b>Criteria for Credibility: Mutual Vulnerability</b>
Liberia National Transitional Government	NPFL, ULIMO, IGNU	<i>Vulnerability of NPFL:</i> The NPRAG dissolves upon LNTG formation <sup>723</sup> ; Disarmament requirement reduces ability for self-defense. <sup>724</sup> Loses control over own interests.  <i>Vulnerability of IGNU:</i> The IGNU dissolves upon the formation of the LNTG <sup>725</sup> ; Loses control over own interests.  <i>Vulnerability of ULIMO:</i> Disarmament requirement reduces ability for self-defense. Loses control over own interests.
Encampment and Disarmament	IGNU	<i>Vulnerability of NPFL:</i> Loses ability to defend against ECOMOG or other rebel factions.  <i>Vulnerability of ULIMO:</i> Loses ability to defend against other rebel factions.
Provision for Peace Enforcement <sup>726</sup>	IGNU NPFL ULIMO	<i>Vulnerability of NPFL:</i> Peace enforcement provisions protected ULIMO in case the NPFL reneged.  <i>Vulnerability of ULIMO:</i> Peace enforcement provisions protected NPFL in case the ULIMO reneged.

<sup>721</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1995..." (S/26272, Annex), Part II Political Issues, Section B, Article 14, no. 4.

<sup>722</sup> Ibid, Part II Political Issues, Section B, Article 14, no. 4.

<sup>723</sup> Ibid, Part II Political Issues, Section B, Article 14.

<sup>724</sup> Ibid.

<sup>712</sup> Ibid.

<sup>726</sup> Ibid, Part I, Military Issues, section C, article 4; section F, article 7; Section E, article 6; section B, article 3; section G, article 8.

## **Implementing the Cotonou Accord**

Some cite the Cotonou Accord as just another one of Liberia's many failed peace attempts because peace did not ensue. Alao et al (1999) summarize that Cotonou failed because the personal sense of insecurity faced by combatants impeded demobilization, the negotiators failed to recognize the weak control faction leaders had over their organizations, and the time frame and the modalities for the tasks required were unrealistic and vague. Additionally, Alao et al (1999) criticize the lack of commitment on behalf of donors and the seemingly biased nature of ECOMOG in dealing with the Liberian factions.<sup>727</sup> Similarly, while not explicitly referring to the Cotonou accord, during this same period, Olonisakin (2000) cites that the sentiments against ECOMOG, because of its alleged use of the new Liberian factions to fight against Taylor, undermined its authority.<sup>728</sup> Similarly, Herbert Howe (1996) echoes many scholars when he criticizes that ECOMOG's tactic of looking the other way, when factions like the anti-NPFL Liberian Peace Council (LPC) formed, undermined the Cotonou Accord.<sup>729</sup>

However, somewhat lost in highlighting these events is that the Cotonou Accord managed to move the Liberian peace process forward for nearly one year before stalling. Following the Cotonou Accord, the Liberians parties used its framework, such as the Council of State, to begin the formation of a governing institution that would eventually allow the parties to work toward elections. Although fighting between parties stalled the peace process eventually, it is equally important to note the manner in which this step-by-step peace process attained its goals. In particular, I will discuss how the moves to form the transitional government and disarm the factions helped to advance the notion of the transitional government, deployment of ECOMOG/UNOMIL and disarmament.

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<sup>727</sup> Alao et al, 70-2.

<sup>728</sup> Olonisakin, 138

<sup>729</sup> Howe, 166; see also: Vogt, 354..

## ***Forming the Transitional Government***

### ***Promises of Political Participation***

The transitional government consisted of the Council of State, the Supreme Court Justices, Members of the Elections Commission, Cabinet Ministers, the members of the Transitional Assembly, and the Managing heads of Public Corporations and Autonomous Agencies. The Council of State was particularly important because it represented a collective presidency with members of all the factions. Notably, the Council of State was required to make decisions by consensus.<sup>730</sup> The Cotonou Accord stipulated that the members of the transitional government had to be installed by August 1993 -- one month after signing the Accord.<sup>731</sup>

### ***A Third Step at Political Vulnerability***

At first, there were reasons for optimism. Pursuant to the Cotonou Accord, the following five members of the Council of State were chosen by mid-August 1993:

- Interim Government of National Unity: Bismarck Kuyon<sup>732</sup> (at the time the speaker of the Interim Legislature)
- United Liberation Movement: Mohammed Sheriff
- National Patriotic Front of Liberia: Dorothy Musuleng Cooper (at the time the education minister for the NPRAG)
- The remaining two members: David Kpomakpor (a former justice of the Supreme Court) and Thomas Ziah.<sup>733</sup>

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<sup>730</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1995..." (S/26272, Annex), Part II Political Issues, Section B, Article 14, no. 7(i, iv)

<sup>731</sup> Ibid, Part II Political Issues, Section D, Article 16.

<sup>732</sup> Later replaced with Phillip A. Z. Banks (see UN Security Council "Letter dated 16 February from the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General" (S/1994/187, Annex). 17 February 1994. (Readex Microprint).).

<sup>733</sup> All members documented in: "Warring Sides Nominate Interim Government", *The Associated Press* August 16, 1993. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 19, 2001. Notably, Ziah was a member of the Krahn ethnic group; he was replaced in March 1994 by Dex Tawoyo, also a Krahn (see: Focus on Africa, "ULIMO Rift Deepens; Forces Engage in Shoot-Out", (text). London BBC World Service in English, 1705 GMT, 5 Mar 1994. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-044; 7 March 1994, p.26).



Then, in early November, 1993, the parties reached agreements on the composition of the elections commission, the speaker of the legislative assembly, and Supreme Court justices and 13 of the 17 members of the cabinet were selected by November 5, 1993.<sup>734</sup> According to Trevor Gordon-Somers, the Special Representative of the Secretary General to Liberia, ULIMO conceded many positions to the NPFL in the hopes that the NPFL would concede the Finance, Justice, Defense, and Foreign Ministries to it.<sup>735</sup> It did not turn out that way. Instead, the four posts remained unfilled until mid-April.<sup>736</sup>

### ***Disarmament and Demobilization***

#### ***Promises for Compliance***

As the political posts were being decided, preparations by UNOMIL were making demobilization imminent. During the same time as these early political developments, as UNOMIL began to reach its full force (369 troops<sup>737</sup>), UNOMIL also began to deploy within Liberia. In December, the Joint Cease fire Monitoring group, which was composed of not just the warring parties, but ECOMOG and UNOMIL as well<sup>738</sup> began deployment toward the Sierra Leonean and the Ivorian borders, as well as Kakata and Buchanan along the coast.<sup>739</sup>

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<sup>734</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/26868) 13 December 1993. (Readex Microprint), para 7.

<sup>735</sup> Trevor Gordon-Somers, personal interview.

<sup>736</sup> "Taylor Names 5 Supporters to Transitional Cabinet" (text). Paris AFP in English, 2042 GMT, 28 Feb 1994. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-040, 1 March 1994; p. 26); UN Security Council, "Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1994/588), 18 May 1994. Readex Microprint, paras 5, 9.

<sup>737</sup> United Nations, United Nations and the Situation in Liberia, Department of Public Information, (United Nations: New York, February 1997), 4.

<sup>738</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1995..." (S/26272, Annex), Part I Military Issues, Section B, Article 3

<sup>739</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/26868), para 13. Notably, Buchanan was used by the NPFL to export goods (Reno (1998) and Kakata was the headquarters of Roosevelt Johnson, who would form a dissident faction of ULIMO (Focus on Africa Program, "Further on ULIMO...").

Additionally, the NPFL opened roads leading to Gbarnga, its headquarters – allowing for the deployment of UNOMIL to that area. By January 1994, UNOMIL had also deployed in Tubmanburg, the headquarters of ULIMO.<sup>740</sup> In January 1994, as UNOMIL had reached its full deployment at 368 troops,<sup>741</sup> the Liberian parties, per the Cotonou Accord, ceased to be members of the joint cease-fire verification mission.<sup>742</sup>

The full deployment of UNOMIL also ushered in the commencement of disarmament and demobilization. While the Cotonou Accord stipulated that disarmament would occur concomitantly with the installation of the transitional government<sup>743</sup>, the exact timing of the events were disputed. Essentially, the NPFL argued that the government had to be seated first, before demobilization could start<sup>744</sup>, while the IGNU argued oppositely.<sup>745</sup> At the realization of UNOMIL's full deployment, the parties issued a statement (The Monrovia Communiqué) on February 15, pledging to respond by installing the transitional government on March 7, 1994 - essentially allowing the NPFL to win the argument.<sup>746</sup> After the installation of the transitional government, the commencement of demobilization of the warring parties, began on March 7 1994.<sup>747</sup>

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<sup>740</sup> UN Security Council, "Second Progress Report ..." (S/1994/168), paras 8, 17.

<sup>741</sup> Ibid, para 15.

<sup>742</sup> UN Security Council "Letter dated 6 August 1995..." (S/26272, Annex), Part I Military issues.

<sup>743</sup> Ibid, Part II Political Issues, Section D, Article 16.

<sup>744</sup> "Taylor Discusses Cotonou Accord, Disarmament" (text). Gbarnga Radio ELBC in English, 1900 GMT, 19 Dec 1993. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-93-243; 21 December 1993, 26).

<sup>745</sup> "NPFL Not to Disarm Until Transition Bodies Set Up" (text). Paris AFP in English, 1735 GMT, 31 December 1993. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-001; 3 January 1994, p. 27-28).

<sup>746</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 16 February..."(S/1994/187), Annex.

### *Failure of Compliance*

The realization of these steps – deployment into NPFL and ULIMO areas, removal of the rebel factions from the Joint cease fire monitoring commission, the commencement of disarmament, and joint political participation – served to increase the military and political vulnerability of the parties to each other. These changes traded a measure of military security for political accommodation. Additionally, ECOMOG's orders to defend itself and militarily retaliate against violations of the cease fire agreement seemed to provide a real penalty for renegeing on the accord.

Demobilization moved very slowly. On April 18, 1994 only 2,200 soldiers had demobilized.<sup>748</sup> By June 24, 1994, 3,192 combatants had demobilized.<sup>749</sup> Two months later, only 3,612 combatants had demobilized. By the end of August, the secretary general admitted that demobilization had come to a standstill.<sup>750</sup> As demobilization slowed, there were other signs of trouble as well. The extension of administration by the LNTG<sup>751</sup> could not get started as a result of internecine hostilities of the parties, which began in December 1993. After a first positive step by the Cabinet members in early May 1994 to visit various municipalities and appoint local government officials,<sup>752</sup> by July, the extension of civil administration was lagging behind schedule.<sup>753</sup>

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<sup>747</sup> UN Security Council " Letter dated 8 March 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General" (S/1994/279). 9 March 1994. (Readex Microprint).

<sup>748</sup> UN Security Council, "Third Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1994/463) paras 24,25. 18 April 1994. (Readex Microprint).

<sup>749</sup> UN Security Council, "Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1994/760), para 19. 24 June 1994. (Readex Microprint).

<sup>750</sup> UN Security Council, "Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1994/1006), para 31.

<sup>751</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1995..." (S/26272, Annex), Part II Political Issues, section B, article 14.

I suggest that the end of disarmament, a precursor to the failure of the extension of civil administration<sup>754</sup> may lie in the confluence of a weakened hold on the factions by the leaders, a poor reintegration program, and an abandonment of security guarantees by the international actors during a time of political accommodation by the parties.

### **Factional Changes**

In late 1993 and mid-1994, two anti-NPFL factions and one anti-ULIMO group emerged in Liberia. In December 1993, the Liberian Peace Council, led by George Boley, began to fight against the NPFL.<sup>755</sup> To worsen matters, ECOMOG was accused of not only supplying the LPC with logistical support<sup>756</sup> and allowing the LPC to circumvent the arms embargo imposed on Liberia,<sup>757</sup> but also of forming the LPC.<sup>758</sup> The Mandingo and Krahn ethnic groups making up ULIMO began fighting in December 1993 when it seemed that the Krahns' were being disarmed disproportionately – at the direction of Alhaji Kromah, ULIMO's leader; Kromah is a Mandingo.<sup>759</sup> Roosevelt Johnson, representing the Krahn members of ULIMO, then began a campaign to wrest Tubmanburg – the ULIMO headquarters – from Alhaji Kromah. News accounts and reports from the secretary-general show that the fighting continued throughout

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<sup>752</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 18 May 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General" (S/1994/594, Annex), 19 May 1994. (Readex Microprint).

<sup>753</sup> UN Security Council, 3404<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Security Council, "Statement by the President of the Security Council" (S/PRST/1994/33), 13 July 1994. (Readex Microprint).

<sup>754</sup> Alao et al (1999), 54.

<sup>755</sup> "Renewed Fighting Reported Between NPFL, Peace Council" (text). Paris AFP in English, 1544 GMT, 9 Aug 1994. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (Online; November 13, 1995; Accessed on February 9, 2002).

<sup>756</sup> United Nations, The United Nations and the Situation in Liberia, 8.

<sup>757</sup> Alao (1998), 77

<sup>758</sup> Gershoni (1997), 60.

<sup>759</sup> Focus on Africa, "Further on ULIMO...".

August 1994; notably, while steps were being taken to advance the political agreement.<sup>760</sup> By March, ULIMO had split up into ULIMO-K under Kromah and ULIMO-J under Johnson.<sup>761</sup>

In mid-1994, the NPFL experienced its own factional split with the formation of the NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC) by Tom Woewiyu.<sup>762</sup> A former member of the NPFL, Woewiyu turned himself into ECOMOG in April 1993.<sup>763</sup> He split with Taylor, citing his atrocities and stating that '[Taylor] should be killed like a snake'.<sup>764</sup> The NPFL-CRC represented a faction willing to participate in the LNTG independently of NPFL conditions. Taylor had stated that as long as the NPFL did not get the ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs, it would not participate. However, Woewiyu, Lavel Supuwood, Zaiye Dohkee, and Sam Dokie defied this order by taking their cabinet posts.<sup>765</sup>

Reports of the loose organization of the factions suggest that defections were not wholly unexpected.<sup>766</sup> Ellis (1999) describes that faction members and the Liberian society were not easily separable. In reality, faction members moved between participating in armed combat and Liberian society. As a result, many fighters were simply part-time combatants that were motivated by reasons of self-interest to join or leave the groups.<sup>767</sup> Equally notable, outside the headquarters, sub-units of factions were common, as were wide ranges in the educational and ideological make-up of the groups. Equally important, a leader's success in the field depended

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<sup>760</sup> UN Security Council, "Sixth Progress Report ..." (S/1994/1006), para 9. (Readex Microprint).

<sup>761</sup> Alao (1998), p. 39; Focus on Africa Program "Further on ULIMO Infighting" (text). London BBC World Service in English, 1705 GMT, 28 Mar 1994 (GPO-FBIS-AFR-94-060; 29 March 1994; pp. 23-24).

<sup>762</sup> Alao (1998), 37.

<sup>763</sup> Aboagye, 114.

<sup>764</sup> "Taylor Denies Accord on Broadened Council" (excerpt). Paris AFP in English, 1819 GMT, 27 Jan 1995. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa*; (Internet version; November 19, 1995; [Online Database] February 9, 2002).

<sup>765</sup> Dunn, 37.

<sup>766</sup> UN Security Council, "Sixth Progress Report ..." (S/1994/1006), para 10.

more on the local environment and fulfilling immediate survival needs, than the achievements of the group nationally. Thus, the sub-units had little incentive to pursue the group's global policy. The number of ad-hoc roadblocks by NPFL members, even as Taylor had declared roads to Gbarnga free of such obstacles, evidenced such fractionalization.<sup>768</sup>

In a related account, Ellis (1999) reinforces the notion of loose organization. While faction leaders were responsible for providing resources to their commanders, the sub-units' commanders held the responsibility for obtaining provisions for their subordinates. Commanders who did not receive sufficient funds from the faction leaders were more likely to set up a rival group. Indeed, this system was used to divide factions; rival faction leaders may approach particular commanders with bribes to encourage them to defect.<sup>769</sup>

#### **International reactions**

The reactions by the international organizations worsened the military insecurity. Given the continued fighting among the NPFL and ULIMO, UNOMIL reduced its deployment in Liberia.<sup>770</sup> The slow down in disarmament was also followed by a reduction of the disarmament staff by 60 percent.<sup>771</sup> Then, citing the resumption of hostilities, the factions' leaders prevented the combatants from further disarmament.<sup>772</sup> The international community also did not provide sufficient financial assistance for a successful demobilization. As of April 1994, the international community made no contributions to the trust fund established for reintegration

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<sup>767</sup> Ellis (1999), 134

<sup>768</sup> Alao et al, 47

<sup>769</sup> Ellis (1999), 141-2.

<sup>770</sup> UN Security Council, "Sixth Progress Report ..." (S/1994/1006), para 13.

<sup>771</sup> Ibid, para 18

<sup>772</sup> Ibid, para 17

services to demobilized soldiers.<sup>773</sup> The reintegration program, the National Volunteer Programme, which served a total to 1,300 former combatants, consisted of repaying combatants with food for clearing roads and collecting rubbish as well as receiving agricultural, educational, and vocational training.<sup>774</sup>

Thus, by mid- to late 1994, when disarmament and the political process of the Cotonou Accord came to a standstill, the factions found themselves weaker, facing more adversaries and unable to rationally choose disarmament, while at the same time, they had taken steps to accommodate each other politically. Mutual vulnerability entails not only that a faction can be retaliated against, but also that they can advance their own interests. In this instance, ULIMO for example had not obtained what it wanted politically, and faced an increased security threat. There was an asymmetry in the notion of vulnerability with ULIMO. Similarly, while the NPFL had obtained political benefits, it became increasingly unable to protect itself against others. Thus, the balance of vulnerability was undone; it eroded the credibility that the demobilization and political participation would materialize. This is summarized in Table 4.4.

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<sup>773</sup> UN Security Council, "Third Progress Report..." (S/1994/463), para 26

<sup>774</sup> Sesay, (1996), 25; see also United Nations General Assembly, 49<sup>th</sup> session, Agenda item 37(b), "Assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Liberia..."(A/49/466), para 15-16. While Sesay uses a figure of 1,500 combatants, I elect to use the 1,300 figure given in the UN report.

**Table 4.4 Undoing Mutual Vulnerability Post-Cotonou**

Date	Event
November 5, 1993	Agreement reached on elections commission, supreme court justices. <sup>775</sup>
December 1993	Deployment by Joint Cease Fire Monitoring Commission toward Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. <sup>776</sup>
December 14, 1993	Fighting between ULIMO and Lofa Defense Force. Reports of ethnic problems in ULIMO areas. <sup>777</sup>
December 30, 1993	Fighting within ULIMO reported. <sup>778</sup>
January 16, 1994	LPC and NPFL fighting; road between Gbarnga and Monrovia partially reopened. <sup>779</sup>
January 1994	UNOMIL at full deployment with 368 troops; UNOMIL in Gbarnga and Tubmanburg. <sup>780</sup>
March 1, 1994	ECOMOG deployment begins. <sup>781</sup>
March 7, 1994	Commencement of Disarmament and the Installation of the Transitional Government. <sup>782</sup>
April 14, 1994	LPC demands a place in LNTG. <sup>783</sup>
April 19, 1994	Decision on four cabinet posts: NPFL obtains foreign affairs and Justice; ULIMO obtains finance; IGNU obtains Defense. <sup>784</sup>
May 13, 1994	NPFL announces that it will stop disarming due to the continued fighting with LPC and the inability of ECOMOG to stop it. <sup>785</sup>
August 28, 1994	3,612 of 30,000 demobilized. <sup>786</sup>

<sup>775</sup> UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/26868) 13 December 1993. (Readex Microprint), para 7.

<sup>776</sup> Ibid, para 13

<sup>777</sup> "Fierce Fighting Reported Between ULIOM, LDF in Lofa" (text). Gbarnga Radio ELBC in English, 1900 GMT, 14 Dec 1993. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa*; (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-93-239; 15 December 1993, 27-28).

<sup>778</sup> "ULIMO Faction Blames Kromah Group for Camp Attack".

<sup>779</sup> "More fighting noted between Peace Council, NPFL" (text). London BBC World Service in English, 1705 GMT, 16 January 1994. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-011; 18 January 1994, 40-41).

<sup>780</sup> UN Security Council, "Second Progress Report..." (S/1994/168), paras 8, 15, 17.

<sup>781</sup> "ECOMOG Troops Begin Disarmament Deployment" (text). Paris AFP in French, 1311 GMT, 1 Mar 1994. *FBIS Daily Report-West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-041, 2 March 1994, p. 12).

<sup>782</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 8 March 1994..." (S/1994/279).

<sup>783</sup> Focus on Africa Program, "LPC Demands Place in Transitional Government" (text). London BBC World Service in English, 1705 GMT, 14 April 1994. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-073, 15 April 1994, p. 38).

<sup>784</sup> "Taylor Names 5 Supporters to Transitional Cabinet"; UN Security Council, "Fourth Progress Report..."(S/1994/588), paras 5,9.

<sup>785</sup> "NPFL Suspends Disarmament, Rules out Talks with LPC" (text). Paris AFP in French, 1217 GMT, 13 May 1994. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (GPO Microfiche; FBIS-AFR-94-094, 16 May 1994, p. 27).



## **Summary of Cotonou Accord**

In the post-Cotonou period, the mutual vulnerability that was to occur with each group disarming and surrendering political authority could not take place due to organizational weaknesses and a poor international response to persuade soldiers to demobilize. The situation had a multiplier effect: the increased security concerns led to a withdrawal of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, which meant that warring factions could more easily fight with impunity. Much of the literature blames the resumption of the hostilities on the increased factionalization of the Liberian civil war. While the number of organizational splits prevented the factions from disarming and drove ECOMOG and UNOMIL from their deployment posts within Liberia, it is also important to note the context in which the slow down of demobilization took place. Notably, ULIMO's political strategy did not gain it the positions it wanted, UNOMIL and ECOMOG deployment for disarmament had occurred, the factions were no longer part of the cease fire monitoring group, and their control over their rank and file had weakened. Additionally, the latter part of this period highlights the consequences of a poor response from the international community and the inadequate reintegration package.

## **Akosombo and Accra Agreements (1994)**

### ***Akosombo Agreement***

By late August, with demobilization at a standstill and the continued hostilities between the NPFL and the LPC and the internecine ULIMO fighting, it was clear that the Cotonou Accord had not worked. Two quickly arranged, and unimplemented, agreements followed the Cotonou Accord. The agreements failed to account for the new factions that had unraveled the Cotonou Accord and did not provide any incentives for the warring factions to stop fighting. On September 7<sup>th</sup>, 1994, Ghana's President, Jerry John Rawlings called a meeting of the NPFL, the AFL, and

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<sup>786</sup> UN Security Council, "Sixth Progress Report..." (S/1994/1006), para 31.

ULIMO, at Akosombo, Ghana. The result was the September 12<sup>th</sup> Akosombo Agreement. While the major elements of the Akosombo Agreement mirrored the Cotonou Accord, there were some important differences. Namely, the Akosombo Agreement allowed for the following:

- AFL was to act as a national army once disarmed.<sup>787</sup>
- Included the participation of civil society on the five-member Council of State through the Liberian National Conference.<sup>788</sup>

But the Akosombo Agreement did not account for some serious changes taking place in Liberia. Firstly, at the same time as the Akosombo meeting, a Liberian National Conference (LNC) was organized in Monrovia among civil society groups to discuss the obstacles to peace in Liberia.<sup>789</sup> The LNC opposed the Akosombo Agreement for its semblance to a military junta.<sup>790</sup> The attendees at the national conference questioned the validity of the parties to commit to peace while they were still fighting and unable to control their factions.<sup>791</sup> Additionally, the national transitional government criticized that the Akosombo Agreement gave the warlords power<sup>792</sup> -- asserting that the warlords created jobs for themselves through the Akosombo Agreement.<sup>793</sup>

Secondly, the Akosombo Agreement did not account for the new hostilities that hindered the implementation of the Cotonou Accord. While the parties were meeting at Akosombo, the

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<sup>787</sup> UN Security Council. "Letter Dated 14 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the UN Security Council" (S/1994/1174, Annex), (Readex Microprint). Part I Military Issues, section F, article 6.

<sup>788</sup> Ibid, Part II Political Issues, section B, article 14.

<sup>789</sup> See for example: UN Security Council, "Seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1994/1167). 14 October 1994. Readex Microprint, para 14.

<sup>790</sup> "Factions fail to form Government; 30,000 flee fighting" (excerpts). Paris, AFP in English, 1632 GMT, 26 Sep 1994. *FBIS Daily Reports – West Africa* (Internet version; November 12, 1995; [Online Database] February 6, 2002).

<sup>791</sup> UN Security Council, "Seventh Progress Report..." (S/1994/1167), para 14.

<sup>792</sup> "Liberia factions hold secret talks in Ghana", Deutsche Presse-Agentur November 6, 1994. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 19, 2001.

<sup>793</sup> "Politicians, Professionals, Media Reject Peace Pact" (excerpt). Paris AFP in English, 1309 GMT, 13 Sep 1994. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa*. (Internet edition; November 12, 1995; [Online Database]: February 9, 2002).

NPFL was continuing to fight an ever increasing number of dissident forces in Liberia. Involved in the anti-NPFL fighting during the Akosombo negotiations were the AFL, LPC, ULIMO-J, Lofa Defense Force (LDF), and NPFL-CRC. Gbarnga, the NPFL headquarters, was attacked on September 8, 1994. By September 23, it was confirmed that Gbarnga had been taken over by a coalition of the AFL, dissident members of the NPFL, ULIMO, the LPC, and the LDF.<sup>794</sup> At the same time, there was also a coup attempt by Charles Juju.<sup>795</sup> In fact, the NPFL no longer controlled the 10 counties it had during the implementation of the Cotonou Accord as the LPC, controlled five of the 13 counties by the middle of 1994.<sup>796</sup> The inter-factional dispute in ULIMO continued. Earlier that year, in May, ULIMO-J actually controlled Tubmanburg, the headquarters for the original ULIMO— taking it from ULIMO-K.<sup>797</sup> At Akosombo, ULIMO-K, wanted to sign separately from, ULIMO-J, which wanted to sign for all of ULIMO.<sup>798</sup> After some NPFL combatants took 43 UNOMIL military observers hostage on September 9<sup>th</sup>, the UN started to withdraw. The UNOMIL military observers were released on September 18<sup>th</sup>, however, a decision was made to evacuate all UNOMIL personnel as a safety precaution.<sup>799</sup>

It is not new to assert that Akosombo failed because the factions were left out.<sup>800</sup> But, my aim in the preceding section was not just to mention the new factions, but also to emphasize that the balance of power had changed. ULIMO-J, the dissident faction, now controlled

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<sup>794</sup> "Faction Coalition Reportedly 'Completely Controls Gbarnga'" (text). Paris, AFP in English, 0209 GMT 23 Sep 1994; *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (Internet version; November 12, 1995; [Online Database] February 9, 2002)

<sup>795</sup> Aboagye, 118.

<sup>796</sup> Ibid.

<sup>797</sup> Ibid.

<sup>798</sup> "Final Peace Agreement Said Reached at Akosombo Talks" Accra, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network, 1300 GMT, 12 Sep 1994. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa*. [Online Database]; February 9, 2002).

<sup>799</sup> UN Security Council, "Seventh Progress Report..." (S/1994/1167), paras 29-33.

Tubmanburg and the NPFL did not hold the majority of the counties. By failing to account for the significant changes occurring in Liberia, the increased strength of the new factions, the agreement could not create mutual political and military vulnerabilities between the factions – thus, forfeiting credible political participation and demobilization. Not surprisingly, the Akosombo Agreement was never implemented. Three months later, the warring parties reconvened in Accra. The result of the Accra meeting was the Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement and the Accra Clarification.

### ***The Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement and the Accra Clarification***

On December 21, 1994, in response to the reactions by the non-signatories to the Akosombo Agreement, the warring parties met in Ghana once more to sign the Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement and the Accra Clarification (hereafter referred to as the Accra agreements).<sup>801</sup> While the Accra Agreements generally re-affirmed the Akosombo Agreement, the main addition of the Accra agreements was to include the representatives of the Liberian National Council and the other splinter groups, which united to form a (anti-NPFL) coalition (the coalition members were: LDF, LPC, NPFL-CRC, ULIMO-J) in the Council of State. Hence, while the Council of State still comprised five people, in addition to ULIMO and the NPFL, the Council of State would also have one member each from the LNC, and the AFL/coalition group. Finally, the Council of State would be chaired by Tamba Taylor, a chief selected by the NPFL and ULIMO-K.<sup>802</sup> Unchanged from the Akosombo Agreement, two other representatives would

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<sup>800</sup> See: Sesay (1996), 76; Alao et al, 73.

<sup>801</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 5 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council" (S/1995/7, Annex I) 5 January 1995. Readex Mircorpint.

<sup>802</sup> Ibid, Part II Political Issues, section A.

serve as Vice-Chairs of the Council of State.<sup>803</sup> As the Accra agreements do not change the voting procedure, the Council of State was still to make decisions by majority vote.

Given the make up of the groups, the requirement of majority rule did not foreshadow any predictable cooperation between the groups:

- (1) The members of the coalition were anti-NPFL:
  - The NPFL-CRC had split from the NPFL.
  - The LPC had fought against the NPFL.
  - ULIMO-J had attacked the NPFL positions.<sup>804</sup>
- (2) It was not foreseeable at the time that NPFL and ULIMO-K would cooperate: ULIMO-K sponsored a host of anti-NPFL groups –Bong Defense, Nimba Defense, Bassa Lofa Defense, Congo Defense.<sup>805</sup>
- (3) Cooperation between ULIMO-K and the coalition did not seem likely as neither ULIMO-J nor the LPC supported the ULIMO-K.<sup>806</sup>

Thus, alliances between groups were not clear *a priori*. As a result, the members of the executive Council of State were each mutually vulnerable: the NPFL could not expect ULIMO-K to join together with the AFL/coalition members; ULIMO-K could not expect cooperation between the AFL/coalition members and the NPFL; Tamba Tailor had the support of both NPFL and ULIMO-K.

#### *Forming Institutions: The Council of State*

The Council of State also offers insights into the problems encountered in the formation of institutions. Disagreements within the formation of the Council of State surfaced in voting rules that would decide the representative of AFL/coalition. Under consideration were Hezekiah

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<sup>803</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 14 October 1994..." (S/1994/1174, Annex) Part II Political Issues, section B, article 14.

<sup>804</sup> Alao, 37-39.

<sup>805</sup> Ibid, 38-40.

<sup>806</sup> Ibid, 39

Bowen for the AFL and George Boley for the coalition.<sup>807</sup> Facing a deadlock, ECOWAS members from Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire proposed an expansion of the Council of State to six members. While the Nigerian foreign minister reported that the Liberian warring factions had agreed to this new set-up<sup>808</sup>, Taylor later denied any such agreement. Furthermore, he stated that he would not serve on the Council of State as long as the proposed sixth member, Tom Woewiyu, a NPFL dissident who formed the NPFL-CRC<sup>809</sup> served as well.<sup>810</sup> In addition to the personal animosity, with a system of majority voting, I suggest that the addition of Woewiyu would tip the balance to the anti-NPFL group. If in the previous construction, no group could form a foreseeable coalition, under this proposal, the two members of the AFL/coalition could conceivably form an anti-NPFL block. At that point, the previous mutual vulnerability is erased. Indeed, no resolution on the Council of State occurred. At the end of January 1995, just one month after the last agreement, the peace talks were suspended.<sup>811</sup> The Accra agreements were not able to bring a permanent cease-fire. Furthermore, the Accra Agreements could not start implementation. The potential asymmetric political vulnerability against the NPFL did not credibly establish that the NPFL could protect its interests in the new

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<sup>807</sup> "Peace Talks Deadlock, To Continue in Monrovia" (text). Accra, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network in English, 2000 GMT, 12 Jan 1995; *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (Internet version; November 19, 1995; [Online Database] February 9, 2002).

<sup>808</sup> "Faction Leaders Agree to Form 6-Member Council" (text). Accra, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network in English, 1300 GMT, 25 Jan 1995. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa*; (Internet version; November 19, 1995, [Online Database] February 9, 2002).

<sup>809</sup> Alao (1998), 37.

<sup>810</sup> "Withdraws from New Council" (text). Paris AFP in English, 1644 GMT 30 Jan 1995; *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (Internet version; FBIS-AFR-95-019; November 19, 1995, [Online Database] February 9, 2002).

<sup>811</sup> "Negotiators React" (text). Accra Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network in English, 2000 GMT, 31 Jan 1995; *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (Internet version; November 19, 1995; [Online Database] February 9, 2002).

Council of State. By April, the secretary-general of the United Nations reported that hostilities had resumed.<sup>812</sup>

### **The Abuja Accord I (August 1995)**

From the time of the Cotonou Agreement, the installation of the Council of State held the key to the implementation of the peace agreements. Only with the successful implementation of the Council of State could the other tasks – demobilization and elections – be completed. Disarmament was to occur “concomitantly” with the installation of the LNTG.<sup>813</sup> Thus, in the months following the collapse of the Accra agreements, three proposals were set forth for the composition and functioning of the Council of State. For clarity, they are summarized in Box 4.1 below.

#### **Box 4.1 Proposals for Council of State Membership**

<b>Proposal 1: Presented by the LNTG</b>	<b>Proposal 2: Presented by the Transitional Legislative Assembly</b>	<b>Proposal 3: Presented by the Foreign ministers of the ECOWAS member states</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Council of State would comprise five members (it would exclude the AFL).</li> <li>• Chairman would hold executive power.</li> <li>• One vice-Chairman would be chosen from among the remaining four members.<sup>814</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Council of State would comprise six members.</li> <li>• All members would have veto power.<sup>815</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Council of State would have six members.</li> <li>• One member would serve as the Chair</li> <li>• Foreign ministers remained divided if remaining five members would be of equal status or have a hierarchy among themselves.<sup>816</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>812</sup> UN Security Council, 3527<sup>th</sup> meeting, Resolution 985 (1995) [On the extension of the mandate of the UNOMIL], 13 April 1995. [Online Database] <[www.un.org/Docs/scres/1995/9501807e.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1995/9501807e.htm)>. (cited February 12, 2001).

<sup>813</sup> UN Security Council, “Letter dated 6 August 1993...” (S/26272 Annex) Part II, Political Issues section B, article 4, no. 4; this is not changed in the Akosombo or Accra agreements.

<sup>814</sup> UN Security Council, “Eleventh Progress Report of the Secretary General on The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia” (S/1995/473). 10 June 1995, para 4. [Online Database] <[gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95\\_06/473](http://gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95_06/473)> on February 15, 2002.

<sup>815</sup> Ibid, para 5.

In the end, the Abuja Accord signed on August 19, 1995, provided for a six-member Council of State (Proposal 3). Reportedly, Tom Woewiyu was persuaded by ECOWAS heads of states to abandon his hopes of a seat on the Council of State in favor of George Boley of the LPC.<sup>817</sup> The acceptance of Boley is not surprising; in the past, the LPC had battled against both ULIMO-K and the NPFL.<sup>818</sup> Hence, the addition of Boley would place neither ULIMO-K nor the NPFL at a disadvantage. Indeed, in time, Boley would feel at odds with Taylor and Kromah.<sup>819</sup> Professor Wilton Sankawolo was selected as the Chairman, while the five other members – namely Taylor for the NPFL, Lt.-Gen. Kromah for ULIMO, Boley for the coalition group, Quian for the LNC, and Chief Tamba Tailor – were designated as Vice-Chairmen, all of equal status. By all accounts, Wilton Sankawolo was not a political threat; he did not have a political following and in fact, did not even know he was nominated as chair when it was announced in Abuja.<sup>820</sup> The Abuja Agreement accommodated the ULIMO-J faction, led by Roosevelt Johnson, by the provision of several ministerial posts<sup>821</sup> and the AFL was to head the ministry of defense.<sup>822</sup>

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<sup>816</sup> Ibid, para 8.

<sup>817</sup> Adebajo, 60

<sup>818</sup> Alao, 1998, 39.

<sup>819</sup> "Out of Control" Africa Confidential, 10 May 1996, 2

<sup>820</sup> "Peace in Sight", Africa Confidential, 8 September 1995, 8

<sup>821</sup> ULIMO-J members were appointed to head the following: The Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Rural Development, the Ministry of State Without Portfolio, the National Bank, the Corporative Development Agencies, the Agricultural Industrial Training Board, the Forestry Development Authority. In addition, ULIMO-J would serve deputy heads in the following: Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information, the National Insurance Corporation of Liberia, the National Housing Authority, Liberia Water and Sewage Corporation, National Housing and Savings Bank, Fire Service, General Auditing, Institute of Public Administration, and the National Food assistance Agency. (UN Security Council, "Letter dated 30 August 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General" (S/1995/756, Appendix). 30 August 1995. (Readex Microprint).

See also the recorded Abuja Agreement: UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 25 August 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council" (S/1995/742, Annex) 28 August, 1995. Readex Microprint, Part II Political Issues, Section A.



Additionally, the Vice-Chairmen of the Council of State who wished to contest the election could do so, unlike in previous agreements, on the condition that they resigned their positions three months ahead of the elections; the Chair could not contest the election.<sup>823</sup>

### **Implementing the Abuja-I Accord**

More than anything, the Abuja-I Accord was a political agreement. In his work, Adebajo (2002) characterizes this period as the start of when ECOMOG decides to treat the warring factions as potential political groups with a view to seeking a political solution.<sup>824</sup> Its main contribution, however, the six-member Council of State, did not create mutual political vulnerabilities between the parties. Placing ULIMO-J outside of the governing structure effectively eliminated them from the decision making process. While there were avenues by which ULIMO-J may have influenced governmental decisions, the fact remained that the Council of State, vested with executive power until the elections, held power over ULIMO-J. As such, there was an imbalance in the vulnerability experienced by ULIMO-J versus the other warring factions.

The imbalance in vulnerabilities began to surface within months of the signing of the Abuja Agreement. The difference in political power was voiced in December 1995 by Roosevelt Johnson, and other ministers, as a reason for his threat to pull out of the government since the Council of State had not yet called a meeting of cabinet ministers<sup>825</sup> – the only participation

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<sup>822</sup> UN Security Council, "Twelfth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1995/781). 9 September 1995. [Online Database] <[gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sprep/95\\_09/781](http://gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sprep/95_09/781)> (cited February 15, 2001), para 9.

<sup>823</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 30 August 1995..." (S/1995/756, Appendix). Part II Political Issues, Section D.

<sup>824</sup> Adekeye, 60.

<sup>825</sup> Nyenati Allison, "Liberian Transitional Government in Crisis", The Associated Press December 11, 1995. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 20, 2002.

Johnson had as the Minister of Rural Development.<sup>826</sup> I argue that the inability of ULIMO-J to check the adverse behavior of the Council of State, by virtue of existing outside of it, led to the violent April 6<sup>th</sup> street fighting in Monrovia and the subsequent breakdown of the Abuja accord. Equally important, the Council of State marginalized ULIMO-J at a time of increasing fractionalization in ULIMO-J itself, weakening command and control within the other warring parties, and increasing cooperation between the NPFL and ULIMO-K. The result of this environment was an increase in vulnerability on the part of ULIMO-J.

### ***Intra-factional Dissent***

There were general problems with command and control over the factions by the military leaders – creating an environment that threatened military security.<sup>827</sup> Reports indicated that the NPFL troops acted of their own accord – setting up roadblocks and charging different entities levies to pass through them.<sup>828</sup> Additionally, independent generals and commanders of the NPFL criticized Taylor for ‘ritualistic killings ... [and deception].’<sup>829</sup> Equally important, the weakened organizations made disengagement and demobilization more difficult. As late as the end of October 1995, some members of the rank and file were unaware of the procedures for disengagement and disarmament – reflecting a break down in command and control by faction leaders.<sup>830</sup> Moreover, any incentive provided from outside Liberia to disengage and demobilize was small. While UNOMIL, the LNTG, ECOMOG, UNDP and some other UN agencies had set

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<sup>826</sup> “Keeping what peace?” Africa Confidential, 16 February 1996, 2.

<sup>827</sup> UN Security Council, “Twelfth Progress Report...” (S/1995/781) para 12.

<sup>828</sup> Francois-Xavier Harispe. “Gun-toting boys decide who rides Liberia’s highways”. Agence France Presse December 21, 1995. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 20, 2002.

<sup>829</sup> “Charles Taylor Denounced by aides for Deception” Xinhua News Agency December 1, 1995 Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 20, 2002.

up a disarmament task force<sup>831</sup> the funds to operate it did not materialize.<sup>832</sup> Once again, the events had a multiplier effect; security in general then became difficult to establish as ECOMOG withdrew from Liberia's interior due to the threats to peacekeepers.

Most significantly, ULIMO-J also began to have internal trouble with loyalty. As stated before, the split between ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K represented an ethnic split between the Krahns (ULIMO-J) and the Mandingos (ULIMO-K). However, the ethnic divisiveness did not end there. Other Krahn leaders were also suffering from a lack of cohesion. Notably, Roosevelt and Boley, both Krahn, began vying for a position on the Council of State.<sup>833</sup> Therefore, Johnson was not only marginalized by ECOMOG and the other warring factions, but by his fellow Krahns as well. In the months following the Abuja (I) Accord, Johnson's control over ULIMO-J itself appeared tenuous. In early March, 24 ULIMO-J commanders unilaterally replaced Johnson with William Karyee. Following Johnson's dismissal, the Council of State removed Johnson from his post as Minister of Rural Development, citing his continued fighting, and ordered ECOMOG to search his home.<sup>834</sup> The marginalization of Johnson continued with the Council's attempt to charge him with murder of a fellow Krahn member of ULIMO-J.<sup>835</sup> In March 1996, Taylor ordered the arrest of Johnson for the murder of a Karyee loyalist – the new recognized leader of ULIMO-J.<sup>836</sup>

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<sup>830</sup> UN Security Council, "Thirteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1995/881), 23 October 1995. [Online Database] <[gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95\\_10/881](http://gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95_10/881)> (cited February 15, 2002), para 19.

<sup>831</sup> UN Security Council, "Twelfth Progress Report..." (S/1995/781 , para 41.

<sup>832</sup> UN Security Council, "Sixteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1996/232). 1 April, 1996, , (Readex Microprint), para 30.

<sup>833</sup> "Keeping what peace?" Africa Confidential, 16 February 1996,1-2.

<sup>834</sup> "Liberian militia clash" Deutsche Presse-Agentur , March 8, 1996. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 20, 2002.

<sup>835</sup> "Johnson Dismissed, Ordered Arrested", Deutsche Presse-Agentur March 22, 1996. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 20, 2002.

<sup>836</sup> "Johnson dismissed, ordered arrested"; "Heavy fighting continues in Monrovia as forces surround Johnson", Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 6, 1996. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 20, 2002.

Subsequently, the Council of State officially recognized William Karyee as the leader of ULIMO-J.<sup>837</sup>

### ***Inter-factional coalitions***

In the last quarter of 1995, there was less opportunity for ULIMO-J to exploit differences among Council members as the council members became united. A memorandum of understanding to cease hostilities, agreed to by the NPFL and ULIMO-K and negotiated by LPC's leader, George Boley, on November 30, 1995, paved the way for more ECOMOG deployment and the reopening of roads by the other factions. In particular, roads through Bong County were opened linking Monrovia further inland to Lofa, Nimba, and Grand Gedeh counties. After the memorandum, the other factions withdrew claims of cease fire violations and reaffirmed their commitment to the peace accord.<sup>838</sup> Additionally, ULIMO-K and NPFL formed an alliance to patrol areas without ECOMOG deployment.<sup>839</sup> Prior to the memorandum of understanding, ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K had clashed repeatedly in the Bong Mine area until mid-September.<sup>840</sup> In fact, they refused to demobilize until more ECOMOG troops had deployed, due to a lack of trust between them.<sup>841</sup>

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<sup>837</sup> "Heavy fighting continues in Monrovia as forces surround Johnson".

<sup>838</sup> UN Security Council, "Fourteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1995/1042) 18 December 1995. [Online Database] <[gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95\\_12/1042](http://gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/uncurr/sgrep/95_12/1042)> (cited February 15, 2001), paras 6-7.

<sup>839</sup> "ULIMO Faction Leader Says he is Committed to the Peace Process", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. November 20, 1995. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 20, 2002.

<sup>840</sup> UN Security Council, "Thirteenth Progress Report..." (S/1995/881), para 13

<sup>841</sup> *Ibid*, para 18

### ***International Collaboration***

Perhaps, the most significant change in this period was the cooperation between ECOMOG and NPFL. The improvement in the relationship between Taylor and Abacha, Nigeria's Head of State, who replaced Babangida, began in June 1995. Various reports discuss secret agreements and closed-door meetings that resulted in a more cooperative relationship.<sup>842</sup> Whatever the means, the fruits of the new relationship were evident in the last stage of the peace process. Differing accounts propose reasons for the Taylor-ECOMOG cooperation. One view states that Abacha's domestic and international problems left him little time to focus on Liberia.<sup>843</sup> Due to his holding of Olusegun Obasanjo and 39 others charged with plotting a coup and Moshood Abiola, who won the 1993 Presidential election, the international community began exploring ways to signal their discontent. The commonwealth began to voice the possibility of keeping Nigeria away from the November 1995 Commonwealth meeting in Auckland. In addition, Nelson Mandela, Robert Mugabe, and Yoweri Museveni began to assert that Abacha hand over power to civilians.<sup>844</sup> Domestically, the National Coalition for Democracy also began to push for, among other things, more decentralization, the formation of new political parties, and a reformation of the electoral system.<sup>845</sup> News accounts also suggest that France's decision to purchase off-shore oil fields in Nigeria, in the face of US sanctions to protest Abacha's holding of Abiola, helped to improve relations between Abacha and Taylor, who was supported by the francophone countries. France also did not criticize Abacha's handing of Abiola and Obasanjo.<sup>846</sup>

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<sup>842</sup> Sesay (1996b), p. 400; "Blood Under the Bridge", *Africa Confidential*, 1 August 1997: 2-3; Adebajo, 32.

<sup>843</sup> "Trekking to Monrovia" *Africa Confidential* 21 July 1995, 4.

<sup>844</sup> "Pushing Abacha" *Africa Confidential* 25 August 1995, 1.

<sup>845</sup> *Ibid*, 2-3.

<sup>846</sup> "Peace in Sight" *Africa Confidential*, 8 September 1995, 8.

Ordering the arrest of Johnson also appears to be a culmination from an increased marginalization by ECOMOG of ULIMO-J and an increased cooperation between the NPFL and ECOMOG. Johnson had already been charged for stealing ECOMOG equipment. However, reports suggest that in its investigation, ECOMOG chose to ignore the possibility that ULIMO-J and the NPFL had collaborated in a plot to steal ECOMOG equipment. Instead, ECOMOG seemed to single out ULIMO-J as a threat to the peace process and turned a blind eye while the NPFL and ULIMO-K engaged in fighting with ULIMO-J.<sup>847</sup> As fighting erupted to stop Johnson's arrest, Johnson loyalists moved to the Barclay Training Center in Monrovia at which point all the factions were drawn into 11 days of fierce urban fighting.<sup>848</sup> It stalled the peace process until August 1996. Table 4.5 summarizes this critical timing of events.

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<sup>847</sup> "Out of Control" Africa Confidential, 10 May 1996, 2

<sup>848</sup> *Ibid*, 1.

**Table 4.5. Increasing insecurity in the post-Abuja-I period.**

Date	Event
August 1995	Rapprochement between Abacha and Taylor. <sup>849</sup>
September 9, 1995	ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K refuse to disengage from Lofa Bridge area. <sup>850</sup>
November 20, 1995	NPFL and ULIMO-K agree to jointly set up a buffer zone in Bong County to monitor cease fire violations, as ECOMOG troops were not in the area. <sup>851</sup>
December 11, 1995	Roosevelt Johnson threatens to pull out of government because Council of State has not had cabinet meetings. <sup>852</sup>
December 31, 1995	ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K continue to clash. <sup>853</sup>
March 2, 1996	Johnson replaced with William Karyee by some ULIMO-J members. <sup>854</sup>
March 4, 1996	ECOMOG withdraws from Tubmanburg as ULIMO-J attacks peacekeepers. <sup>855</sup>
March 5, 1996	Council of State suspends Johnson as Minister of Rural Development and orders a search of his home for arms. <sup>856</sup>
March 22, 1996	Inter-faction fighting breaks out between ULIMO-J members at Monrovia. <sup>857</sup> Johnson charged with murder by Council of State. <sup>858</sup>
April 6, 1996	Johnson attacks Monrovia. <sup>858</sup>

### Summary of Abuja-I Accord

Paradoxically, despite improved ECOMOG/UNOMIL collaboration<sup>859</sup>, commencement of disarmament,<sup>860</sup> the loss of partisanship in the Council of State, (as evidenced by its coordinated approach to dealing with Johnson), a seemingly stronger commitment to peace

<sup>849</sup> Adebajo, 60.

<sup>850</sup> "Peace Process Lags as Warring Factions Fail to Disengage Troops". BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 29, 1995. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. February 20, 2002.

<sup>851</sup> "ULIMO Faction Leader Says he is Committed to the Peace Process.

<sup>852</sup> Nyenati, December 11, 1995.

<sup>853</sup> "Fighting continues near Liberian town", Deutsche Presse-Agentur December 31, 1995. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. 20, 2002.

<sup>854</sup> UN Security Council, "Sixteenth Progress Report..." (S/1996/232), para 4.

<sup>855</sup> "ECOMOG temporarily withdraws from Tubmanburg" Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 4, 1996. [Online Database] from Lexis Nexis on February 20, 2002.

<sup>856</sup> UN Security Council, "Sixteenth Progress Report..." (S/1996/232), para 7.

<sup>857</sup> Ibid, para 12.

<sup>858</sup> "Johnson Dismissed, Ordered Arrested".

<sup>859</sup> UN Security Council...(S/1995/881), para 33

accord (evidenced by the memorandum of understanding) and a reduction in ECOMOG's bias against the NPFL, the Abuja I Agreement unraveled. Mutual vulnerability between ULIMO-J and the Council of State could not be obtained due to the design of the peace accord. It provided the Council of State with an opportunity to further marginalize ULIMO-J. As a result, the environment was not conducive to disarmament because it was the only means by which ULIMO-J could defend itself.

#### **SECTION 4.4 THE ABUJA-II ACCORD (AUGUST 1996)**

After the Johnson assault on Monrovia, ECOWAS attempted to diffuse the tension by calling on the Council of State to reinstate Johnson as Minister of Rural Development. Following the events of April 1996, Johnson had been granted temporary residence in Ghana and Nigeria.<sup>861</sup> On Johnson's part, ECOWAS urged Johnson to respect the Council of State. A cease-fire was eventually established in May 1996. It held until a meeting of the ECOWAS foreign ministers in August, where they amended the Abuja-I Accord to place the peace process back on track.

Primarily, the second Abuja Agreement reaffirmed and revised the timetable of the Abuja-I Accord signed earlier<sup>862</sup>: a cease-fire was to begin on August 31, 1996 and elections were to be held on May 30, 1997.<sup>863</sup> Significantly, Roosevelt Johnson, along with the other warring factions, was also included in the discussions. The second Abuja Accord also replaced the chair of the Council of State with Ruth Perry.<sup>864</sup> To ensure the implementation of the accord,

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<sup>860</sup> UN Security Council "Thirteenth Progress Report..." (S/1995/881), para 31.

<sup>861</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter Dated 17 May 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General" (S/1996/377, Annex). Readex Microprint, para 8.

<sup>862</sup> "Supplement to the Abuja Accord" as reproduced in Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives - The Liberian Peace Process: 1990-1996, Jeremy Armon and Andy Carl, editors. 1 (London: Conciliation Resources, 1999), 43-53; 68

<sup>863</sup> UN Security Council, "Eighteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1996/684). 22 August, 1996. Readex Microprint, paras 2-3; 9-10.

<sup>864</sup> UN Security Council "Eighteenth Progress Report ..." (S/1996/684), para 14.



ECOWAS would verify the completion of task at five critical points.<sup>865</sup> As the last remaining task of the Abuja-I Accord was the commencement of demobilization before the holding of elections, the focus of the period was on these two tasks. As has been asserted, Nigeria played a key role through personal diplomacy in moving the peace process forward to the holding of elections.<sup>866</sup> The effect of this diplomacy is seen in these two remaining tasks of the Liberian peace process.

## **Implementing the Abuja-II Accord**

### ***Demobilization***

Beyond allowing ECOMOG to retaliate for cease fire violations as stated in the Abuja-I Accord, there were no incentives for the parties to begin demobilization. Despite a deadline of January 31, 1997, disarmament and demobilization began slowly at first.<sup>867</sup> One of the biggest obstacles, as identified by the factions, was the persistent military insecurity. For example, as clearly stated by Boley, leader of the LPC, as long as the NPFL continued to clash with the LPC in Zwedru, one of the places with the slowest rate of disarmament, the LPC would not demobilize.<sup>868</sup>

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<sup>865</sup> Ibid, para 10.

<sup>866</sup> See the following on Nigeria's role: Adebajo (2002), 67; This point was also made by James Jonah, the former Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs during this time (James Jonah, telephone interview, February 12, 2002).

<sup>867</sup> UN Security Council, "Eighteenth Progress Report ..." (S/1996/684, Annex); "Foreign Minister says Liberian Disarmament Pace too 'slow'" (text). Paris AFP in English, 1707 GMT, 18 Jan 1997. *FBIS Daily Report - West Africa* (FBIS-AFR-91-013, Internet posting: January 22, 1997); [Online Database]: February 21, 2002.

<sup>868</sup> "Peace Council's Boley Gives Reasons for Slow Disarmament" (text). Paris AFP in English, 1003 GMT 12 Dec 1996. *FBIS Daily Report-West Africa*. (FBIS-AFR-97-022; Internet posting: February 4, 1997); [Online Database]: February 21, 2002.

Reintegration programs did not provide incentives to demobilize either.<sup>869</sup> Reintegration programs that were promised for the fighters never fully materialized.<sup>870</sup> Indeed, it consisted of an identification card, agricultural tools, and transportation to the home community. In fact, Alao et al (1999) state that by 1997 the funds for demobilization were such that the former combatants could only remain in the demobilization camps for an average of twelve hours each.<sup>871</sup>

Logistical and operational shortfalls were a final deterrent to effective demobilization.<sup>872</sup> As late as November 1996, ECOMOG's 7,500 force was still just deployed in Monrovia and its surrounding areas and UNOMIL only had 23 observers.<sup>873</sup> Even in January 1997, the ECOMOG's 7,500 force and UNOMIL's 78 observers, although more dispersed inland than in November, remained primarily along Liberia's coast.<sup>874</sup>

The military insecurity, poor reintegration programs, and thin peacekeeping force deployment did not create any incentives for the factions to voluntarily disarm. In essence, there was no mutual vulnerability among the factions to spur compliance. For this reason, the role of Nigeria's President Sani Abacha and Foreign Minister, Tom Ikimi, feature prominently in precipitating demobilization.

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<sup>869</sup> "Foreign Minister says Liberian Disarmament Pace too 'slow'" ... 18 Jan 1997.

<sup>870</sup> "ECOMOG Chief Malu Interviewed on Disarmament Process" (excerpt) Paris AFP in English, 1139 GMT, 28 Jan 1997. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (FBIS-AFR-97-018; Internet posting: January 29, 1997); [Online Database]: February 22, 2002.

<sup>871</sup> Alao, et al 94

<sup>872</sup> I thank Adekeye Adebajo for pointing this out to me.

<sup>873</sup> UN Security Council, "Twentieth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia", (S/1996/962) 19 November 1996, paras 14-15.

<sup>874</sup> UN Security Council, "Twenty-first Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia", (S/1997/90) 29 January 1997, [Online Database] February 12, 2001, paras 8,11.

## **Sani Abacha, Tom Ikimi, and Demobilization**

As has been stated before, in 1995, a *détente* between Sani Abacha and Charles Taylor occurred.<sup>875</sup> This new working relationship appears to have been a key precursor to Taylor's decision to disarm. Although at the end of the summit that produced the Abuja-II Accord Taylor announced that he would demobilize first,<sup>876</sup> it was still four months before Taylor would actually follow through on his promise. Citing displeasure at the slow pace of demobilization, Tom Ikimi, Nigeria's Foreign Minister, who at an Abuja reception in 1996 introduced Taylor as Liberia's next president<sup>877</sup>, traveled to Monrovia to meet with the faction leaders on January 17.<sup>878</sup> The next day, Ikimi warned that combatants still armed after the January 31<sup>st</sup> deadline would be treated as criminals by ECOMOG and the factions themselves would cease to exist.<sup>879</sup> On January 22<sup>nd</sup>, after the smallest faction, the LDF, had been ordered to disarm by its leader, Taylor ordered the disarmament of the NPFL. This was followed on January 24<sup>th</sup> by George Boley's order for the LPC to disarm.<sup>880</sup> By January 26, 38 percent of all combatants had been disarmed (the NPFL and ULIMO led with 54 percent and 52 percent of all combatants disarmed, respectively).<sup>881</sup> The disarmament deadline was extended by one week; on February 9, 62 percent of all combatants had been disarmed.<sup>882</sup> However, true to their promise, ECOMOG arrested several combatants

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<sup>875</sup> See for example: "Blood Under the Bridge", 3.

<sup>876</sup> "Liberian faction leader pledges to take disarmament lead" Deutsche Presse-Agentur August 2, 1996. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. March 4, 2002.

<sup>877</sup> "Blood Under the Bridge", 3.

<sup>878</sup> "Council Holds 'First' Meeting Since Assassination Attempt" (text) Paris AFP in English, 1049 GMT, 17 Jan 1997. *FBIS Daily Report – West Africa* (Internet version; FBIS-AFR-91-012, January 21, 1997. [Online Database] February 21, 2002)

<sup>879</sup> "Foreign Minister Says Liberian Disarmament Pace Too Slow".

<sup>880</sup> "Another Warlord Orders His Faction to Disband" (text). Paris AFP in English, 1739 GMT, 24 Jan 1997. *FBIS Daily – West Africa* (FBIS-AFR-97-017; Internet version, January 28, 1997; [Online Database] on February 21, 2002).

<sup>881</sup> UN Security Council, "Twenty-First Progress Report..." (S/1997/90, Annex II).

after the deadline, including Alhaji Kromah, leader of ULIMO-K for holding weapons illegally.<sup>883</sup> Equally important, the impasse of the demobilization process shows that (with the exception of the Lofa Defense Force), once the largest force demobilizes, it is likely that the remaining factions will also demobilize as the threat of military vulnerability lessens.

### **Election Date Changes**

A second crisis during the implementation period was the scheduled date of elections, May 31<sup>st</sup>, 1997. As the date drew near, assessments by election observers and the parties themselves began to question the preparedness of the country for elections. Consequently, the political parties, with the exception of the NPFL began to call for a postponement of the elections until October 1997.<sup>884</sup> Taylor, who assumed victory, wanted to hold the elections on the date planned. He threatened that he would not feel the need to comply with the Abuja Agreement should they not occur in May. ECOWAS also agreed with Taylor. Moreover, Ikimi, Nigeria's foreign Minister stated that the decision to postpone the elections rested with ECOWAS and not the Liberian political parties. Further bolstering Taylor, some ECOMOG contributing countries threatened to leave Liberia if the elections were postponed.<sup>885</sup> To resolve the situation, the ECOWAS heads of state met in mid-May. As a compromise, the ECOWAS Heads of State decided that elections would be postponed until July 19<sup>th</sup>, but not until October. While it allowed the other parties more time to prepare, it was still considered a tight schedule,<sup>886</sup> thus not disadvantaging Taylor too much.

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<sup>882</sup> UN Security Council. "Twenty-second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia" (S/1997/237). 19 March 1997, para 13, (Readex Microprint).

<sup>883</sup> "Faction Head Koromah Under House Arrest After Arms Seizure" (text). Paris AFP in English, 1331 GMT, 7 Mar 1997. *FBIS Daily Report-West Africa* (FBIS-AFR-97-066; Internet version, March 11, 1997; [Online Database] on February 21, 2002).

<sup>884</sup> Carter Center (1997), 22-24.

<sup>885</sup> Lyons, 48-49

## **Summary of Abuja-II Accord**

Ultimately, the implementation of the Abuja-II Accord was greatly assisted by the personal intervention of ECOWAS members. In particular, the involvement of Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Tom Ikimi, facilitated with the rapprochement between Nigeria and Taylor, intervened at critical times to push the process forward and indicate his support of Taylor's candidacy. Nothing else built into the process could bind the parties to commence disarmament on their own or seek to resolve the election date concerns. For this reason, the involvement of Nigeria was the crucial catalyst and manager of the final stages of the Liberian peace process.

## **SECTION 4. 5 CONCLUSION**

In this case study of the Liberian peace process, I have attempted to look at both the periods of peace between accords and renewed conflict in order to highlight the effect of mutual political and military vulnerability between factions as a means to quell political instability. The piecemeal nature of the peace process in Liberia provides opportunities to understand the roles that regional entities might play, the contributions needed by the larger international community, and the dynamics between the warring factions. Equally important, the Liberian case offers solutions that may prompt factions to follow through on promised tasks when agreements fail to create politically or militarily vulnerable situations. Generally, the Liberian case showed that when political accommodation coincided with suspicions of military or financial threats to the factions, the peace process stalled. In those cases, asymmetric vulnerability developed through the actions of the international community, the timing of actions and events, and the organizational structure of factions. On the other hand, as hypothesized, in the presence of mutual vulnerability, the implementation process advanced. Mutual vulnerability developed through the timing of actions and concessions and diplomatic efforts by neighboring states.

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<sup>886</sup> "New Polling date gives breathing space to war-ravaged Liberia". *Agence France Presse* May 22, 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe. March 4, 2002.

Absent institutions, the timing of events, actions, and concessions was critical in creating mutual political and military vulnerability. In the first time period covered (1990-1992), the criticality of the timing of actions and concessions is demonstrated in joint monitoring by ECOMOG and the NPFL during ECOMOG's deployment into Liberia and the simultaneous recognition of a dual administration.<sup>887</sup> Yet, vulnerability becomes asymmetric to the NPFL when ECOMOG is suspected of assisting ULIMO, a rival of the NPFL.<sup>888</sup> Similarly, the implementation of the Cotonou Accord stalls after weakening control by the faction leaders occurred at the commencement of demobilization and the end of joint patrolling between the factions and ECOMOG/UNOMIL.

The effect of the regional and larger international community is not as clear. Notably, the threat and twice-evidenced ability of military retaliation by ECOMOG for cease-fire violations did not seem to have an effect, as Walter (1999) would predict. Most prominently, the Liberian case displays the benefits as well as the costs of engaging a regional peacekeeping force. The proximity of the neighboring states in West Africa created opportunities to form alliances through both shared grievances as well as strategic opportunities. These histories manifested themselves in the peace process. For example, Nigeria's intentions were suspicious because its president, Ibrahim Babangida was an ally of former Liberian president, Doe.<sup>889</sup> In another example, the regional ties in the end offered a chance for biased personal diplomacy by Nigeria to push the peace process to its final stage when there were no features binding any faction to begin demobilization. Underpinning the new relationship between Nigeria and Taylor were talks of a secret agreement and behind-closed-door discussions, as well as a direct endorsement of Taylor's

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<sup>887</sup> On dual administration, see Taylor's comment in: Dorbor (1991); On military concessions see ECOWAS Committee of Five, ...7 April 1992, para 5.

<sup>888</sup> Wippman, 172.

<sup>889</sup> See accounts in Adeleke, 578; Howe, 148; Aboagye, 154.

presidency.<sup>890</sup> Even when Taylor's apparent ally, Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast<sup>891</sup> took over the mediation process with the Yamoussoukro Agreements, the peace process broke down. Thus, it appears that it is not sufficient that a biased regional ally negotiate on behalf of a faction leader, but that the alliance offers some strategic advantage.

The larger international community, which was called upon to fund the reintegration program, may have prevented the creation of mutual military vulnerability through its poor response. Moreover, the lack of alternatives may have contributed to the proliferation of factions, as combatants had to seek different ways to survive. Still, the argument that international contributions help demobilization is overshadowed by the fact that at the end, even without a reintegration package, Liberia's factions demobilized under the orders of their leaders. In turn, their leaders were pushed to finish the demobilization process after meeting with Tom Ikimi, Nigeria's Foreign Minister – once again demonstrating the role played by regional allies in this case.

The countries in West Africa were also instrumental in staving off an electoral crisis. When the other Liberian political parties wanted a later election date, as more time was needed to prepare, ECOWAS sided with Taylor, who favored the status quo. In the end, the result was a compromise that did not hurt Taylor significantly.<sup>892</sup>

Stedman (2001) argues that the proliferation of forces makes implementation difficult because compromises become difficult as situations become more fluid.<sup>893</sup> Similarly, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) argue that, up to a certain point, the greater the number of factions, the more

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<sup>890</sup> See: Sesay (1996b), 400; "Blood under the Bridge".....; This also refers to ECOWAS' siding with Taylor on keeping the election date as May 31, 1996 (see Lyons, 48-49).

<sup>891</sup> On support by Ivory Coast see: Ellis, 65-74, 90; Aning (1997).

<sup>892</sup> "New Polling date gives breathing space to war-ravaged Liberia".

<sup>893</sup> Stedman (2001), 10.

hostile and difficult and implementation environment.<sup>894</sup> In the case of Liberia, I find that the proliferation of factions during the negotiations at Akosombo and Accra made the attainment of mutual vulnerability difficult. As a result, these agreements were not implemented. However, as the large number of factions did not consistently present an obstacle, their effect is inconclusive.

During the formation of new institutional structures, such as the Council of State, advancement depended on the rules regarding membership. The Council of State's formation did not start after the Accra Agreements, when the rules predicted that potential anti-NPFL partnerships could form among the members. In contrast, later during the Abuja-I Accord, when membership changes did not portend such asymmetry, the Council of State was able to form.

The effects of timing, the international community and the organization of factions generally confirm the hypotheses of the dissertation – albeit, less strongly than the cases of Mozambique and Angola. The table below summarizes the outcome in the implementation of Liberia's peace agreements.

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<sup>894</sup> Doyle and Sambanis, 785.



**Table 4.6 Results of Hypotheses in Liberia**

<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Mutual Vulnerability?</b>		<b>Implementation Outcome</b>	
			<b>Predicted</b>	<b>Actual</b>
1. Timing of actions, concessions, and events	Yes (pre-ULIMO)		Advance	Advance
	No (post-ULIMO)		Stall	Stall
	Yes (Early Cotonou)		Advance	Advance
	No (End Cotonou)		Stall	Stall
2. Electoral rules and vested interests	No		Stall	Advance
3. Administrative rules and vested interests	No (1 <sup>st</sup> Council of State)		Stall	Stall
	Yes (2 <sup>nd</sup> Council of State)		Advance	Advance
<b>International community</b>	<b>Effect on Mutual Vulnerability</b>		<b>Implementation Outcome</b>	
	<b>Predicted</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Predicted</b>	<b>Actual</b>
4. Low International financial assistance	Negative	Negative	Stall	Advance
5. No International cohesion	Negative (Pre-Yamoussoukro)	Negative	Stall	Advance
International cohesion	Positive (Post-Yamoussoukro)	Weak Positive	Advance	Advance
<b>Organization of factions</b>	<b>Effect on Mutual Vulnerability</b>		<b>Implementation Outcome</b>	
	<b>Predicted</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Predicted</b>	<b>Actual</b>
6. Cohesive, leader compliant	Not applicable			
7. Loosely organized, leader compliant	Negative	Negative	Stall	Stall
8. Cohesive, leader not compliant	Not applicable			
9. Loosely organized, leader not compliant	Weak	Positive	Advance	Advance
10. Proliferation of factions	Negative	Negative / weak effect	Stall	Stall/ Advance

In conclusion, the historical accounts suggest that in many instances, military and political mutual vulnerability sustained short intervals of peace. In those cases, it was a sufficient and necessary condition for peace in Liberia. On the other hand, the increase in military insecurity during times of political accommodation by the parties, either through the proliferation of factions or suspected sponsorship of factions led to resumption in hostilities. However, unlike the cases of Angola and Mozambique, it was not always necessary – as demonstrated in the fulfillment of the Abuja-II Accord; in that case, the intervention of Nigeria’s foreign minister served as the catalyst for demobilization and a moderate change in the contested election date.

## **CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION**

Implementing a peace agreement is the next most important thing to its signing. While recent research indicates that civil wars eventually do end<sup>895</sup>, many wars may need more than one peace process to finally reach a settlement. As the research by Hartzell et al (2001), shows, the average peace agreement staved off renewed conflict for approximately 42 months.<sup>896</sup> Multiple peace agreements not only mean that the civil war continues, but in some cases – like Angola and Rwanda – the violence after the failure of a peace agreement may be worse than in the civil war preceding it.<sup>897</sup> It is important to get it right the first time.

The lack of focus on implementation processes leads to poor recommendations for the factors that bring stability to a country. In particular, little consideration in the literature is given to the changing relationship between the parties to an agreement as they proceed to implement the accord. As a result, upon close inspection of cases, the conclusions from some research do not match reality. The existing literature on the post-accord period, such as work by Hartzell (1999), Paris (1997), and de Soto and del Castillo (1994) tends to focus on political and economic institutions to ensure political stability that may take years to develop. In the meantime, how a country starts on the road to stabilization remains unclear. The cases in this dissertation reveal that the period when the implementation of a peace agreement takes place also involves continued negotiation and compromise between the parties. Differing from the existing literature, this research project focuses on the interactions between the entities involved in the implementation of the accord and how these interactions elicit particular responses that advance or hinder the implementation process.

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<sup>895</sup> Licklider (1998), 123.

<sup>896</sup> Hartzell et al, 195.

<sup>897</sup> Stedman (2001), 4.

Broadly, the literature points to two recommendations for the post-accord period. First, drawing from the conflict management literature, recommendations center on the adoption of power sharing strategies<sup>898</sup>. Secondly, acknowledging the heavy involvement of the international community in mediating and managing peace accords and processes, scholars and practitioners make recommendations on the level of international involvement.<sup>899</sup> I review these briefly below.

Advocating the use of power sharing strategies is increasingly common. Almost all mediators strive to create some system by which all interested parties can have a stake in government after the settlement of the conflict. Usually, power-sharing manifests itself through either territorial autonomy, governments of national unity, and proportional representation. But the manner in which these strategies determine the success of an implementation is inconclusive. In one of the few large-n studies examining power-sharing strategies, while Hartzell (1999) shows that most agreements that institutionalize territorial, military, and economic participation eventually resulted in stable settlements, it does not shed any light on how a country navigates through the implementation period. Specifically, it gives no indication for the difficulty of an implementation of a peace agreement, the dangers that may derail it, or the role that regional entities or the larger international community may play in ensuring its success. In a follow up large-n study by Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001), territorial autonomy is shown to result in stable settlements. Again, it is not clear which mechanisms are at work to provide this stability. Additionally, as Appendix 1-A shows, it is possible to have many power-sharing tactics included in a peace agreement without a stable settlement resulting (and vice-versa).

The case studies in this dissertation display important characteristics that are at odds with the power-sharing advocates. Mozambique is widely hailed as a success, but its peace agreement

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<sup>898</sup> Power-sharing strategies as a method of conflict resolution are recommended by: Walter (1997; 1999), Hartzell (1999); Sisk (1996); Lijphart (1970).

<sup>899</sup> On the need for international intervention see: Walter (1997; 1999), Hampson (1996); Zartman (1995); Doyle and Sambanis (2000); de Soto and del Castillo (1994).

did not make power-sharing provisions. Notably, Chissano was clear about not wanting a government of national unity even as the international community pressured him to consider one.<sup>900</sup> Angola offers a stronger contradiction. Supposedly, the lesson from the failure of the Bicesse Accords was the lack of power-sharing.<sup>901</sup> As a result, the Lusaka Protocol was more robust, with explicit power sharing provisions between the government and UNITA.<sup>902</sup> Yet, the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol failed. Finally, during the course of Liberia's 16 peace accords, power-sharing was included beginning with the Cotonou Accord in 1993, the 12<sup>th</sup> accord.<sup>903</sup> Still, there had been a fragile peace with some of the previous accords. Furthermore, the Cotonou Accord itself did not last. In the case of Liberia, the basis of this contradiction may lie in how civil wars are coded. For example, Hartzell (1999) codes Liberia as one war and one peace agreement rather than several.<sup>904</sup> Thus, in Liberia, as Abuja II (the last peace accord before the civil war ended), which built on the Cotonou Accord, assumed a certain amount of power sharing it may seem like power sharing ended the civil war.<sup>905</sup> The experiences of Liberia and Angola suggest that, while a peace agreement may contain provisions for institutions and other governing structures, these future promises do not necessarily seem to factor into whether a faction leader may decide to continue or to stall an implementation process. On the other hand, Mozambique's results suggest that factors besides an explicit position in government may sustain a party's interest in advancing the implementation of a peace accord.

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<sup>900</sup> See the following articles: Hanlon, "Pressure for Unity Government" ( July 1994); "Chissano on campaigning conditions, possibility of Dhlakama being vice-president" (April 26, 1994); "South African president meets Mozambican former rebel leader" (July 22, 1994).

<sup>901</sup> Many report on this – see for example Anstee (2000), 87

<sup>902</sup> see UN Security Council, "Letter dated 9 December 1994..." (S/1994/1441, Annex).

<sup>903</sup> UN Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1993..." (S/26272, Annex).

<sup>904</sup> Hartzell, 13

<sup>905</sup> Notably, Hartzell also codes Nicaragua as having one war and one peace, when in reality, the Chamorro government signed 40 separate agreements with various contra groups (see Spalding 39-41)

Besides the provision for a range of power-sharing mechanisms, another recommendation is the involvement of the international community. There are two main recommendations: the international community must significantly intervene and it should be united. As expressed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992), the international community is expected to provide resources to bring stability to the post-conflict period.<sup>906</sup> From case studies, Hampson (1996) concludes that those with a greater amount of involvement by the international community were more likely to have stable settlements. Employing more specificity, Walter (1997) states that guarantees made by international entities mitigate the security fears of warring parties, thus ensuring that negotiated settlements do not unravel. Reinforcing Walter's conclusion, Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) also find that third party guarantees help settle conflicts.<sup>907</sup> Cousens and Kumar (2001) argue that the international community can best impact the post-conflict period by understanding the actors and the political environment. Only then can the international community assist in constructing institutions that enable "self-enforcing peace".<sup>908</sup> Lastly, some literature also emphasizes the need for consensus in the international community. Stedman (2001) argues that regional states that build alliances with the insurgents may undermine efforts to bring peace to a country.<sup>909</sup>

While Stedman's (2001) findings seem to ring true, the three case studies in this research project do not completely bear out some of the other hypothesized impacts of the international community. In Mozambique, Walter (1999) is wrong in her assertion that demobilization began only after the deployment of the UN force.<sup>910</sup> In fact, as I pointed out in the case study, the UN had been fully deployed with more than 6,000 for approximately six months, before

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<sup>906</sup> Boutros-Ghali, paras 55-59

<sup>907</sup> Hartzell et al, 200

<sup>908</sup> Cousens and Kumar, 12

<sup>909</sup> Stedman (2001) 11

demobilization began<sup>911</sup>. Instead, the start of demobilization coincided more closely with the agreement both parties had reached on administrative structures. Renamo then waited for the government to move first.<sup>912</sup> Moreover, despite that there is no indication the UN contingent was willing to use force, the implementation of the peace accord in Mozambique was by all measures a success. In contrast, Angola only had a 350-member UN contingent during the implementation of the Bicesse Accord and nearly 7,000 during the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol<sup>913</sup>, but war resumed in both cases. Finally, ECOWAS had varying levels of intervention – at one point reaching nearly 14,000<sup>914</sup> – and had shown a willingness to use force in 1990 and 1992,<sup>915</sup> but the civil war continued until 1996.

In the literature, the mechanism through which the international community helps to stabilize settlements is not clear. Still, like power-sharing, the call for more international involvement has not gone unheeded. Since 1948, the United Nations has participated in 54 peacekeeping operations.<sup>916</sup> However, between 1992 and 2001, the United Nations created 31 peacekeeping operations.<sup>917</sup> Recently, new actors with less experience have begun to enter the post-conflict arena. In Africa, sub-regional organizations, such as ECOWAS in West Africa and the Southern African Development Commission (SADC) in Southern Africa that were conceived

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<sup>910</sup> Walter (1999), 149

<sup>911</sup> The UN was fully deployed by August 1993 (United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ”, S/26385, 30 August 1993, and S/26385/Add.1, 10 September 1993) and demobilization began in March 1994 (United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ”, (S/1994/511)).

<sup>912</sup> United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General ...” (S/1994/511), 233; Hanlon, Issue 9, April 1994, 1.

<sup>913</sup> *On Bicesse Accord see:* UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General ...” (S/22627, microfiche), para 15; *On Lusaka Protocol see:* United Nations. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 255-7.

<sup>914</sup> Olonisakin, 137

<sup>915</sup> Olonisakin, 122-135; Alao, et al, 30.

<sup>916</sup> United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” 15 January 2002.

<sup>917</sup> United Nations, “Current Peacekeeping Operations”; United Nations, “Completed Peacekeeping Operations”

to promote regional economic integration increasingly take on the task of managing the negotiation and implementation process. As Crocker, Hampson and Aall (1999) state in their introduction, sometimes one of the greatest problems is managing the mediators.<sup>918</sup> The increasing requirement for international intervention and the increased variety of mediators indicates the need to more clearly understand the impact and the role of external entities.

The inconsistencies that come from recommendations of power sharing and international involvement necessitate a closer look at the steps needed to successfully implement a peace agreement. Explicit studies on the implementation period are scarce. Stedman's work (1997, 2001) and that of Doyle and Sambanis (2000) begin to address the challenges in this environment. Stedman's (1997) typology of "spoilers" of the peace presents indicators to the international mediators for how to correctly identify and work with particular "spoilers", in order not to derail the implementation process. In a follow up study, Stedman (2001) broadens his conceptualization of the complications of the post-conflict environment to include the number of factions, the presence of resources, the foreign policies of the neighboring states, and the level of international involvement. However, the analysis misses how the parties react to each others' moves – an important component of the post-conflict period.

In addressing some of these gaps and contradictions, this research project looks inward at the factions themselves. Specifically, I draw out the domestic and international context surrounding a faction leader's decision to comply with implementing requirements in the peace agreement. The main idea I employ rests on the notion that the credible promise of political participation and demobilization will move the implementation process forward. Operationally, I define credibility as the presence of mutual political and military vulnerability – as informed by the work on contracts and game theory by such scholars as Williamson (1985), Kreps (1990), and

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<sup>918</sup> Chester A. Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall, "Introduction" in Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall ed. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999, 4

Schelling (1980). The presence of mutual vulnerability among the factions is necessary to get the implementation started and to keep it going.

Of key importance in the creation of mutual vulnerability is the notion of the timing of events, actions, and concessions by the factions. This reflects the implementation period's step-by-step process and constant reassessment of political and military positions by the factions as they contemplate their next move. Additionally, considering that some institutions of governance or electoral management begin their formation during the implementation period, I examine the effect of institutional rules and vested interests on the creation of mutual vulnerability. I consider two intervening variables that impact how the timing of events, concessions, and actions by the factions and the institutional rules and their vested interests will create vulnerability: the international community and the organization of the factions.

The idea of mutual vulnerability as the engine that propels the implementation process forward shows that decisions are based on a leader's assessment of his political and military vulnerability at the time of decision and not at some future date. In other words, the context in which a decision is made is important. As a result, it is possible to understand why a promise of power-sharing a few years in the future does not always make a difference in the success of an implementation period. In addition, using the concept of mutual vulnerability also outlines a more specific role for the international community. As such, it shows the plausibility of the relative ineffectiveness of a large international contingent – even one willing to use force. The cases indicate that linking the peace agreement's provisions and international intervention with factors that directly affect the military and political vulnerability of the parties produces results.

### **Conditions for a Successful Implementation of a Peace Agreement**

#### ***Forming mutual vulnerability***

The cases show that faction leaders took steps to comply or defect from agreed promises based on their perceived level of political or military vulnerability to the other faction or factions.



Not only do the presence of provisions in the peace agreement that render the factions politically and militarily mutually vulnerable start the implementation of a peace accord, but the implementation of the peace agreement occurs through the continued presence of such vulnerabilities. More precisely, the cases show that events or concessions that take place concurrently such that they create mutual political and military vulnerabilities among the parties help to advance the implementation of a peace accord. Alternatively, when events or actions that take place concurrently do not create mutual political and military vulnerability among the factions – either by creating asymmetric vulnerability or eroding previously created vulnerability – the implementation process is likely to stall or worse, hostilities may recur.

Mozambique's successful implementation of the General Peace Agreement rested on the creation of political and military vulnerability between Frelimo and Renamo. In particular, financing for Renamo, allowing Renamo to appoint its members as deputies to the governors of the provinces until the elections, the consensus requirement for decisions in the National Elections Commission, and the schedule of demobilization were all factors that rendered the Frelimo and Renamo vulnerable to each other.<sup>919</sup> As a result of these features, Renamo was drawn into the political space through the financial assistance and had to acknowledge the government's administrative sovereignty. Notably, the administrative accommodation was made as Renamo faced the prospect of demobilization. With this arrangement, Renamo was able to retain some political influence as its military insecurity increased. Still, as mentioned before, simultaneous demobilization did not follow immediately, the government – the stronger party – moved first, before Renamo followed.<sup>920</sup> As a result, because the government was the stronger party, potential asymmetric military vulnerability for Renamo was mitigated. The features of the

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<sup>919</sup> The following sources provide information on these points. Financing Renamo: see Ajello, 637; Local administration arrangements: Hanlon (September 1994), 1; United Nations, (S/26432), 197; National Elections Commission: see Mazula, 40-55; information from Ismael Valigy, personal interview.

<sup>920</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General..." (S/1994/511), 233; Hanlon (April 1994), 1

implementation period reveal that Mozambique's progress was not predicated on future promises of power-sharing nor on the time at which the UN force was deployed. Rather, changes that created vulnerability between Frelimo and Renamo were made as the implementation process progressed.

As the election-planning period involved the development of institutions, rules governed the behavior of Renamo and Frelimo. A consensus requirement, which dominated the planning of the first elections, made Renamo and Frelimo mutually politically vulnerable. Most significantly, the consensus rule forced both Frelimo and Renamo to forfeit candidates of their own choosing for the chair of the National Elections Commission: Brazão Mazula the nominee of neither Renamo nor the government, was selected as the chair of the Commission.<sup>921</sup> Equally important, the consensus rule forced compromises by Renamo and Frelimo. The effect of the consensus rule in helping to advance the development of an institution through mutual political vulnerability perhaps is best seen in the subsequent elections that did not have rules or clear outside interests requiring consensus: In both the 1998 and 1999 elections, Mozambique experienced a degree of political instability as Renamo was politically vulnerable to the government decisions.

In contrast, asymmetric vulnerability marked Angola's implementation process. During the implementation of the Bicesse Accords, as the government and UNITA took steps to comply with the provisions in the peace accord, the government revealed that it had trained an anti-riot police force.<sup>922</sup> At the time that the government revealed the existence of the anti-riot police, UNITA had returned a significant amount of territory over to the government, had assembled most of its troops, and demobilization had begun.<sup>923</sup> Thus, the appearance of the anti-riot police

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<sup>921</sup> Valigy, personal interview.

<sup>922</sup> Anti-riot police: Anstee (1996), 71, 72; UNITA assembly of troops: Anstee (1996), 52.

undermined an environment that should have rendered both sides militarily vulnerable. Similarly, during the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, which contained wide-ranging power-sharing provisions<sup>924</sup>, the government's conciliatory political accommodation was undermined by UNITA's hiding of troops and refusal to surrender its headquarters of Bailundo and Andulo.<sup>925</sup>

Liberia exhibited several periods where political and military vulnerability between the factions helped to move the implementation process forward as well as periods of asymmetric vulnerability when the implementation period stalled and hostilities resumed. Early in the process, the recognition of the NPFL as a legitimate political entity and the weakening of the interim government – forming essentially a dual administration in the Bamako Agreement<sup>926</sup> helped to attain other agreements, including the beginning of deployment of peacekeeping troops into NPFL territory.<sup>927</sup> However, perceived bias on the part of ECOMOG against the NPFL and threats to the financial base of the NPFL during the time when military vulnerability increased with the deployment of ECOMOG into Liberia, stalled the implementation process.<sup>928</sup>

For similar reasons of asymmetric vulnerability, the Council of State could not be completed. During the formation of the Council of State, when changes to the membership structure included the possible addition of Tom Woewiyu<sup>929</sup>, there was the potential for anti-NPFL coalitions to form – thus creating asymmetric political vulnerability during a time of

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<sup>923</sup> Announcement of Anti-riot police: Anstee (1996) 71,72; Troop assembly: Anstee (1996) 52; Administrative centralization: "Government Said Inhibiting Electoral Administration" UNITA states still controlled six municipalities.

<sup>924</sup> The Lusaka Protocol: UN Security Council, "Letter dated 9 December 1994...." (S/1994/1441, Annex).

<sup>925</sup> For questions on UNITA's troop assembly: UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..."S/1998/333, para 25; For the issue of Bailundo and Andulo: UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..." S/1997/959, para 3; UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General..."S/1998/524, para 2,3.

<sup>926</sup> On dual administration and weakening interim government: Aboagye, 94; Ellis, 89-92;

<sup>927</sup> ECOWAS Committee of Five .. 7 April 1992.

<sup>928</sup> ECOMOG Bias: Adebajo, 43-44 ; Financial threats to NPFL: Reno (1998) 97, 102;

political accommodation. As a result, the Council of State could not complete its formation. Progress on the Council of State occurred when the member chosen to replace Woewiyu, George Boley<sup>930</sup>, could form neither an anti-NPFL coalition nor an anti-ULIMO-K coalition, the two individually represented armed factions.

Political marginalization also played a role in the launching by Roosevelt Johnson, head of ULIMO-J, of the round of fighting before the last peace accord.<sup>931</sup> As the cooperation between members increased in the Council of State— of which Johnson was not a part – through the agreement on a memorandum of understanding<sup>932</sup> Johnson’s isolation and weakening hold on his organization was exacerbated. Specifically, William Karyee, leader of a dissident ULIMO-J faction was recognized as the official leader of ULIMO-J. As the NPFL and ULIMO-K ordered Johnson’s arrest for murder of fellow Krahn, Johnson launched an attack on Monrovia. After Johnson was given asylum in Nigeria and Ghana, settlement finally began in Liberia with the demobilization of the factions.<sup>933</sup> Like in Mozambique, after the NPFL, the stronger party, began demobilization, the other factions (save the smallest, which went first) followed.<sup>934</sup>

The cases show that power sharing in future governance does not necessarily factor in the decisions during the implementation process. Rather, decisions of the factions are functions of more immediate concerns in the implementation environment. Of particular importance in advancing the implementation process is the creation of political and military vulnerability among the factions.

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<sup>929</sup> “Withdraws from New Council”.

<sup>930</sup> Adebajo, 60

<sup>931</sup> See accounts in “Out of Control”, 1-2.

<sup>932</sup> UN Security Council, “Fourteenth Progress ...” (S/1995/1042)

<sup>933</sup> *On Johnson’s arrest and Karyee’s recognition see:* “Johnson dismissed, ordered arrested”; “Heavy fighting continues in Monrovia as forces surround Johnson”; *On asylum see:* UN Security Council, “Letter Dated 17 May 1996...” (S/1996/377, Annex).

### ***The International Community and Mutual Vulnerability***

Actions that reinforced or undermined military or political vulnerability did not occur in a vacuum. Sometimes the presence of the international community also appears to be necessary to engender such timing. In fact, the international community has consistently displayed a greater effect than the organizational structure on how the timing of concessions, events, and actions by the factions create mutual political and military vulnerability. From the international community, I focus on its financial contribution, direction of diplomatic efforts, and the degree of consensus on a particular course of action. Simply having more of all these variables is not a prerequisite to success. Rather, the key lies in how the international community can contribute to the creation of political and military vulnerability.

In Mozambique, the financial contribution of the international community helped to get Renamo “out of the bush” and into Maputo, costing the government its political dominance<sup>935</sup>, while at the same time also costing Renamo some of its sovereignty.<sup>936</sup> Equally important, the \$18 million reintegration package from the international community spurred the demobilization of Renamo<sup>937</sup>, which made a return to war more difficult when Dhlakama called for a boycott. In contrast, in Angola and Liberia, demobilization was made more difficult due to the poor response to humanitarian appeals.

Diplomacy and the consensus of the international community also affected whether the parties were able to create situations of mutual vulnerability. In general, a unified international community was helpful. Divided opinion in the region or in the larger international community gave the insurgents some allies for their causes. This result is clearly seen when Mozambique is compared to Angola and Liberia. In Mozambique, not only was the international community

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<sup>934</sup> UN Security Council, “Twenty-first Progress Report...” (S/1997/90, Annex II); UN Security Council, “Twenty-second Progress Report...” (S/1997/237), para 13.

<sup>935</sup> United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General...” (S/1994/511), p.237

<sup>936</sup> Zuppi, personal interview.

solidly behind the peace process, but former ‘friends’ of Frelimo, like Robert Mugabe, lobbied Renamo during times when the implementation process threatened to come to an impasse.<sup>938</sup> As such, the government could not gain an advantage through its alliance with external entities. In Angola, the judgements of the UN and other entities against UNITA seemed to precede the Angolan government’s overtures make political accommodations to UNITA. In contrast, countries and entities that bought diamonds from and sold weapons to UNITA facilitated the civil war.<sup>939</sup> Finally, in Liberia, Nigeria’s eventual support for Taylor<sup>940</sup> appeared to be instrumental in sparking demobilization and staving off an impasse over the election date. In each of these cases, the international community contributed to creating political and military vulnerabilities between the factions by affecting the timing of events, concessions, and actions by the factions.

Through resources and diplomatic policy the international and regional communities can assist the implementation process in specific, targeted ways. In the cases, it is not always a question of how large of a force or its willingness to forcibly enforce the peace. Rather, international or regional entities can affect a faction’s relative political and military vulnerability – and thereby, its decisions – through the control a leader has over his factions, a faction’s political viability, and the cost a faction leader may experience for not following through on commitments or the benefit of following through on commitment.

### ***Organization of the Factions and Mutual Vulnerability***

The organization of factions – both the number and the cohesiveness of the units –also affected how timing creates political and military vulnerability. Importantly, the effect of the factions’ organization on timing of events depends not just on the group leader, but the ability of

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<sup>937</sup> Syngge, 66

<sup>938</sup> Mugabe’s role is documented throughout the account by Hume (1994).

<sup>939</sup> See Global Witness (1998) on the role of external entities in the Angola civil war.

that leader to control the group. The degree of cohesion within the group affects the creation of political and military vulnerability through the ability for groups to carry out the actions indicated by their leaders. This is evident in the cases.

In Mozambique, Ajello aimed to keep Renamo together by ensuring the Dhlakama had enough resources to sustain patronage systems.<sup>941</sup> Thus, as long as Dhlakama remained committed to following through on Renamo's promises and he could control the organization, the Mozambican implementation process would move forward. On the other hand, Dhlakama was unable to fulfill a threat to boycott the 1994 elections because, by then, the members of Renamo on the Elections Commission simply wanted to hold the elections<sup>942</sup>; they had developed a vested interest in the electoral process.

In contrast to Mozambique, the cohesiveness of UNITA was instrumental in facilitating the return to war, because Savimbi did not want to continue with the demobilization following the revelation of the anti-riot police by the government.<sup>943</sup> The demobilization of the government forces made it easy for UNITA to resume hostilities,<sup>944</sup> because UNITA's soldiers remained unified in the assembly areas.<sup>945</sup> Demobilization of government forces may have been facilitated by the relatively more generous reintegration package offered by the government.<sup>946</sup>

Liberia displayed the effects of both loosely organized factions and a proliferation of factions. The lack of organizational cohesion among the Liberian factions made the

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<sup>940</sup> Adebajo, 60.

<sup>941</sup> Ajello, 637

<sup>942</sup> Zuppi, personal interview.

<sup>943</sup> Anstee (1996) 154

<sup>944</sup> Cohen (2000), 116

<sup>945</sup> Lautenbach. "MPLA, UNITA Military Forces Compared" (23 June 1992).

<sup>946</sup> "CCPM Outlines Troops' Demobilization Procedures"

implementation of agreements difficult, as communication could not be made easily.<sup>947</sup>

Additionally, the proliferation of factions – in particular during the 1994 negotiations for the Akosombo and Accra agreements made the creation of political and military vulnerability among the factions difficult. However, the parties at times formed coalitions to pursue particular objectives. For example, the NPFL and ULIMO-K joined together to patrol areas that ECOMOG could not reach.<sup>948</sup> These types of fluid arrangements would likely not be possible in more rigid organizations. But the ease with which coalitions could form held the potential to advance the implementation process.

The work by Stedman (2001) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) show that as the number of factions increase so does the international community's difficulty in implementing the peace agreements. In Stedman's work, the number of factions increases the difficulty of compromise between the factions.<sup>949</sup> The cases in this study caution against such a broad generalization of the effect of factions. While the number of factions may be detrimental, it is also important to examine the strength of the leader and the cohesion of the factions. Unified groups with a leader that takes actions to undermine vulnerability (as in Angola) may be worse than less unified groups with weak leaders that undermine vulnerability (as in Mozambique). Adding to the puzzle, Doyle and Sambanis' results show that as the number of groups increases, the environment becomes less dangerous due to coalitions between groups that may form.<sup>950</sup> Furthermore, as these cases show, the organization of factions do not just affect external entities. They also affect the internal decisions made by the factions.

Finally, the international community's contributions can also overcome impasses caused by the organizational structure itself by adequately funding demobilization and reintegration

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<sup>947</sup> On the organization structure see: Alao et al, 47.

<sup>948</sup> "ULIMO Faction Leader Says he is Committed to the Peace Process" (November 20, 1995).

<sup>949</sup> Stedman (2001), 10



programs as occurred for the success of Mozambique's and the failure of Angola's programs. In other words, the international organizations can affect the organizational structure of factions – thus shaping the environment in which the faction leaders make decisions.

### **Assessing the Hypotheses**

In sum, mutual vulnerability usually served as a necessary and sufficient condition for the advancement of the implementation of peace agreements, as hypothesized. Outside of institutional structures, mutual vulnerability developed from the timing of actions, concessions, and events. However, in Liberia this was not uniformly true, as evidenced by the need for international intervention for the commencement of demobilization. In the context of institutions, such as the National Elections Commission in Mozambique and the Council of State in Liberia, the rules and vested interests created vulnerability.

Examining the cases of Angola and Mozambique, the international community also proved generally instrumental in creating mutual vulnerability through the availability of funding for reintegration programs, in accordance with the hypotheses. Yet, while only Mozambique received significant assistance from the international community to carry out demobilization, Liberia's demobilization began following diplomatic pressure from Nigeria and military threats from ECOMOG. Thus, although financial assistance may be sufficient, it may not be always necessary for mutual vulnerability.

Lastly, as hypothesized, while Renamo's cohesiveness and Dhlakama's compliance helped to advance the implementation of Mozambique's General Peace Accord, the proliferation of factions and their loose organization in Liberia was not a consistent problem. Thus, the effect of the organizational structure on these three cases is inconclusive.

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<sup>950</sup> Doyle and Sambanis, 785; 789.

**Table 5.1 Summary of Hypotheses in the cases**

<b>Hypotheses</b>	<b>Mutual Vulnerability?</b>		<b>Implementation Outcome</b>	
			<b>Predicted</b>	<b>Actual</b>
1. Timing of actions, concessions, and events	Yes (Mozambique, Liberia)		Advance	Advance
	No (Angola)		Stall	Stall
	No (Liberia)		Stall	Stall
	No (Liberia – Abuja-II)		Stall	Advance
2. Electoral rules and vested interests	Yes (Mozambique)		Advance	Advance
	No (Mozambique 1998, 1999)		Stall	Stall
	No (Liberia)		Stall	Advance
3. Administrative rules and vested interests	No (1 <sup>st</sup> Council of State)		Stall	Stall
	Yes (2 <sup>nd</sup> Council of State)		Advance	Advance
<b>International community</b>	<b>Effect on Mutual Vulnerability</b>		<b>Implementation Outcome</b>	
	<b>Predict</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Predict</b>	<b>Actual</b>
4. International financial assistance	Positive (Mozambique)	Positive	Advance	Advance
Low International financial assistance	Negative (Angola)	Negative	Stall	Stall
	Negative (Liberia)	Negative	Stall	Stall
5. International cohesion	Positive (Mozambique)	Positive	Advance	Advance
	Positive (Liberia)	Weak positive	Advance	Advance
Low international cohesion	Negative (Angola)	Negative	Stall	Stall
	Negative (Liberia)	Negative	Stall	Stall
<b>Organization of factions</b>	<b>Effect on Mutual Vulnerability</b>		<b>Implementation Outcome</b>	
	<b>Predict</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Predict</b>	<b>Actual</b>
6. Loosely organized, leader compliant	Negative (Liberia)	Negative	Stall	Stall
7. Loosely organized, leader not compliant	Weak (Mozambique)	Positive	Advance	Advance
	Weak (Liberia)	Positive	Advance	Advance
8. Cohesive, leader compliant	Positive (Mozambique)	Positive	Advance	Advance
9. Cohesive, leader not compliant	Negative (Angola)	Negative	Stall	Stall
10. Proliferation of factions	Negative (Liberia)	Negative	Stall	Stall / Advance

**Directions for Further Research and Lessons for Third Parties**

The research project is directed at two main audiences. First, the research project seeks to contribute to the literature on the implementation of peace agreements. A second audience is the international, regional, and non-governmental entities that work in post-conflict environments.

### ***Potential Direction of Further Research***

Logically, in order for conflict to end, one important criterion is having a successful implementation process. However, many works take the implementation of a peace agreement for granted. Additionally, the few large-n studies, which may be used to understand implementation periods, do not produce strong conclusive results. In part, this may be due to poor specificity of variables. For this reason, the results of the case studies in this dissertation offer some directions for further research. In particular, the results from these case studies bring a greater focus to the environment in which the factions make decisions. Thinking about the implementation process as an environment in which factions take actions relative to their vulnerability to other factions may provide greater insight for other puzzles such as why some conflicts are settled despite a failure to implement many provisions (or vice-versa).

The cases in this research project suggest that the few large-n studies in the literature<sup>951</sup> do not specify all the correct variables. The main benefits of large-n studies are that conclusions may be made more strongly through the control of different variables and less bias in the case selection.<sup>952</sup> Yet, the poor relationship between generally acceptable principles for post-accord governance – such as power sharing – and the inconclusive results of the effect of large investments of international intervention suggests that the variables being tested may not be correctly specified. Moreover, the results from these studies still do not give any indication why one implementation process will progress while another will stall.

The work being conducted by Stedman (2001) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) is encouraging in that it begins to uncover the features of the environment in which implementation proceeds. However, the focus lies overwhelmingly on how the international community can

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<sup>951</sup> A good summary of large n-studies is found in: Licklider (1998): 121-132. A more recent study was conducted by Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001).

<sup>952</sup> Van Evera, (1997).

adapt to an existing situation rather than how it may change it. In this project, I have attempted to show how some variables interacted to create politically and militarily vulnerable positions. In turn, these situations made the promise for political reform and demobilization more credible. Similarly conducted case studies may yield data that identifies such characteristics as which party commenced assembly and demobilization of troops, the extent of administrative centralization at particular points in the process, or types of institutional rules – all of which will create a clearer picture of the implementation period. Equally important a better understanding of the implementation period should begin to answer the following: How did the factions relate to each other? How did the factions relate to the external entities? What options were facing the demobilized rank and file? These are just some of the questions that should be answered in a more comprehensive manner in order to develop more successful implementation processes. The answers to these questions will also allow a better specification of variables in order to conduct large-n studies.

### *Limitations of the Theory*

The creation of mutual political and military vulnerability may work best in situations where the insurgents seek an expansion of the political space. The applicability of the theory of mutual vulnerability is limited when insurgents fight for secession rather than an expansion of the political space or the civil war also becomes an inter-state war. These are elaborated upon below.

Limitations of this theory may be found in its applicability to secession movements, as opposed to those insurgencies that seek to expand the political space. Assuming that the only means by which to quell political instability is through granting the right of secession, then if a group does not want to be a part of an existing state, there is little political accommodation by the state that may entice it to withdraw its grievances permanently. Thus, while not all secession movements end in partition, for those where it is the only viable option, focusing on the creation of mutual vulnerability may not be useful.

Additionally, civil wars that are complicated by wars with neighboring states, such as presently exists in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), may not lend themselves resolvable through the use of mutual vulnerability. In particular, a solution to the civil conflict in the DRC will also have to account for the motivations of Angola, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda, which remain involved in the country.

### ***Lessons for Third Parties***

A goal of the research project is to improve the manner in which international entities, regional organizations, and other non-governmental organizations assist the parties in managing the implementation period. The results of these three case studies carry some implications for its continued involvement. Additionally, the results of these three cases suggest that some long-held requirements may not necessarily need to be fulfilled in order to attain a stable settlement. Notably, the cases suggest that is not simply a matter of the number of troops or the willingness of the international entity to use force. Instead, the outcomes of the implementation processes show that there are more strategic opportunities for the regional and larger international community to bring resolution to civil conflicts. A more effective use of the regional and larger international community occurs when it affects the incentives of a faction leader at critical times to continue with the implementation process, rather than defect. Those incentives usually change the political or military vulnerability of a faction vis-à-vis the others in the conflict.

Using the notion of mutual vulnerability brings into question two particular requirements that many international entities and governments in the case studies strove to fulfill: the extension of all territory under a central administration and the simultaneous start of demobilization. Many peace agreements require the complete extension of central administration during the implementation period. Moreover, the accounts in newspapers and the memoirs of envoys (in particular Anstee's account of Angola's Bicesse Accord) show the importance of fulfilling this goal. Instead, the case studies show that a temporary dual administration at points when other

requirements may bring military or political vulnerability may help to advance the implementation process. This is not the same as permanently creating territorial autonomy. However, it does allow factions to balance the degree of vulnerability they perceive with respect to other factions. Additionally, as they prepare to re-create themselves as political parties, such an administrative arrangement may provide former insurgents with a sense of their ability to wage a legitimate campaign.

The simultaneous commencement of demobilization is also an implied goal – judging from the schedules that appear in the peace agreements. Yet, the cases in this study show that it may matter which faction moves first. In Mozambique, Frelimo preceded Renamo with troop assembly and demobilization before Renamo began each of those steps.<sup>953</sup> In Liberia, although the smallest faction, the Lofa Defense Force did order demobilization before the NPFL by a few days, only after the NPFL began demobilization, did the other groups follow.<sup>954</sup>

Liberia's experience presents lessons for regional entities as well. Increasingly, sub-regional organizations in Africa are required to address the conflicts in their regions. However, regional entities, such as ECOWAS and SADC present both an opportunity and an obstacle, as demonstrated in Liberia. While it may appear that regional organizations may be in a good position because of the local knowledge they bring to a situation, sub-regional organizations should proceed with caution. Just as sub-regional organizations might know the nuances of a situation, their close historical and political ties with a country may also present the opportunity to bring bias to a situation. As was the case in Liberia, the division in ECOMOG was as much a product of shared history as it was with regional distrust for Nigeria. At the same time, Nigeria held the key to facilitating the final settlement of the Liberian civil war.

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<sup>953</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General..."(S/1994/511), 233; Hanlon (April 1994), 1

<sup>954</sup> UN Security Council, "Twenty-first Progress Report..."(S/1997/90, Annex II); UN Security Council, "Twenty-second Progress Report..." (S/1997/237), para 13.

**In sum, this research project contributes to the small number of studies on the implementation of peace agreements. While, the intervention of the international community and power sharing strategies are widely held as important ingredients in the post-conflict period, existing studies do not sufficiently specify the role played by these two features in advancing or stalling the implementation of peace agreements. In this research project, I have focused on the factors that influence a faction leader's decision in order to begin to understand how implementation processes succeed or fail. The notion of political and military vulnerability adds greater specificity to the character of the implementation environment and also suggests more precise roles for the international community.**

**Appendix 1-A. Centralist Civil Wars since the end of the Cold War.**

<i>Centralist Civil Wars</i> <sup>955</sup>	<i>Unity Governments</i>	<i>Proportional Representation</i>	<i>Territorial Autonomy</i>	<i>Peace?</i>
Angola 1 (Bicesse Accord)	NO	NO	NO	NO
Angola 2 (Lusaka Protocol)	YES	YES	YES	NO
Sierra Leone I	NO	NO	NO	NO
Sierra Leone II	YES	NO	NO	NO
Liberia 1 (Bamako)	NO	Na <sup>956</sup>	YES	YES
Liberia 2 (Banjul 4)	NO	Na	YES	YES
Liberia 3 (Lomé)	NO	Na	YES	YES
Liberia 4 (Yamoussoukro – I)	NO	Na	YES	YES
Liberia 5 (Yamoussoukro – II)	NO	Na	YES	YES
Liberia 6 (Yamoussoukro – III)	NO	Na	YES	YES
Liberia 7 (Yamoussoukro – IV)	NO	Na	YES	YES → NO <sup>957</sup>
Liberia 8 (Cotonou)	YES	Na	YES	YES → NO
Liberia 9 (Geneva)	YES	Na	YES	YES → NO
Liberia 10 (Akosombo)	YES	Na	YES	NO
Liberia 11 (Accra)	YES	Na	YES	NO
Liberia 12 (Abuja I)	YES	YES	YES	YES → NO
Liberia 13 (Abuja II) <sup>958</sup>	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cambodia	NO	YES	NO	NO → YES
Nicaragua	NO	YES	YES	NO → YES
Mozambique	NO	NO	YES → NO <sup>959</sup>	YES
South Africa	YES	YES	YES	YES
Chad	YES	NO	NO	YES
El Salvador	NO	NO	NO	YES
Guatemala	NO	mixed	YES	YES

<sup>955</sup> Sources providing overviews of the conflict are listed in Appendix 1-B.

<sup>956</sup> The peace accord did not address what type of election Liberia would have.

<sup>957</sup> Indicates that the peace accord broke down during the implementation period.

<sup>958</sup> As will be explained in the chapter on Liberia, I focus on just the Liberian peace agreements listed in this table.

<sup>959</sup> Indicates that the implementation period began with a division of territory and ended with consolidation.



## Appendix 1-B. List of Centralized and Regionalist Civil Wars since the Cold War

### Negotiated Settlements Concluded between 1989-1996

Country	Beginning	End	Conflict type
Angola I	1975	1989	CC
Angola II	1989	1991	CC
Angola III	1992	1994	CC
Cambodia	1970	1991	CC
Chad II	1989	1996	CC
El Salvador	1979	1991	CC
Guatemala	1968	1996	CC
Liberia	1989	1996	CC
Mozambique	1981	1992	CC
Nicaragua	1981	1989	CC
Sierra Leone I	1991	1996	CC
South Africa	1983	1991	CC
Azerbaijan	1989	1994	RC
Bosnia	1992	1995	RC
Croatia I	1995	1991	RC
Croatia II	1995	1995	RC
Georgia (Abkhazia)	1992	1994	RC
Georgia (S. Ossetia)	1989	1992	RC
Lebanon II	1975	1989	RC
Moldova	1992	1992	RC
Morocco	1975	1991	RC
Philippines	1972	1996	RC

**CC: Centralist Conflict**

**RC: Regional Conflict**

Sources: The list of negotiated settlements and their start and end dates were obtained from Hartzell (1999). I categorized the conflicts as either regionalist (RC) or centralist (CC) based on research on the cases. Selected references on the conflicts include:

Angola: Brittain (1998); Vines (1999); Hare (1998); Manning (1998)

Cambodia: Brown (1998); Doyle (1995)

Chad: Atlas and Licklider (1999); Azevedo and Nnadozie (1998); Foltz (1995)

El Salvador: Cañas and Dada (1999); Johnston (1995); UN General Assembly (A/46/864/S/23501)

Guatemala: Azpuru (1999); Seider (1998); UN General Assembly (A/50/956)

Liberia: Magyar and Conteh-Morgan (1998); Lyons (1999)

Mozambique: Vines (1996); General Peace Accord of Mozambique

Nicaragua: Close (1999); Spalding (1999)

Philippines: Bertrand (2000); Muyot (1996); Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (1997); Druckman and Green (1995)

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## Appendix 2. Electoral Outcomes

### Proposal I

Province	District	Presidential results					Legislative results				
		Chissano	Pct	Dhlakama	Pct	Valid Votes	Frelimo	Pct	Renamo	Pct	Valid Votes
Cabo Delgado	Pemba	19,824	66	8,274	27	30,117	17,492	60	8,568	30	28,964
Gaza	Xai-Xai	34,055	95	782	2	35,775	30,579	89	868	3	34,523
Inhambane	Inhambane	15,150	84	1,642	9	18,053	12,545	73	1,737	10	17,158
Manica	Chimoio	20,050	36	29,973	53	56,230	16,552	30	32,006	59	54,465
Maputo-c	Maputo	332,725	87	33,405	9	380,461	293,511	79	33,436	9	371,912
Maputo-p	Matola	123,672	89	9,739	7	138,412	105,200	79	10,621	8	133,398
Nampula	Nampula	54,810	50	44,577	41	109,420	46,121	44	47,060	45	105,644
Niassa	Lichinga	16,423	64	7,151	28	25,554	13,557	57	7,446	31	23,812
Sofala	Beria	37,561	25	102,500	69	148,568	32,001	22	100,104	69	145,291
Tete	Tete	24,317	65	9,826	26	37,488	19,170	54	10,333	29	35,806
Zambezia	Quelimane	26,445	41	32,464	50	64,317	22,721	36	32,429	51	63,466
<b>Total</b>		<b>705,032</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>280,333</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>1,044,395</b>	<b>609,449</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>284,608</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>1,014,439</b>

Proposal 2

Province	District (Town)	Presidential results					Legislative results				
		Chissano	Pct	Dhlakama	Pct	Valid Votes	Frelimo	Pct	Renamo	Pct	Valid Votes
Cabo Delgado	Mocimboa da Praia	18,668	64	8,939	31	29,096	15,660	56	9,293	33	28,019
Cabo Delgado	Montepuez	33,872	61	11,924	22	55,143	27,258	52	13,866	27	52,043
Gaza	Chibuto	16,109	102	139	1	15,850	13,591	90	224	1	15,075
Gaza	Chokwe	16,684	95	361	2	17,473	14,324	86	454	3	16,753
Gaza	Mandlakaza	46,613	93	1,169	2	49,962	37,727	79	1,587	3	47,714
Inhambane	Maxixe	26,310	81	3,394	10	32,471	20,082	65	3,858	13	30,821
Inhambane	Vilankulo	31,719	88	1,381	4	36,116	22,639	67	1,952	6	33,958
Manica	Barue (Catandica)	4,635	29	8,917	55	16,076	3,409	22	9,485	61	15,665
Manica	Manica	21,766	53	13,463	33	40,690	17,909	46	15,009	38	39,131
Maputo-p	Manhica	39,696	93	1,138	3	42,585	31,745	81	1,274	3	39,299
Nampula	Angoche	29,623	35	42,145	50	84,479	23,336	29	45,026	55	81,638
Nampula	Ilha de Mocambique	4,422	26	10,752	62	17,320	3,677	22	10,797	66	16,350
Nampula	Monapo	23,186	28	40,763	49	83,929	18,268	22	45,166	56	81,230
Nampula	Nacala	15,319	27	34,761	62	56,469	12,670	23	35,436	65	54,338
Niassa	Cuamba	26,430	78	4,781	14	34,081	21,238	65	5,579	17	32,668
Niassa	Lago (Metangula)	9,768	66	2,768	19	14,783	7,542	54	3,357	24	14,028
Sofala	Dondo	8,164	21	26,943	70	38,619	6,488	18	26,825	73	36,908
Sofala	Marromeu	6,041	30	11,730	58	20,363	4,884	24	12,551	63	20,005
Tete	Moatize	14,355	40	15,684	44	35,765	10,373	30	16,598	48	34,602
Zambezia	Gureu	45,008	66	16,994	25	68,676	36,269	54	19,453	29	66,768
Zambezia	Milange	11,448	14	55,224	68	80,896	7,548	10	56,792	73	77,611
Zambezia	Mocuba	32,504	48	29,863	44	67,663	27,369	41	31,259	47	66,239
<b>Total</b>		<b>482,340</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>343,233</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>938,505</b>	<b>384,006</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>365,841</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>900,863</b>
<b>Total for Proposals 1&amp;2</b>		<b>1,187,372</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>623,566</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>1,982,900</b>	<b>993,455</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>650,449</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>1,915,302</b>

Proposal 3

Province	District (Town)	Presidential results					Legislative results				
		Chissano	Pct	Dhlakama	Pct	Valid Votes	Frelimo	Pct	Renamo	Pct	Valid Votes
Cabo Delgado	Macomia	19,676	77	4,753	19	25,538	16,254	68	4,811	20	23,987
Cabo Delgado	Mueda	30,214	94	785	2	32,022	25,207	84	933	3	30,023
Gaza	Bilene Macia (Macia)	37,935	95	485	1	39,901	29,602	79	880	2	37,295
Inhambane	Homoine	22,800	76	3,947	13	29,991	16,698	59	4,696	17	28,325
Inhambane	Massinga	44,748	76	5,407	9	58,861	28,726	52	6,325	11	55,211
Inhambane	Morrumbene	18,708	57	8,387	25	33,105	13,205	43	9,473	31	30,819
Inhambane	Zavala (Quissico)	29,054	86	1,739	5	33,607	21,082	67	2,009	6	31,553
Manica	Gondola	14,392	31	24,408	53	45,992	11,065	25	26,774	60	44,322
Manica	Manica (Machipanda)	21,766	53	13,463	33	40,690	17,909	46	15,009	38	39,131
Maputo-p	Boane	18,128	90	1,230	6	20,115	14,571	77	1,268	7	19,000
Maputo-p	Namacha	9,021	89	537	5	10,093	7,691	80	546	6	9,565
Nampula	Nacala Velha	5,343	17	18,201	59	30,823	4,296	15	17,976	63	28,337
Nampula	Namapa	31,732	41	21,698	28	76,847	23,936	33	24,800	34	73,004
Nampula	Mogovolas (Namelil)	18,806	28	32,125	47	68,166	14,858	23	35,365	54	65,730
Niassa	Mandimba	10,667	49	7,682	35	21,957	8,203	40	8,195	40	20,259
Niassa	Marrupa	8,479	59	2,296	16	14,251	5,952	43	2,967	22	13,752
Niassa	Mecanhelas (Nsaka)	12,917	55	6,196	27	23,352	9,605	44	7,461	34	21,857
Sofala	Buzi	1,742	4	39,338	87	45,185	1,335	3	40,194	91	44,280
Sofala	Gorongosa	3,250	24	7,495	56	13,410	2,294	18	8,197	63	13,073
Sofala	Cheringoma (Inhaminga)	175	3	5,558	88	6,335	104	2	5,905	94	6,298
Sofala	Nhamitanda	4,078	11	28,440	78	36,533	2,982	9	28,561	82	34,978
Tete	Mutarara (Nhamaiabwe)	5,122	15	23,927	72	33,393	3,530	11	25,081	77	32,453
Tete	Cahora-Bassa (Songo)	12,136	81	1,571	11	14,936	9,648	67	1,821	13	14,444
Tete	Angonia (Ulongue)	17,992	28	30,989	49	63,218	12,195	20	36,411	60	60,537
Zambezia	Alto Molocue	16,433	28	35,657	61	58,365	13,720	24	38,166	66	57,552
Zambezia	Morrumbula	8,842	15	41,696	69	60,813	6,986	12	45,800	76	60,087
Zambezia	Pebane	12,931	31	22,924	54	42,078	11,015	27	24,166	58	41,508
<b>Total</b>		<b>437,087</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>390,934</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>979,577</b>	<b>332,669</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>423,790</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>937,380</b>
<b>Total for Proposals 1,2,3</b>		<b>1,624,459</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>1,014,500</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>2,962,477</b>	<b>1,326,124</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>1,074,239</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>2,852,682</b>

**Notes:** The data on election results come from the 1997 publication by the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE). The list of cities and towns to be included in the 1998 local elections is obtained from the Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Issue 18, June 1997.

The organization of the results refer to three different proposals for local elections. Proposal 1 refers to the proposal to include only the provinces' capital cities. Proposal 2 refers to the addition of 12 cities requested by Renamo. Proposal 3 refers to an additional 27 cities Renamo requested.

The percentages do not sum to 100 because only the results of Chissano and Frelimo and Dhlakama and Renamo are reported. By its own admission, the STAE report contains errors, which may explain why the results in a couple of cases sum to more than 100.

The proportion of votes for Chissano, Dhlakama, Frelimo, and Renamo are calculated based on valid votes.

Occasionally, the STAE presents results for the city separately from the rest of the district. In these cases, I have reported the results of the city, as the requirements for participation in the local elections favored cities. Cities are affected by this: Chibuto, Chokwe, Lichinga.

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